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INTRODUCTION
 
The rapid pace of technological progress has been accompanied by
 
an increasing attempt to foresee and evaluate the consequences of new
 
technological applications. On the one hand, we recognize that technology
 
has yielded great benefits. But at the same time it is becoming evident
 
that not all of the impacts of technological innovation are beneficial
 
and that some can lead to quite serious, and often unexpected, hazards.
 
The concept of "technology assessment" represents an attempt to understand
 
and appraise the results of technological progress in order to allow the
 
development of policies for the rational application of technology.
 
Studies of the meaning of "technology assessment" and its effective
 
implementation have been a major part of the research effort of the Program
 
of Policy Studies. Work in similar areas has been carried on in other
 
academic institutions, in some government agencies, and even in the Congress
 
where hearings held by several committees have investigated various approaches
 
to the assessment function.
 
But just as the actual assessment process has been characterized by
 
a high degree of fragmentation among various organizations and individuals,
 
so the study of the assessment process has also been performed by indi­
viduals who are often isolated from the thoughts and ideas of others investi­
gating the problem. This fragmentation has adversely affected the quality
 
of work in the field; the lack of an effective base structure of definitions
 
and concepts has caused each investigator to carry out his research as
 
though no one had examined any aspects of the problem previously. This 
is, of course, one of the problems of any new area of study; the development
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of a common ground from which to discuss important substantive problems
 
is perhaps a sign of maturity.
 
With this in mind, the staff of the Program of Policy Studies felt
 
that the institution of a seminar series dealing with certain aspects of
 
the technology assessment process would provide an opportunity for some
 
of those interested in the problem to get together and to discuss their
 
ideas in a relatively informal atmosphere. Such an exchange of view­
points would, it was hoped, lead to an understanding of the ways-in
 
which others approach the concept of technology assessment in order to
 
create a kind of background for further study in the area.
 
Participants were invited from academic,;industrial and governmental
 
organizations in an attempt to gather as broad a spectrum of ideas and
 
opinions as possible. Four sessions were held in the Winter and Spring
 
of 1969. At each the author of a prepared paper moderated about two
 
hours of discussion among the participants. The general chairman of the
 
series was Louis H. Mayo, Vice President for Advanced Policy Studies and
 
Director of the Program of Policy Studies in Science and Technology at
 
The George Washington University.
 
Clarence Danhof, a Senior Staff Scientist of the Program of Policy
 
Studies, presented the first paper on-"Assessment -Information Systems"
 
which called attention to some of the problems involved in obtaining the
 
information necessary for the assessment function to proceed. The role
 
of the technical expert-and role of the public were considered at some
 
length in the paper and the ensuing discussion.
 
The second paper was prepared by Richard A. Carpenter, Senior
 
Specialist in Science and Technology for the Science Policy Research
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Division of the -LegislativeReference Service of the Library of Congress,
 
and dealt with "Technology Assessment and the Congress." It considered
 
the needs of the Congress and the present role of the Legislative Reference
 
Service in fulfilling some of those needs. The lively discussion ranged
 
from an exchange on the partiality or impartiality of committee hearings
 
to the position of the engineer in assessment. This breadth in the topics
 
discussed was perhaps somewhat more extensive than might have been expected
 
but merely serves to indicate the wide scope of the problem.
 
Harold P. Green, Professor of Law and Director of the Law; Science
 
and Technology Program of The George Washington University National Law
 
Center, followed with a discussion of the "Adversary Process in Technology
 
Assessment." The paper provoked spirited debate on Dr. Green's proposal
 
to establish an organization whose purpose would be to determine and 
publicize the detrimental aspects of technological applications.
 
Finally, Louis H. Mayo considered "The Management of Technology 
Assessment." He stressed his view of the tbtal problem approach to 
technology assessment and once again the discussion covered numerous
 
topics. Consensus was not reached in this or any of the other discussions,
 
but then, consensus was not the goal of these sessions.
 
Summaries of the major points raised in the discussion sessions were
 
prepared by Raphael Kasper. It should be noted that this seminar series 
was not intended as a final and completed study of the assessment function,
 
but rather as a series of exchanges which could provide a basis for further
 
examination of the problem.
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1: ASSESSMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
 
Clarence H. Danhof N - 030269=40302 
Long before man had begun to make purposefuliuse of fire, he,
 
no doubt, had accumulated a stock of transmittable information compre­
hending effective and ineffective, safe and hazardous materials and
 
methods that related to his interests in accomplishing an objective-­
such as securing food. The knowledge 6f materials and methods that
 
yielded desired results constituted the applied technology and was
 
maintained since it was in constant use. Experiments with materials
 
or methods that yielded results of neither positive or negative
 
significance no doubt tended to be forgotten. But special efforts
 
were made to retain knowledge of materials or methods that proved so
 
harmful in the results of use as not to be repeated voluntarily. The
 
taboo served to communicate and preserve such knowledge.
 
The first action credited to man in the book of Genesis is the
 
naming of all the animals and birds--the foundation of an information
 
system. Of greater interest is the third action there recorded which
 
was an effort to extend the available knowledge of resources with regard
 
to their suitability for some desired use, in this case food. The
 
problem was the relatively simple and straightforward one of determining
 
whether the fruit of a certain tree would, when eaten, a) provide
 
satisfaction and b) yield undesirable consequences. The existence of a
 
taboo against the use of the fruit of the tree suggested that earlier
 
experience had been unfavorable. The possibility of undesired results
 
was therefore of particular importance, inviting consideration of
 
whatever advice might be found. Adventuresome Eve sought the advice
 
of the serpent who offered himself as an expert. The serpent assured
 
Eve that "eating the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the
 
garden" would not produce death but instead "your eyes shall be opened
 
and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." 1
 
The advice was of compelling appeal. Eve did violate the taboo
 
and ate, and called upon Adam to confirm her satisfied reaction. Three
 
consequences are recorded:
 
1) The immediate result was desirable--the fruit
 
was good.
 
2) Adam and Eve became aware of their nakedness
 
and invented clothes--an intermediate result
 
subject to a variety of explanations.
 
3) Adam and Eve did encounter evil--they lost Eden.
 
A technological system together with its related
 
culture, disappeared to be replaced by another.
 
In modern parlance, Eve was engaged in the assessment of new
 
technology, a process which man has undertaken countless times over
 
in his history. Though Eve's assessment effort was, viewed superficially,
 
a simple -operation, it had all the elements common to the modern process.
 
These are:
 
1. 	 Initiative in identifying a solution to a felt problem
 
or an opportunity to gain a desirable objective, both
 
requiring exploration of an area involving some unknowns.
 
2. 	 The application of expert, specialized knowledge to the 
problem at issue, so that possible gains and hazards can 
be defined as clearly as possible. 
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3. 	A new technology may yield good or bad results or, frequently,
 
a mixture of both. The undesired consequences may affect
 
the immediate user, a large group, or all of mankind. Such
 
undesired consequences may appear immediately, in which case
 
cause and effect relationships are clear. The consequences
 
may also emerge slowly, perhaps within the memory of a
 
generation or two. The consequences, however, may become
 
evident over so prolonged a period of time as to be perceptible
 
in long retrospect so that cause and effect relationships can
 
be ascertained only by very complex analytical techniques, if
 
at all. In Eve's case, the immediate and intermediate reactions
 
were met by user reaction but the long range impact involved
 
higher authority.
 
The Assessment Process in the Contemporary Society:
 
The development of a new technology is, in the modern situation,
 
usually a far more complex process than the determination of the edibility
 
of a fruit. The development process is part of an elaborate effort to
 
search out new knowledge and to appraise such knowledge for possible
 
application to desirable objectives and the avoidance of those that are
 
undesirable. The-provisions made by society for dealing with these hazards
 
has 	grown substantially but there is increasing evidence that the machinery 
is far from what it might or should be.
 
The assessment of new technology is an integral part of the process
 
of accomplishing technological change. For our purposes the development
 
of a technology occurs in two distinct stages in each of which the assess­
ment process differs in significant ways. In the pre-introduction stage 
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of development, it is the developer who, -seeking to find a desirable
 
use for a technique or material, applies tests he deems'relevant to
 
determine both the positive and negative characteristics. In the
 
application stage, it is the user who applies such tests, employing
 
what may be somewhat different criteria. An essential part of the
 
assessment process, then involves the using public which provides a
 
large part of the effort in seeking those conditions under which the
 
benefits of the new technology can be best aftained. Such efforts
 
continue over a prolonged period of time, thereby permitting the longer
 
term effects of the new technology to make themselves apparent.
 
The decision by the developer to make the innovation available to the
 
public through the market or otherwise is presumably made with some con­
fidence that it will perform a desired service,at an acceptable cost-benefit
 
ratio and that it will do so without undesired consequences if prescribed
 
conditions of use are followed. In the usually long process of developing
 
an innovation, numerous actions have occurred that yielded negative or
 
undesired results. Both contribute to the originator's knowledge of
 
conditions under which the innovation must be applied to secure hoped-for
 
results.
 
The decision to introduce may have rested wholly on the basis of
 
information developed and assessed within the originating organization.
 
In many cases, however, outside assistance has been sought. The device
 
may then have been user (market) tested. It may have been submitted to
 
examination by experts for conformity to standards established by an
 
industry-wide organization, by an independent testing organization or by
 
a government agency. In the case of new drugs, and certain food or food­
related items, it will have been clinically tested and then submitted to
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the Food and Drug Administration for its approval. When finally offered
 
to the public,.,the considerations favoring public experimentation with
 
the innovation are substantial. No unfavorable results accompanying
 
use have been identified or if some have been it is believed that they
 
can be eliminated, or controlled within acceptable levels, by advice and
 
warnings controlling the circumstances of application. The first stage
 
of assessment has been completed. -
The central characteristic of the second stage-of assessment is the
 
involvement of the general-public. No testing underlimited and possibly
 
simulated conditions can completely comprehend all the possible cir­
cumstances of use. Public application is likely to present a more com­
prehensive range of possible applications.under widely varying circumstances
 
,and hence to.yield a wider variety of results, both.positive and negative.
 
Some undesirable effects will emerge under unanticipated conditions and
 
only over a more or less prolonged period of time. Buyers can be expected
 
to communicate their opinions of the innovation to the originator in
 
numerous ways. The rates of purchase will indicate acceptance with more
 
or less unqualifi4d enthusiasm as may also the appearance of competitive
 
suppliers. Potential users may, on the other hand, cease to purchase or
 
may return the device if warranty arrangements had been made.
 
We are concerned here, however, not with performance that falls
 
short of expectations nor with adverse effects that are merely unpleasant
 
to individual users. Our concern is rather with adverse effects of the
 
new technology and the relationships that follow between users and origi­
nators. Such adverse effects may result from the failure of the origi­
nator to provide proper materials and instructions or to anticipate
 
results that could reasonably have been forecast. Undesirable results
 
may also follow because of actions by users beyond the reasonable
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anticipation of the originator or sponsor. It is true that new tech­
nologies are sometimes viewed and accepted with great caution, particu­
larly when they constitute new complex systems that make fixed capital
 
investments obsolescence and require substantial capital investments
 
to apply. Other new technologies are quickly accepted and may then be
 
applied less critically and with less discrimination than occurred in
 
the late stages of the originator's testing. Such was the case with,
 
among many others, penicillin and other early types of antibiotics,
 
some medical techniques such as X-rays, ovarectomies, appendectomies,
 
and tonsillectomies, and such pesticides as DDT. As undesirable effects
 
of application accumulate in the professional literature, are summarized
 
and evaluated, constraints develop. This occurred in the past with regard
 
to some use of arsenic and lead and seems now to be occurring with regard
 
to many uses of mercury compounds. This process of re-evaluation may
 
proceed solely between users and the sponsor, with the expert group
 
involved, or may also involve non-experts as in the current controversy
 
over the use of DDT.
 
In this second stage, the problems of observing, recording, analyzing
 
and communicating the results of application may be more complex than in
 
the pre-introduction stage since more or less numerous appliers are in­
volved and the circumstances of application may vary widely from those of
 
the first testing stage. The probability of unanticipated adverse effects
 
therefore increases at the same time that the observation, recording and
 
analysis of such adverse effects--internal to the originating group in
 
the first stage--becomes difficult because of the numerous scattered
 
participants and the need to establish cause and effect relationships
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in what are frequently exceedingly complex situations that operate over
 
long periods of time.
 
One broad reaction by the society is to require the sponsors of
 
new technology to undertake more elaborate pre-introduction tests. Such
 
efforts are strongly constrained in many cases by consumer interest in
 
enjoying the apparent benefits, the possibility of the existence of a
 
"moral issue" in the withholding of a new technology,2 
as well as great
 
reluctance to discourage the innovative process as by increasing its
 
costs. In a society in which growth is a basic desiderata and in which
 
it is assumed that problems can be solved by technological discovery, the
 
withholding of a new technology even for a limited time, tends to be
 
viewed as an offense to society.
 
Adverse Effects: Death.
 
The most earnestly avoided adverse effect of new technology is human
 
death. Death is also one of the most carefully recorded events in our
 
society. Since protection against controllable or avoidable death is a
 
legal right, the cause is assigned of each death and reported to
 
responsible authorities. Assurance that such recording is made follows
 
from the fact that burial, in most jurisdictions, requires a permit which
 
in turn requires that certification as to the cause of death has been
 
made by a prescribed official--an attending physician, a public medical
 
officer, or in their absence a coroner who may call upon experts and
 
upon a jury to assist him. American society has a complex organization
 
to investigate possible causal relationships between a new technology
 
and death. Evidence will be accumulated by qualified experts for
 
government authorities or professional groups--rapidly as in the case 
of Thalidomide, much more slowly as in the realtionship of emphysema and
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cigarettes. In any case, observations concerning possible relationships
 
accumulate as reports published in the professional or technical journals
 
and occasionally reporduced in the popular press.
 
The approach is inherently slow since even a number of suspected
 
deaths may yield no more than a hypothesis regarding a causal relationship.3
 
The reporting- system lends itself to statistical compilation and analysis
 
in the search for a causal relationship or the 'confirmation of a hypothesis. 
The results of such statistical analysis may stimulate expert investigation
 
on a substantial scale.
 
Adverse Effects: Personal Injury.
 
Many new technologies present few, if any, intrinsic dangers. Many
 
others can be adapted to include built-in safety provisions or require only
 
simple instructions and cautions that, it is assumed, will assure safe
 
-usage given a public of reasonably high levels of functional literacy.
 
The benefits of other technologies are obtained indirectly in which the
 
public secures the services of the technology through an expert and does
 
not itself control its application.
 
A death attributable to the use of new technology represents a
 
failure of the efforts of the originator and, possibly, of the larger
 
society to anticipate hazards, to impress the user of the existence of a
 
recognized danger, or to provide methods whereby the desired services can
 
be obtained safely. It is an inherent part of the process of developing
 
a new technology that hazards be identified and that the procedures 
involving hazards be eliminated or minimized. The originator will have 
acquired or have available a stock of information on hazards and their
 
avoidance. In some areas, the originator--and the public--have available 
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testing services that provide for the application of standards developed 
from experience that provide constraints. These form the basis for the 
formulation of rules for safe application of which the user should,be 
fully informed. It remains true, however, that in public usage, the 
circumstances of application will be-more varied and on occasion less 
guarded than was the case in-the originators" laboratories. If a 
hazard exists, sooner or later some member of the public will experience 
it and the critical question is that of frequency. Data on injuries by 
type of technology are by no means as accurate as death data., although 
causal relationships are in many areas more readily established. The 
collection of data on public experience is then an essential function,
 
contributing to the continuing development of the technology and to the
 
procedures governing its safe use. One of its products is the development
 
of data on probabilities of adverse reactions, these being essential to
 
the determination of the risks being accepted in the usage of any given
 
technologies.
 
Such analysis of experience has led to a variety of public actions
 
to assure safety. These may be categorized as follows:
 
1) Legal prohibition of the use of a technology, e.g., opium, LSD,
 
lead for water piping. (Note the failure of the effort to
 
prohibit the beverage uses of alcohol.)
 
2) Legal prescriptions of the conditions under which a technology
 
may be used, e.g., prescription drugs, electrical and plumbing
 
installations, nuclear energy, X-rays, aircraft, vessels.
 
Generally, such regulation utilizes licensing, certification
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and inspection procedures and typically is applied to situa- -
tions in which benefits of the technology are provided to tha 
public through an intermediate supplier of the service. 
3) Legal requirements that the user be informed of risks and of 
limitations on use procedures, e.g., presticides, cigarettes.. 
4) Legal requirements that a given technology must be used as part 
of a system, e.g., aircraft, certain regulations pertaining to 
air and water pollution, federal auto safety legislation. (Note 
that licensing procedures cited under #2 above may include such 
positive requirements.) 
Adverse Effects: Collective Injury.
 
In the preceding discussion, attention centered upon injury to a per­
son or relatively small number of persons occurring within a relatively
 
short period of time as a result of some direct contact with a technology.
 
Adverse effects can also be experienced by persons--possibly very large
 
numbers--because the environment within which they live includes within
 
it adverse forces that may cumulate into uncontrollable and eventually
 
disaster proportions. Many problems of this nature have arisen in the
 
past but have been successfully dealt with, as in the case of develop­
ment of public waste disposal systems or in the substitution of processed
 
and chlorinated water for water naturally "pure." Indeed our society
 
rests upon past successes of-this nature.
 
Such "fixes" will no doubt continue to be achieved but them is much 
evidence that they will become more difficult. The possibility also 
exists that both because the nature of a solution to a problem or because 
no technological fix is available, society may find itself forced to change 
its structure and values if it is to deal with some adverse effects of 
new technology, the alternative being disaster.
 
It is the long range effect that presents particular problems,
 
partly because of the difficulties of determining the causes of adverse
 
effects and partly because the values by which adverse effects are judged
 
are not a matter on which consensus is easily obtained. Many a new
 
technology has made possible the achievement of an immediate goal only
 
to produce over a more or less prolonged period of time new problems of
 
great difficulty. Viewed broadly, many of the problems arise from the
 
very success of man's efforts to expand his technology which has created 
problems that threaten his achievements if not the existence of society 
- itself as now structured. Excessive population growth rates is one of 
the more obvious aspects of the problem. 
The experience of Adam and Eve is again relevant. That they were 
correct in their assessment of a new technology--up to a point--is 
obvious. Man has subsequently greatly elaborated upon their procedures. 
The disaster that befell Adam and Eve we may wish to consign to myth or 
fable--or to the wrath of God. If it were a unique experience we might
 
be justified in the view that it holds no significance for us. It was,
 
however, not unique but rather, as Arnold Toynbee recounts in some detail,4
 
a frequent experience over human history. We know little about such
 
societal catastrophes. Numerous forces were no doubt at play. That
 
technological failure was a component of many if not most seems a
 
reasonable hypothesis. 
If man's increasing mastery of his environment has expanded--enormously 
in the Western world of the 20th century--man's relationship to that 
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environment has at the same time become increasingly brittle and fragile.
 
Man's facile assumption that he can manipulate his environment to his
 
to his own exploitative objectives without changing that environment in
 
some basic and perhaps critical characteristics is an assumption that
 
is increasingly dubious and perhaps perilous. Man's ecology clearly has
 
changed--and we are increasingly recognizing that.not all the changes are
 
improvements. If then, man increasingly cannot assume his "natural"
 
environment as a given--because he has changed it--enormously important
 
questions arise. It is the nature of the man-made environment that
 
requires analysis and careful monitoring.
 
In this category of assessment problems, the originator of the
 
technology has passed from the scene as a central figure since technology
 
is now thoroughly accepted and highly valued for its benefits. The
 
users and beneficiaries of the technology now constitute a vestedvinterest.
 
The technology is no longer new but is thoroughly embedded as a component
 
of the society.
 
The problems presented by the technology are dealt with by procedures
 
that differ sufficiently from systems previously discussed to warrant
 
designation as a third type or stage of assessment. It is in these areas
 
that the role of the expert and particularly his interaction with the
 
public is least developed and most uncertain.
 
Information Systems and the Role of the Expert:
 
The preceding effort to define the range of assessment problems gives
 
emphasis to what is undoubtedly obvious. Since the days of Eve, man has
 
relied upon expert observation and analysis as the foundation of its
 
efforts to deal with technological change. As a result of the growth
 
of knowledge being probed for its application potentials, the expert has
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become both quantitatively and qualitatively more important than in
 
Eve's day. The expert ferrets out potentially useful technology, is a
 
principal source of advice and persuasion, and assesses results, by serving
 
as gatherers, synthesizers, and interpreters of observational data and
 
analysts of causal relationships.
 
Society is dependent upon its stock of qualified experts:
 
1) To ask relevant questions and record their observations.
 
2) To communicate with each other to confirm their observations and
 
to establish'magnitudes. (It is here that the growth of knowledge
 
has produced numerous problems of information organization and
 
retrieval. These problems'affect the expert function but only
 
as such do they relate to the assessment process.5)
 
3) 	 To summarize their finds; preferably'as a consensus but in the
 
absence of a consensus, then as to areas of agreement and
 
disagreement.
 
4) To indicate the significance of these findings to an audience
 
capable of determining that action is or is not warranted.
 
On its part, society must provide such an audience, providing in so
 
doing a source of guidance as to areas of concern, an opportunity to
 
determine areas of agreement and disagreement and in the process reappraise
 
the nature of the values being considered.
6
 
In the case of Eve, the expert did not hesitate to communicate
 
enthusiastically his concept of the advantages his advice offered his
 
client. In this respect his performance differed little from that to be
 
found in much contemporary popular scientific literature.7 The experts
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did include some predictions as to the long range consequences that might
 
follow and of their effect on man's society. As experts do, the serpent
 
left to his client the decision as to the long range values she wished
 
to pursue, and the evaluation of the gains that might be made as compared
 
with the risks she was prepared to assume. -Then as now, expertise does
 
not carry with it any special qualifications as to values one wishes to
 
8
 
pursue.
 
As the expert becomes more important, societies develop methods of
 
dealing with him. A first step is to establish and protect confidence
 
requiring some procedure to distinguish between the qualified and the
 
charlatan. In both the routine exercise of expertise and in the production
 
of new knowledge, a variety of checks exist though all of them tend to
 
rely on the peer system whereby experts certify to the competence and the
 
quality of work of others in their field. A major problem not easily
 
dealt with is that of the confidence merited by an expert group, a
 
question that from time to time requires non-expert examination of the
 
assumptions and methods upon which the expert's claimed knowledge is
 
based.9
 
Far more difficult is the question of the use that the nonexpert
 
public should make of the expert. It is a well established principle
 
at least in policy-making.1 0
 that the "expert be on tap but not on top," 

In form that principle is well observed; in practice there are difficulties.
 
The public cannot expect to obtain from the expert what it feels it needs
 
unless it is able to ask questions that will elicit appropriate answers.
 
Recall that Eve's source of expert opinion is referred to, after the fact,
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as a serpent. Considering the consequences to her of the expert's
 
advice, Eve's opinion was no doubt justified. 1 ' It is at least possible 
that the relationship might have been more satisfactory had Eve asked her 
expert some questions that pushed the analysis into a more critical 
consideration of long range consequences. In the area of assessment, as
 
in others, effective relationships between the experts and the public rest
 
upon interactions in which each urges upon the other consideration of its
 
concepts of problems and values. Flexibility in this respect would
 
seem to require an avoidance of "officially" sanctioned expertise and
 
other forms of rigidity that hinder the free flow of observations and
 
analyses and that may lead too quickly to consensuses in which values and
 
underlying assumptions remain unquestioned.12
 
The nature of the problems differ with social experience with the
 
involved. Where legal responsibilities have been assigned, reporting
 
procedures develop into well-structured systems, as in the case of
 
human fatalities. This is not to say that the operation of that system
 
might not be improved but the weaknesses that appear to exist lie with
 
the discretion exercised by the expert observers. We can reasonably
 
doubt that the cause of all deaths is determined with any high degree of
 
accuracy. However, from the point of view of assessing the technological
 
source of fatalities, it seems likely that over time significant experi­
ence will be identified and reported with reasonable promptness. In any
 
case, very considerable progress has been made.
 
The reporting of technology-related injuries is less satisfactory
 
with the exception of those areas for which specific responsibilities
 
has been legally assigned. In the case of aircraft fatalities, pharma­
cological, and industrial accidents, legal requirements and compensation
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provisions seem to assure substantially accurate reporting, and to
 
stimulate efforts to reduce hazards. In other areas, the reporting
 
procedures are less satisfactory, data collection is frequently hap­
hazard, legal and financial liabilities are'uncertain with the role of
 
human negligency a source of confusion. Corrective measures are usually
 
of the advisory and educational type.
 
In areas involving collective safety, significant steps towards
 
assignment of legal responsibility recently-have been taken relative to
 
air and water pollution. In both cases the evidence has been sufficiently
 
persuasive to support such action but much data collecting'remains to be
 
done before the precise nature of the problems is known or corrective
 
procedures fully developed. Meanwhile, data collecting is enhanced
 
through the enforcement machinery provided. Establishment of standards
 
provides a guide for observation and measurement as well as a focus for
 
debate over'the values involved.
 
Other areas may follow the pattern by which human waste pollutions
 
are controlled as for air pollution, solid waste, noise, thermal problems,
 
and scenery. Environmental control is a concept of some appeal but the
 
wide variety of problems and values comprehended suggest that the approach
 
will be component by component. These and related areas--such as the
 
population problem--are in the stage in which information is developed
 
and exchanged principally within the research community and with those
 
members of the public already convinced of the seriousness of the problems.
 
Some members of these groups are carrying out the functions of synthesizers
 
and publicists and some are organized for the purpose of influencing
 
legislation.
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In a mature communication structure, the process of observing,
 
collecting, and disseminating information will reflect the interests
 
and values of the responsible organization. Even when a formal organi­
zation exists with responsibility to act upon technology-generated
 
problems, informal observations and reporting continue as an important
 
input to the assessment process. Indeed, while the. formal organization
 
may conduct considerable research on experience in public usage, private
 
groups remain an important source of information and assessment. This
 
"role of private groups is particularly important when there are differences
 
in the values held.by the responsible agency and those held by private
 
groups. In the case of DDT, for example, the responsible agency has
 
contented itself with controlling adverse effects of usage by requiring
 
cautionary labels. Some private groups believe that sufficient evidence
 
has been accumulated to demonstrate clearly that the continuing use of:
 
the material is too dangerous to non-human life, and eventually to human
 
life, to countenance. A principal problem of such groups is to find an
 
audience that can react to its findings in such manner as to contribute
 
to the formulation of public policy. In this instance, the private groups
 
are by-passing the cognizant agencies of the federal government. They are
 
presenting their case instead to state regulatory agencies and may
 
eventually appeal to that fundamental constitution--the court.
 
If, as in the case of DDT, the experts disagree as to the scientifically
 
determined facts and the economic values involved the public-finds itself
 
in the position of determining the basis for the disagreement. Frequently
 
the disagreement rests upon inadequate knowledge and the solution is a
 
continuation of research on the problem. The public then must recognize
 
that the best available scientific knowledge at any given point of time
 
is subject to change--and sometimes very drastic change. Permissible
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levels of exposure--as to radiation or pesticides--are, for example
 
frequently judgements by experts rather than well documented determina­
tions. We must expect these to change over time though the direction of
 
change is difficult to predict. In such common situations, expert disa­
greements stem from interpretations made regarding the significance of
 
available knowledge and the crux of an assessment is one of the values
 
applied, frequently implicitly rather than explicitly. In the DDT case,
 
as in many others, there exists a conflict of values. The knowledge
 
expert can be granted no special competence as an expert in the values
 
held or in the choice of values that a public group or society as a whole
 
may take. The public cannot and'should not passively accept the values
 
of the expert as its own.
 
Conclusion:
 
One can argue that the apparent evolution of assessment procedures
 
is proceeding along lines that will provide adequate control machinery
 
when the need is clearly demonstrated. This may mean a continuation of
 
our traditional approach of responding to a crisis or near crisis. The
 
nation has done better than that in some areas, but only time will tell
 
if we have been properly alert in others.
 
If the earlier comment regarding the fragility of man's control
 
over his environment is sound, then our society faces problems of an
 
urgency not easily measured but assuredly reflecting the very rapid rate
 
of scientific and technological change. We may, in fact, fact the
 
prospect of irreparable crisis. Even the possibility of such a crisis
 
suggests that reliance upon the slow evolution of public acceptance of
 
responsibility is unsafe.
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In this situation, recognition should be given to the greatest
 
difficulty facing expert observers in those areas that lack a formal
 
information structure,particularly those that are viewed in a long time
 
perspective. The problem is not that there is a total lack of expert
 
warnings of possible undesirable developments. Our society--as most
 
others--has a fair number of prognosticators who serve as Jeremiahs. 
The difficulty is the absence of a platform and an audience before whom 
their assessments can be given adequate and authroitative consideration in
 
the light of long-range public policy. The President's Scientific Advisory
 
Commission, the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of
 
Engineering and similar organizations have acquired important though
 
limited functions in providing authoritative reviews of expert thought.
 
In the last analysis, the problem is one of identifying the social
 
significance in an assessment situation. At this stage the assessment
 
is no longer solely a function of the expert but involves the values and
 
objectives of the society and frequently the conflicting v4lues and
 
objectives of groups within the society. The problem is then one to be
 
resolved through the political structure of society. In that process the
 
role of the expert as advocate is no doubt necessary since he is most
 
knowledgeable and most involved. As advocate, however, he presents
 
special problems of credibility to the interested public, particularly
 
since he frequently if not normally takes positions well beyond what
 
can be documented by information generally accepted as true. Securing
 
public acceptance of an action affecting its values and objectives is
 
not difficult if there is a clear threat to life. In situations where
 
the threat is a low statistical probability remote in time, securing
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public action is far more difficult. It is with regard to such problems
 
that the nation's information system is precariously ineffective. One
 
approach might be a periodic, authoritative, public review of the nation's
 
progress toward its scientific and technical goals including in those
 
goals the protection of its hard-won achievements.
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Footnotes
 
1 Genesis, Chapter 3, v. 4-5, King James Version.
 
2 As occurred in the case of the Salk vaccine, See House Committee 
on Science and Astronautics, 91st Congress, 1st session. Technical 
Information for Congress A report by the Science Policy Research Division­
of the Legislative Service, 1969, p. 321. 
3 It is not suggested that the system is beyond criticism. For
 
extensive criticism with reference to the evaluation of new drugs see
 
U.S. Senate, 89th Congress, 2nd session, Committee on Government Opera­
tions, Interagency Drug Coordination, 1966, particularly 102-262.
 
4 Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, 6 vol. Oxford University
 
Press, 1934. Unfortunately Toynbee's analysis pays scant attention to
 
technological factors.
 
5 These problems are surveyed and assessed in National Academy of
 
Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Scientific and Technical
 
Communication, 1969.
 
6 Philip Ritterbush writes: "The problems in environmental improve­
ment at the federal government level should not be characterized as deriving
 
from too little scientific knowledge, but from the failure to devise a
 
suitable forum within which conflicting expert views could be reconciled
 
and comprehensive program planning could be carried on...." op. cit.
 
p. 112 in "Environment and Historical Paradox," General Systems, Yearbook
 
of the Society for-General Systems Research, XIII (1968) p. 112.
 
7 At the present time, the reporting of the possible results of new 
and hoped for knowledge in genetics is markedly characterized by prophecy. 
See, e.g., Albert Rosenfeld, The Second Genesis, Prentice-Hall, 1969. 
8 A still useful analysis is Harold J. Laski, "The Limitations of
 
the Expert," Harpers, 160, December 1950, pp. 101-110.
 
9 Joseph Jastrow (ed.) The Story of Human Error, New York, 1936, makes 
for disquieting reading in this respect.
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The aphorism is attributed to Harold Laski by Paul H. Appleby, 
"Making Sense Out of Things in General," Public Administrationi Review, XXII,
 
December 1962, p. 175.
 
11 Note too that the serpent was severly punished by higher authority.
 
Genesis, Chapter 3, v. 14-15.
 
12 For one of many such, see Ashley Schiff, Fire and Water: Scientific
 
Heresy in the Forest Service, Harvard University Press, 1962.
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Discussion of ASSESSMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
 
The discussion centered on three general topics (the role of experts,
 
the adequacy and destination of information, and the role of the public)
 
and touched briefly on several others. As might have been expected, there
 
was little consensus but a broad range of opinions was presented by the
 
twenty-six discussants.
 
Role of the Expert:
 
The seminar participants differed on the extent to which reliance
 
should be placed upon "experts" in obtaining the information necessary
 
to perform assesments. The views ranged from those of a Congressional
 
staff member who believed that only "specialists and experts" could solve
 
the problems of technology assessment to those of others who indicated
 
some reservations concerning the great dependence upon experts which
 
seems to characterize assessments. A university professor was concerned
 
with the fact that experts can, and often do, differ on matters of
 
substance. "I'm sure," he stated, "that we've all seen a number of cases
 
in which both sides have witnesses with expert credentials and yet come
 
up with completely opposed views." A government official raised the 
problem of
 
finding unbiased experts. It seems to me that the experts
 
who are most capable of making technological assessments
 
are liable to be in the employ of bureaus or companies that
 
are interested in furthering technology.
 
This developmental bias of experts often makes it difficult to find
 
technically competent qpponents of a particular technological application.
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In the words of another university professor:
 
I suspect, today,that there are at least several areas
 
of technology which are controversial, at least to the
 
laymaR, with respect to which it is almost impossible
 
to find an expert who will take the anti-technological
 
point of view so that the negative view never gets
 
articulated, whether it's sound or not.
 
One suggestion for overcoming the "biased expert" problem was
 
provided by an agency representative who held that greater use of
 
university scientists in an assessment role might overcome the predominant
 
influence of development-minded industrial scientists. The problem of
 
locating impartial experts was, in his words,
 
one of the best arguments that I know of for us having
 
a broad scale federal support of research in the
 
universities and gathering up a lot of these functions
 
(of obtaining information for assessment processes) within
 
the free play of the intellectual market place in the
 
academic sphere. There you do have the whole tradition of
 
public disclosure and public discussion--in fact,the whole
 
system works on the public nature of the exchange.
 
The universities are, in part, shielded from those market pressures which
 
make it difficult, if not impossible, for industries or agencies to under­
take candid and-impartial assessments.
 
Some of the participants, including a university scientist, noted a
 
serious communications .problem that exists between technologists and non­
technologists. There is a need, in the view of an agency official, to
 
"vulgarize" technology ("and that meant in the best sense") in order to
 
make it understandable, "if not to the man in the street, at least to the
 
average Congressman." The use of the mass media was suggested as a means
 
of increasing communications between the scientific and lay communities,
 
though it was pointed out that journalists possess a vested interest in
 
their quest for higher circulation which often leads to inaccuracy in
 
the pursuit of sensation.
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Part of the concern with the reliance on experts was based on
 
the contention, presented by a government agency representative, that
 
the experimental skills of scientists and engineers do not necessarily
 
coincide with those skills necessary for identifying and analyzing the
 
consequences of new or existing technologies. A university scientist
 
disagreed and contended that, in fact, the experimental research outlook
 
may give the best possible information for assessment purposes. Although
 
one of those present attempted to minimize the problem of just who the
 
experts are by holding that experts only make suggestions and recommenda­
tions and do not perform the actual assessment, another took issue with
 
this point:
 
I think that to the extent that we have technology assesment
 
today, the assessment is made by experts. To the best of my
 
knowledge there is no agency of the U.S. government today which
 
assesses technology which does not have, on its staff a
 
significant proportion of technologists or scientists.
 
While suggesting that experts "may have some competence to evaluate the
 
risks" of a technology, the speaker, a university professor, doubted that
 
technological experts have the competence "to determine, let alone qualify,
 
the benefits." Perhaps, he added, a wider membership in the assessing
 
group including social scientists and lawyers as well as scientists and
 
engineers might lead to a more effective mechanism of assessment. "The 
process we are talking about," he concluded, "needs larger doses of
 
common sense and smaller doses of expertise."
 
Adequacy and Destination of Information
 
Several participants questioned the adequacy of existing information 
about the consequences of technologies. One, a university researcher,
 
believed that the prepared paper had been "overly optimistic" in its 
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implication that required information is either in hand or relatively
 
easy to acquire. For both existing and on-going technologies, current
 
sources of information are, in his opinion, not sufficient and
 
there are serious conceptual problems in many cases as
 
to how you would actually develop the information. I
 
think in a.lot of cases you would have to undertake
 
extensive research programs to develop the kind of
 
information you needed.
 
He expressed some concern with the fact that in most instances, we lack
 
the institutions with the resources, responsibility, or incentive to
 
generate the necessary information. An agency representative saw a need
 
for greater specification and accuracy in the reporting of consequences
 
of technological applications; a lack of such detailed reporting has
 
hindered assessment processes greatly. It was noted that virtually all.
 
police reports of automobile accidents, for example, cite as the cause
 
"excessive speed and drinking" because attributing an accident to such a
 
cause is' easier than performing detailed and complex studies to determine
 
the actual cause. This kind of reporting for purposes of expediency
 
rather than accuracy is prevalent and leads to the conclusion that
 
statistics are not always a very meaningful source of information about
 
the'effects of.technology.
 
But if information systems with reference to existing technologies
 
are not satisfactory, what then then can be said of the performance of
 
such systems in identifying the effects of new or developing technologies?
 
This question was raised by a government official, but aside from noting
 
the complexity of any effort to foresee future consequences, the partici­
pants declined to elaborate further and limited the remainder of the
 
discussion to the "post-introduction" phase of technologies.
 
Several speakers raised the problem of determining what occurs
 
within private industrial firms. This is quite an important matter since,
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as was noted earlier, qualified experts in any given technological field
 
are almost always employed by industrial concerns which are involved in
 
the development of the technology. A Congressional aide noted the
 
"tremendous difficulty of obtaining the highly essential information that
 
is in the files of the large corporations" while emphasizing that "we've
 
got to get very honest reporting from the private sector in order to know
 
exactly what's going on in terms of possible dangers." Some new Senate
 
bills, he indicated, may have the effect of opening up for public considera­
tion some results of individual research.
 
The destination of any gathered -informationmay play a -large role in
 
determining the type of information which is to be obtained. To one
 
university professor, this is the "crucial question'" After all, he
 
claimed, when no mechanism or organization requires information, when
 
can information be termed inadequate; "as long as nobody wants the infor­
mation in.any detail except-for statisticians, any information is sufficient"
 
regardless of how sparse it may be. It is only when an organization
 
exists to examine the information that one can begin to be concerned with
 
the adequacy of the information. The need for an opportunity to present
 
information, to have a hearing, was repeated by several participants in
 
the course of the session. "Whether or not the issues were accurate was
 
not the point," stated one speaker in describing his personal -difficulty
 
in obtaining a hearing. "The point really was whether there really was an
 
opportunity to discuss them?" Often, those who seek to obtain a hearing,­
he claimed, are resented and refused any opportunity to testify.
 
A mild dissent concerning the emphasis on information systems was
 
presented by a government official. He made it quite clear that he
 
believed that information, or even information systems,- could not be
 
considered in isolation; "When I consider the quest for information
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systems to be used in this context, I have to ask myself: Information
 
systems to what ultimate end?" He went on to decry what he termed a cult
 
spawned by improved data collecting capability which seems to hold that
 
better information handling alone is a solution to the technology assessment
 
problem. This is a false view, he claimed.
 
You could go on accumulating mountains of information.
 
about technological problems that go on and won't quit.
 
The issue to me is--what are you going to do with it?
 
Who, in the end, is going to organize the political
 
power to translate the information into corrective
 
action. I'm more interested in that end of the problem
 
than I am, frankly, in accepting the presumption behind 
the argument for information systems because I think we
 
can exhause a great deal of energy and resources with
 
the best of intentions and yield very little [if we
 
concentrate on information systems alonej.
 
The point, he said, is that expert opinion, and even common sense, haven't
 
produced effective action. (It may be noted that the remaining three
 
seminars of the series are concerned with the use of information and its
 
translation into action.)
 
Public Participation
 
The discussion turned to the question of public participation in
 
the assessment process. In commenting on the prepared paper, an agency
 
representative noted that it
 
says very little at all about the extent of public
 
participation in the technology assessment process.
 
In our democratic society, the way we generate
 
political pressure is to have the public involved
 
and to have some real broad scale public interest.
 
What we don't really seem to have is a way to match
 
the expertise of our expert to the intellectual
 
resources of the public. If we concentrate on
 
something like a technology assessment agency that
 
does not allow for public advocacy we really won't
 
have gotten anywhere at all.
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It was his view that technology assessment is performed almost secretly
 
and outside the usual framework of the comocratic process. The situa­
tion can be corrected.
 
I think that many of the things that we find to be very
 
serious public problems that do not get adequately
 
ventilated would be adequately ventilated if the
 
recommendations of the scientific advisory apparatus
 
were public and its documents freely available to the
 
public.
 
The importance of television as an educator of the public was strongly
 
emphasized by a Congressional aide.
 
To the suggestion that assessment proceedings be made public one
 
participant expressed concern that "if the assessment process is too
 
public, if all of the-preliminary recommendations and suggestions and
 
some of the wild ideas are publicized at the earliest stages, then you
 
will deter the kind of candor and imagination you want to encourage"
 
on the part of the assessors who might be leery of pursuing certain
 
potentially fruitful lines of inquiry in the face of public disclosure
 
of their efforts. He felt that it was necessary to strike a "fairly
 
complicated balance.., between making the final recommendations open
 
and available for public scrutiny which is not always done and making
 
every preliminary step in the assessment process available to the public."
 
Some of those present had reservations about the role of the public
 
in assessment. An educator noted the characteristic tolerance of the
 
American people toward technological change. "The man on the street,"
 
he stated, "will tolerate anything... in behalf of the advancement of
 
technology." Unless some change in this prevalent attitude can be
 
induced, the public will remain ineffective in producing meaningful
 
action regardless of how well educated it is about the nature of the
 
problem. But even if the public inertia could be overcome, the public
 
29
 
role might not become an effective one, at least in the view of one
 
speaker. He believed that public involvement is important only in
 
extreme cases. Smaller issues cannot excite the public interest and
 
the majority of assessment problems fall in this category rather than
 
in crisis class.
 
Other Considerations
 
The remainder ,of the discussion touched briefly on some miscellaneous
 
points of interest to the participants. A Congressional aide and a
 
professor expressed some concern with the fact that technology assessment
 
seems to concentrate on the detrimental aspects of technologies. They
 
asked for more perspective in noting the positive aspects of technological
 
development. Another Congressional aide held that Congress does in fact,
 
assess both benefits and risks and noted that "Senator Muskie and
 
Congressman Daddario always use the word 'benefit' first and then they
 
talk about hazards." Others felt that the problem of identifying
 
benefits is not crucial to the assessment process. In the words of a
 
university professor,
 
In the very nature of things one can always assume
 
that the benefits of technology will be more than
 
adequately articulated because there are very
 
powerful vested interests which want to articulate
 
those benefits. The read problem is how you
 
articulate the costs and the risks.
 
An agency official agreed and suggested that all new technological
 
developments be subjected to energetic opposition for the purpose of
 
exposing risks which are either unnoticed or neglected by proponents
 
of the technology. (This argument is pursued further in the third
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session of the seminar series in which the central concern is the 
adversary process in technology assessment.) Perhaps the position 
of many of those present was summed up by a Congressional aide who 
said of the consideration of risks and benefits that "the two go 
together - they always go together and they have to go together." 
Any assessment, to be complete, must consider both. 
Two interesting and practical examples of the current state of
 
information systems and assessment were discussed and deserve some
 
note here. One of these concerned the setting, by the National
 
Committee of Radiation Protection, of radiation exposure standards
 
for workers in the atomic energy field. These workers are permitted
 
to receive radiation doses ten times as large as those to which the
 
general public may be exposed. The decision to set higher limits on
 
allowable doses for industry personnel was arrived at without any
 
consultation with the workers and it was predicted by one seminar
 
participant that this desregard for ordinary collective bargaining
 
procedures might lead to strikes in the nuclear industry.
 
The other example was the establishment and operation of the 
National Transportation Safety Board which is required by law to make 
its findings and recommendations available to industries and the public. 
The Board operates solely in the interest of the public and, in the view 
of one discussant, has been effective in inducing changes in the
 
transportation industry through a combination of letters to offending
 
industries and news releases which have notified and educated the public.
 
There was some skepticism among other present over how the effectiveness
 
of such an organization can be evaluated. However, it was suggested
 
that despite the fact that the Board has no way to apply legal sanctions
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to any safety offender, the litters and publicity had produced some
 
changes in conditions in the interests of increased safety.
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PAGE BLANK NOT FILNID. 	 9 0PRECEDING 
2: 	 TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND THE CONGRESS
 
Richard A.'Carpenter
 
This paper is designed to take advantage of the Seminar Series
 
to elicit opinions from the participants on a particular question:
 
the Legislative branch of government as the major focus for technology
 
assessment. My thesis is that the Congress is the most important user
 
of such information and that a bridge to assessment capabilities must
 
be built. The details of its organization, activities and relationships
 
to other agencies and the private sector are not yet developed. The
 
thoughts expressed herein must, of course, be considered as personal
 
opinions and not charged to the Legislative Reference Service or to any
 
Member of Congress.
 
Having been involved in the development of technology assessment
 
for some years, I am not hesitant about offering a definition, even though
 
such an act entails risks of diversions into semantic nit picking.
 
Technology assessment is the process of identifying and studying
 
consequences of the applications of science. The objective is to optimize
 
the use of knowledge for the benefit of society -- to enable us to manage
 
the affairs of a complex, technology based civilization. Consequences
 
which are unintended, unanticipated,. and unwanted are to be minimized. 
Assessment includes forecasting and prediction, retroactive evaluation, 
and current monitoring and analysis. Measurements involve non-economic, 
subjective values as well as direct, tangible quantifications. -
In the United States, the combination system of free enterprise
 
democracy is the vehicie for technological change, economic growth, and
 
social progress. The market place continually weighs and balances costs
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and benefits. The political process performs a similar function for
 
governmental programs. Risk -taking is accepted in America as necessary
 
for private profits and public welfare gains.
 
In the past decade, a dramatic challenge to this method of operation
 
has been recognized. A much more sophisticated view of technological
 
change is required. The close interdependence of mankind and the natural
 
environment is increased by the swelling world population. The social
 
environment is sensitized to untoward effects by the concentration of
 
people into cities. Hidden economic factors often outweigh obvious market
 
values. New forces are available from the application of science which
 
have the power for world-wide and long-term changes--often irreversible.
 
Thus, the development of a technology assessment capability is an
 
urgent task, recently imposed on our economic and political systems by
 
the exponential terms of the growth of population and science.
 
The harbingers of technology assessment include nuclear weapon
 
testing, persistent pesticides, nonbiodegradable detergents, smog,
 
thalidomide, automation, the computer revolution and so on. A hundred
 
less spectacular events could be listed from many industrial and environ­
mental situations. The rubric is broadening to include the often trivial
 
concerns of consumer protection, the intricacies of a sea level Panama
 
canal, the worldwide effects of fossil fuel combustion and the cosmic
 
concerns'of planetary contamination. All these questions boil down to 'a 
need to know more.
 
I would add a special aspect to technology assessment--that is, the
 
positive value of knowing more about our actions,. The alarms and
 
restrictions can too easily become the dominant theme. In fact, assess­
ment can have great value to commerce and to government in revealing.
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unknown benefits-and providing confidence for decisions which otherwise
 
would not have existed. Falsely based inhibitions can be just as bad
 
for society as encountering undesirable consequences.
 
In summary, I see technology assessment as the final step in a
 
long sequence which could be termed the socialization of science. In
 
this sequence science has been apart from the mainstream of society for
 
most of recorded history. Up until the end of the 19th century science
 
had its own momentum and direction--asking virtually no support from its
 
host culture and directly contributing little in return. Then, with the
 
industrial revolution, agricultural engineering, and applied research in
 
the early 1900's, and the miliitary awakening to science in the two world
 
wars, the relationship to society grew rapidly, Science promised and
 
delivered. Society sponsored and glorified research without question.
 
This arrangement continued until the late 1950's when the governmental
 
and corporate support of science reached such financial proportions that
 
a return-on-investment analysis was inevitable. Most manufacturing
 
organizations had erected research laboratories--for window dressing if
 
nothing else. The Federal budget included $4 billion for military and
 
atomic energy R&D in 1958. Adding the space program (with its strong
 
basis in the goal of international prestige) the R&D budget rose to $14
 
billion in 1966 for the three agencies of DOD, AEC, and NASA. In fact
 
90% of the total government R&D support in the last decade was for these
 
purposes. In this period--roughly 1956-1966--the concept of efficiency
 
in the application of science emerged.
 
The R&D practitioner was asked to carefully plan and execute his
 
science in return for generous support from society. The systems approach
 
to projects was perfected. Invention was put on schedule. Spin-off .
 
36
 
and fall-out benefits were extolled by NASA. The Department of Defense
 
procured R&D performance on incentive fee contracts. As additional
 
agencies perceived the ways in which science could help accomplish their
 
missions, the public needs of pollution, transportation, crime, education,
 
housing, etc. began to be served. The demand that science be relevant
 
was accepted. The ability of any scientist--particularly the applied
 
technologist--to work outside this requirement diminished.
 
Now we are entering a final phase. It is no longer enough that
 
applied science be relevant. And so pervasive is science in this
 
civilization that it is difficult to think of any irrelevant experimenta­
tion. But, through technology assessment, society is insisting on eating
 
its cake and having it too. Only when the course of innovation has been
 
studied out and the benefits are shown to outweigh the costs, is technolog­
ical welcome. Each unwanted consequence must have its "technological fix,"
 
in Alvin Weinberg's term. Consumer protection replaces caveat emptor
 
because it is beyond the ability of the buyer to beware. Technology
 
assessment is an added responsibility of science, to be incorporated into
 
the research-development-innovation-diffusion sequence at every stage.
 
Assessment is not measured solely in technical parameters but the measure­
ment is a duty of the managers of science.
 
Thus in 1963, in his memorable address to the National Acadqmy of
 
Science, President Kennedy said, "Everytime you scientists make a major
 
invention, we politicians have to invent a new institution to cope with
 
it." He mentioned specifically, "... our responsibility to control the
 
effects of our own scientific experimentation. For as science investigates
 
the natural environment, it also modifies it--and the modification may
 
have incalculable consequences, for evil as well as good.... The Govern­
ment has to clear responsibility to weigh the importance of large scale
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experiments to the advance of knowledge to national security against the
 
possibility of adverse and destructive effects .... As we begin to master
 
the destructive potentialities of modern science, we move toward a new
 
era in which science can fulfill its creative promise and help bring
 
into existence the happiest society the world .has ever known."
 
The responsibility to assess technology is recognized but assessment
 
so far has been a haphazard affair, initiated by the Rachel Carsons and
 
Ralph Naders or by episodic events such as oil slicks on beaches. These
 
stimuli for assessment have been embarrassing to both the technical and
 
political communities because the lack of control over applied science
 
is dramatically demonstrated.
 
In this climate, the U.S. Congress found that its conventional
 
sources of information were inadequate to the task of adding scientific
 
and technical ingredients to the legislative decision-making process.
 
Essentially, the function of the Congress is to integrate all the elements
 
of national life, with their varying and often conflicting desires and
 
the complex of social, legal, economic, political, and institutional
 
values. The result is the formulation of national policy, and the
 
setting of priorities and timetables via the three major activities of
 
authorization, appropriation and overview. The success of the integra­
tion and compromise is judged directly by the people at the polls.
 
The Congress is not bound to programs during their execution and
 
thus is in a position to critically evaluate the results as contrasted
 
with the legislative intent. The fact that all of the House and about
 
one third of the Senate Members stand for election every two years
 
presents an opportunity for relatively rapid response to public opinion
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compared to an administrative program which may go on for four or eight
 
years and become entrenched in bureaucracy.
 
Information about science and technology is not present in the
 
Congress in the most usual input form--i.e., the personal experience
 
and training of Representatives and Senators. Few scientists and
 
engineers have been elected from an active professional career and there
 
is no sign the number will increase. Thus an information transfer
 
process is more important in technical matters than in other areas of
 
knowledge.
 
The Congress certainly does not lack for information. The openness
 
of the legislative process provides a great variety and number of channels
 
for facts and opinion. The public hearing is common to almost all legisla­
tive considerations.
 
The Federal agencies advocate and defend their programs in hearings,
 
briefings, and continual liaison with the members and committees directly
 
concerned. The Office of Science and Technology in the Executive Office
 
of the President was established by reorganization plan specifically to
 
coordinate executive branch R&D and to report to the Congress on science
 
policy matters.
 
Special commissions are sometimes created by the Congress to examine
 
a policy problem in depth. For example the National Water Commission, the
 
National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress, and
 
the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources are Congressionally
 
constituted to report both to the President and to the Congress.
 
Industries and trade organizations often present testimony at-hearings
 
and carry on extensive information and lobbying activities when legislation
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or government programs particularly affect their interests'. Constituents
 
and local businesses make specific inquiries to their representatives and
 
carry opinions on R&D matters which have obvious political impact.
 
Universities and nonprofit institutions provide data and interpretive
 
studies in the normal course of their activities.
 
Professional technical societies can be a most valuable source of
 
advice and information for the Congress. In contrast to the other sources,
 
the broad membership allows professional, rather than employment related
 
views, to come to the surface. Their tax exempt status need not be
 
jeopardized, nor arethey required to register as lobbyists.1 The simple
 
conditions are that the Congressional liaison-not be a major portion of
 
their activities and that the Congress has invited their testimony.
 
The technical societies -need not be expected to present a consensus
 
view on issues-Awhich might engender internal strife. Rather, they may
 
provide a forum for discussion of science policy issues just as they have
 
historically for the presentation of research results. This new opportunity
 
for professional societies is well worth adding to the traditional functions
 
of publication, national-meetings, and-education.
 
As the need for science information-has become recognized, the
 
legislators have erected a variety of transfer mechanisms and channels.
 
Some members have personal science advisory committees. The political
 
parties have organized scientists and engineers to assist them.
 
In the past few years, professional staffs of committees have been
 
reinforced with persons of mature technical experience. Hearings and
 
briefings are often purposefully arranged as adversary proceedings to
 
present a variety of viewpoints. Ad hoc advisory panels are assembled
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to deal with a particular subject or to provide general advice.
 
In 1963 and 1964, a number of studies and proposals were made
 
relating to science advice for the Congress ranging from Nobel laureates
 
in residence to a "think tank" organization. The Subcommittee on Science
 
Research and Development (chaired by Mr. Daddario) of the House Committee
 
on Science and Astronautics held hearings and issued a report, "Scientific-

Technical Advice for Congress: Needs and Resources." .2 Bills to create
 
a Congressional Office of Science and Technology were introduced in both
 
Houses in the 88th Congress (S. 2036 and H.R. 8066). Another bill (H.R.
 
6866, 88th Congress, lst.session) sought to establish a small science
 
advisory staff in each house.3 The House Select Committee on Government
 
Research conducted extensive studies on the methods by which Congress
 
could improve its handling of federal science affairs.4 Senator Clinton
 
P. Anderson reviewed the difficulties of setting up a body of highly
 
trained technicians solely responsible to Congress in an article in
 
Science magazine;5
 
The conclusion of these deliberations was that a bridge between the
 
Congress and the scientific community was preferable to an "in house" cadre
 
of practicing scientists and engineers. The breadth of legislative
 
problems and the rapid change of specific interests militated against
 
retaining subject matter specialists as advisers. Instead, the need was
 
correctly deduced for a new function to excise the scientific questions
 
from legislative issues, to search the literature and minds of the scien­
tific community for relevant answers, and to interpret and distill the
 
pertinent information for easy use by the legislators.
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The means of establishing the function was found close at hand.
 
The Legislative Reference Service is a 53 year old organization with the
 
Library o Congress. It is divided into 10 divisions which provide
 
research and information on all fields of knowledge related to legislation.
 
The staff numbers over 300 persons ranging from senior scholars to clerks
 
who retrieve factual data. The specialists are thoroughly qualified and
 
recognized in their academic fields-, and, more importantly, they are skilled
 
at interpreting and communicating technical information to the Congress.
 
- LRS works only for the members and their committees and staffs. Pro­
jects are performed on a confidential basis and usually the resulting
 
contributions in printed form do not indicate their origin in the Library.
 
Partisan-political influences are carefully avoided under the direction
 
of the Joint Committee on the.Library.
 
Into this existing organizational framework, the Congress introduced
 
8 new positions by appropriation action for fiscal year 1965, "to meet
 
the increasing requests for service in.the scientific and technological
 
specialties." These positions were augmented with existing funds and
 
organized as the Science Policy Research Division in October of 1964.
 
At present, SPRD comprises 10 senior professionals, 10 junior
 
researchers and assistants, and 5 clerk-typists. The senior researchers
 
have backgrounds in science and engineering which gives them a legitimate
 
standing in the scientific community. Obviously not all disciplines can
 
be covered by so small a staff, but choices are made to correspond to
 
the principal issues at hand--i.e., space, transportation, environmental
 
pollution, oceanography, etc.
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In a typical year assignments will be handled for 50 different
 
committees and subcommittees although the majority come from the House
 
and Senate space committees and a few other technically oriented legisla­
tive panels. About 400 (of the 535) members will be served as indivi­
duals.
 
To be effective as a complete service organization, a reference
 
function is also performed--several thousand inquiries are answered
 
every year. This factual data retrieval has another purpose, however,
 
in that it acquaints members with the division and often leads to policy
 
studies. A research project may be initiated by the SPRD in anticipation
 
of an issue likely to come before the Congress.
 
The objective of the Science Policy Research Division is an increased
 
understanding by the members of Congress of the workings of science and
 
engineering. Scholarshipyor completeness of research, and objectivity,
 
or the absence of advocacy, are the criteria of performance.
 
SPRD is a bridge to a diversity and plurality of information and
 
opinion. It is not a primary source of knowledge. Nevertheless, the
 
way in which the gathered facts are presented to the legislator often
 
does impart a summary judgment, a responsibility which is carefully
 
recognized and accepted.
 
Our experience to date is that Congress does not need advice and
 
that judgments on technical matters must continue to be rendered within
 
-the conventional legislative process. It is not necessary or desirable
 
for the Members to become technical experts. What many of them have
 
become is sensitive to the capabilities and limitations of science and
 
technology. As the NAS report "Applied Science and Technological
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Progress" states:
 
Congress should not attempt to second guess
 
the experts on technical appraisals, but it
 
does have the responsibility to convince itself
 
that the experts have asked themselves the
 
right questions .... In appraising the situa­
tion, it is important for Congress to listen
 
to the skeptics as well as the enthusiasts,
 
and to ask the enthusiasts to answer the
 
arguments of the skeptics. Laymen can learn
 
a great deal from the confrontation of experts
 
even when they do not understand the details.
 
Especially in applied science and technology,
 
priorities and goals can be established only
 
through a multidimensional interaction between
 
scientists, technologists, public servants, and
 
the general public. 6
 
Thus, the critical need of the Congress is to acquire the capability
 
for assuring that competent assessments are done in a timely manner, and
 
for transferring assessment results into a form applicable to legislative
 
decisions. Our technological problems are part of political problems with
 
social, personal, and economic costs and benefits. The Congress is the
 
political assessment body in our society and must have the output of
 
technology assessments in order to do its job.
 
In operation, the Congressional technology assessment capability will
 
initiate assessments, search out ongoing studies, structure hearings to
 
bring about adversary views, monitor assessment functions in the executive
 
agencies and the private sector, and assess the assessors. A relatively
 
small group of professionals (generalists from a number of disciplines) plus
 
a modest appropriation for contract studies will suffice. This capability
 
may also include carrying out assessments when appropriate but a bridge to
 
major efforts elsewhere is the primary intent. Since it is expected that
 
technology assessment will become an integral part of scientific and engineering
 
activity, the Congressional function will be a logical extension of the
 
present work of the Science Policy Research Division.
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The fact that applied science so permeates the entire fabric of
 
society argues against a single assessment institution; and for the
 
development of assessment mechanisms in a wide variety of government
 
agencies, university and nonprofit organizations, and commercial firms.
 
The location of governmental technology assessment solely in the
 
Executive branch would appear to generate impossible conflicts with the
 
necessary promotion and championing of programs and the aggressive
 
administration of the law. The Executive branch determines for its own
 
purposes whether something is worth doing but the Congress determines
 
whether this is good for the whole country. The establishment of a
 
fourth (evaluative) branch of government as suggested by Golovin7 may
 
present an interesting alternative when fully developed. One objection,
 
however, is that such a centralization would interfere with the necessity
 
(in my mind) that assessment be a part of the innovative process wherever
 
it goes on.
 
The case for a Congressional assessment capability is supported by
 
the proceedings of a seminar held in September 1967.8 Some of the con­
clusions from that discussion are:
 
1. 	 Questions of concern to the Congress must be assessed
 
to meet the legislative schedule, i.e., before decisions
 
are made.
 
2. 	 The Congress must be in a position to continuously
 
challenge the Executive branch as to.the consequences
 
of its programs.
 
3. 	 It is important that assessment proceed in an open
 
forum stimulating wide-public discussion. The Congress
 
can provide such an environment.
 
4. 	 The widest possible base of information and opinion
 
must be accessible to assessment projects and the
 
Congress could command this knowledge.
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5. The Congress would be more attentive to assessment
 
results if they were presented via a Congressionally
 
chartered organization.
 
6. 	 The Congress must be convince&that the experts have
 
asked one another the right questions.
 
7. 	 The political decisions affecting the future of tech­
nology rest with the Congress.
 
8.-	 The Congress is sensitive and rapidly responsive to
 
the people and is immediately accountable to the
 
electorate.
 
9. 	 The feeling that applied science is under control
 
(through Congressionally monitored assessments) will
 
restore public confidence necessary to a risk-taking
 
progressive society.
 
10. 	 The needs of the Congress for assessments results
 
would assure that the necessary funds for these
 
activities would be provided.
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Discussion of TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND THE CONGRESS
 
Mr. Carpenter provided an extremely accurate introduction to the
 
discussion when he noted that "this is a -prettyprovocative subject."
 
In asking those present to indicate their opinions concerning the type of
 
information Congress needs, he extended upon the remark in his paper that
 
Congress does not need advice by commenting,
 
What I should haveadded is that Congress obviously
 
does not need or will not take advice on how to vote,
 
even on fairly specific technical matters such as the
 
accelerator at Weston or Mohole. Congress won't abdi­
cate the final judgment in these matters and shouldn't.
 
No one of these decisions is purely technical you can't
 
separate the social, political, and economic aspects
 
from the technological problem.
 
What is needed is reliable, complete and objective information. Perhaps
 
the study of the Congressional role in technology assessment will lead
 
to a search for new institutions that will enable us to "preserve a
 
democratic pattern of decision-making and yet take full and optimum
 
advantage of what is indeed a very technological world." Mr. Carpenter
 
viewed the problem as that of providing a "bridge to Congress" which will
 
make the greatest possible use of technological knowledge and on-going
 
assessments in other sectors of the society.
 
Legislative Reference Service
 
The discussion of the Science Policy Research Division of the
 
Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress which was
 
included in the prepared paper was expanded by some of the participants.
 
A Congressional aide wanted to make clear the fact that the LRS does not
 
take an advocacy position but rather, in an impartial manner, lists the
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questions of interest in any particular matter. Its study then provides
 
the foundations for Congressional committee hearings. In view of comments
 
made at the first seminar in this series concerning the role of experts
 
in the assessment process, a university researcher wanted to know how the
 
Science Policy Research Division of the IRS, which is made up of scientific
 
specialists, avoids the "specialized expert" problem. It was pointed
 
out that the LRS includes specialists in a wide range of fields and that
 
the Science Policy Research Division has "many opportunities to use public
 
administration people, political scientists, social scientists, and
 
economists within LRS." A Congressional aide mentioned that the IRS has
 
the authority to hire outside experts for specific purposes. The exercise 
of this authority leads, in his view, to a flexibility in the operation 
of the IRS which makes its studies particularly valuable. Further, it was 
re-emphasized that it was not the purpose of the IRS to make judgments; 
the hallmarks of the IRS, according to one of its staff, are "scholarship
 
and objectivity." He explained:
 
We try to get all the relevant opinion pulled out of the 
literature and pulled out of the minds of persons around 
the country.... We try to present it [the information 
obtained], interpret it, analyze it, and reduce it to a 
useful form in as objective a manner as possible and we 
use internal review and some external review to assure 
that our own prejudices and advocacies haven't slipped 
into the final product. Obviously, we do this successfully
 
sometimes; not so, other times.
 
Congressional Committees and Hearings
 
The discussion turned to a consideration of Congressional hearings
 
and almost immediately became highly animated. One participant, using
 
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as an example, charged that some 
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Congressional committees deliberately prevent certain views from being
 
heard. The difficulty, he contended, arises when the committee "predeter­
mines the conclusion of the hearing; then it sets up the structure of
 
witnesses that will justify the conclusion it predetermines." A professor
 
agreed and added that the problem of obtaining a hearing is by no means
 
limited to one or a few individuals but is, in fact, quite widespread.
 
Even a Committee staff member agreed:
 
You are quite correct when you say that many times a
 
Committee will decide what they want to find out first
 
and then flush out the points of view they want to
 
use.
 
An agency official noted that the adversary process used in Committee
 
hearings provides an opportunity to "stack the deck; it does seem to be
 
very difficult to insure that in every case the adversary process will be
 
an open one." A Congressional staff member took issue with these points
 
of view; he believed that committees are fair and that they adopt a policy
 
that anyone can be heard. This, he said, is made clear in the public
 
announcement of hearings. Another Congressional aide noted that when all
 
witnesses are not permitted to testify, the cause is often the limited
 
time of Senators rather than bias. The strong differences of opinion
 
among those present over the partiality or impartiality of hearings are
 
perhaps best exemplified by this brief exchange:
 
Congressional Staff Member:
 
"We're fair. We don't shut people off."
 
Participant:
 
"Some of you must deal with a different Congress than I do."
 
The controversy continued when a speaker remarked that he regularly
 
finds in the announcement of hearings a requirement for submission of a
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statement in advance, before the committee decides who is to testify.
 
He concluded that
 
we need, in whatever the structure, an opportunity
 
for both sides, or all sides, of the issue to be
 
included, with the requirement that it all be made
 
public.
 
But a Congressional aide answered that the requirement of prior submission
 
of testimony exists because some statements are clearly "Way out" and
 
the product of quacks. He continued:
 
We can't just let somebody come in with a statement.
 
We have to, in some way, get some sort of perspective
 
before we put on our witnesses. 
Another Committee staff member pointed out that experience with the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy, which had provided most of the examples up to 
this point in the proceedings, cannot really be generalized. The JCAE is 
the only joint committee with legislative authority afid as such is a 
special case. In general, he held, the bicameral system allows interested 
parties two opportunities to obtain a heating and thus provides some pro­
tection against exclusion from the proceedings.
 
An agency official pointed to the proposed ABM system as an issue,
 
outside the'jurisdiction of the JCAE, on which it was difficult (at least
 
until .that time) for scientists opposed to the system to gain a hearing.
 
The scientists, he said, feel that "they were excluded by the Committee 
counsel and that they were systematically disallowed from testifying."
 
Another agency official objected to this example; he claimed that contro­
versies over weapons systems cannot be considered as purely scientific
 
questions. "When you talk about weapons systems, you're talking a different
 
game," he said, to which a speaker replied, "I think we've got to stop 
that game. We're doing things more and more in the name of national defense." 
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A professor claimed that
 
certain Congressional committees, and I would define
 
these as being mission-oriented committees which have
 
mission-oriented agencies as their clients, are every
 
bit as "gung-ho" for technology as the executive spon­
sors of the program.
 
It is thus vitally important that all members of Congress (and the public,
 
too), as well as those members of interested committees, receive informa­
tion from such sources as the Legislative Reference Service. A speaker
 
pointed out that it is not true that all committees demonstrate this pro­
technological bias and cited the example of Representative Fountain's
 
committee and its relations mith NIH. As for providing information to all
 
Congressmen, an LRS staff member noted that the reports of the LRS are
 
available to any Congressman who desires them, and that distribution is
 
thus not limited to the committees which request particular studies.
 
Adequacy of Advice
 
Interest then turned to the question of the typemad adequacy of advice
 
received by Congress. This topic had been discussed at the first session
 
of the seminar with no real conclusion or consensus having been reached,
 
and the conversation continued in a similar vein. The lack of agreement
 
should probably be taken not as an indictment but rather as an indication
 
of the difficulty inherent in the problem.
 
A professor posed the question:
 
Will independent scientific study groups in different
 
agencies using the same methodology and science come
 
to the same conclusion on any given issue]?
 
He went went on to answer that he, for one, believed that they will.
 
Another participant agreed, but a third challenged this view. This speaker,
 
a staff member of the LRS, felt that the nature of the body performing a
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study played a large part in determining what information is used in the
 
analysis (and thus in determining the conclusions). He presented the
 
example of a Department of Agriculture/Forest Service study of fire
 
prevention methods in which "a great deal of research was buried simply 
because it negated the whole function of the Forest Service." Thus, some
 
bodies of fact are hard to find, "even for the LRS," he added.
 
There was some comment about the role of professional societies in
 
technology assessment. One speaker contended that societies should take
 
a more active part in the assessment process and another, an agency official,
 
agreed, although he noted that "you are asking for a great deal in asking
 
the professional societies to step outside their traditional role of being
 
oriented just toward the futherance of their scientific discipline." A
 
Congressional staff member thought that it was important to make a "distinc­
tion between those subjects which are within the competence of the people
 
in the society and broad social questions." He believed that the American 
Physical Society, for example, ought not make policy statements on
 
problems such as "poverty in the South." Decisions about the needs of
 
society are in the province of Congress alone and not in that of the APS
 
or anyone else. This topic has provoked much controversy within scientific
 
societies, but for the purposes of this seminar session, the participants
 
agreed that this brief discussion was sufficient.
 
An agency official thought that before anyone can really understand
 
the type of "bridge to Congress" which would be most successful, it is
 
necessary to "disaggregate the term technology assessment." He identified
 
two kinds of assessments. The first involves an appraisal of effective­
ness in achieving specific program objectives and the second involves
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"looking at ecological consequences" of technological applications. He
 
classified the two assessment processes as the examination of "sought
 
consequences and unsought consequences." For example, if one were
 
concerned with removing stains from clothing, one kind of assessment
 
would consider whether a given product will in fact effectively remove the
 
stains. The other would examine the overall consequences of using the
 
product (water pollution, for instance). The two types of assessments
 
are totally different, and it is quite likely that different assessment
 
mechanisms are appropriate for each. A professor, however, claimed that
 
"this is the situation we have now and that's why we're in such trouble."
 
It is precisely because assessment is disjointed that problems exist. Thus,
 
stain removers are, in fact, evaluated on the basis of how well they remove
 
stains independent of the environmental effects which their use can produce.
 
Another agency representative agreed with the first speaker; he re­
emphasized the point that feasibility is a question of a different order
 
than the "trade-offs" involved in comparing benefits and risks and that
 
"if you don't make these distinctions and try to answer these questions in
 
one fuzzy blur, you'll find that you can't answer them." All partici­
pants clearly felt that it was crucial to examine overall consequences of
 
the use of technology; the point of contention, which was left unresolved,
 
was whether conceptually disaggregating the assessment process helps in
 
achieving a complete analysis or causes people to ignore important parts of
 
the problem.
 
A New Generation of Engineers
 
Because at least some of the information which Congress needs to make
 
decisions concerning technological applications must come from those who
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are technically trained and competent, a professor suggested that in
 
the long run
 
what is needed is the creation of a new generation of
 
engineers who are trained so that in the forward design
 
of the systems that they are creating they build in cer­
tain retrievable values, so that when the system accom­
plishes its primary mission it has either a receptive 
value or can find some recoverable value.
 
He charged that engineers are trained irresponsibly. The very people
 
who will eventually become contract administrators helping to decide
 
which systems should be adopted to obtain certain ends are not currently
 
taught to be aware of social values. It was noted that a prototype of
 
the training system for the "new engineers" has been developed and cur­
rently operated at Stanford University. An agency official suggested
 
that the "new generation of engineers" might be called "public policy
 
engineers." But not everyone was .enthusiastic about the concept of new
 
systems for training engineers. The following exchange demonstrates the
 
reaction of one participant to the creation of "new engineers":
 
Congressional Staff Member:
 
"They won't be engineers anymore if you do that."
 
University Professor:
 
"Change the word--it's semantics."
 
Congressional Staff Member:
 
"That's not true. If you take this thing too far, you
 
end up with people who are not going to do the nuts and
 
bolts of engineering anymore."
 
The current engineering profession was discussed by two other
 
participants. A professor, noting that the engineering profession is
 
the vehicle through which scientific advance leads to technological
 
change, wanted a clarification of the meaning of engineering:
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I must confess that despite somewhat diligent inquiry
 
into this, I've never been able to quite figure out what
 
the concept of engineering embraces. Is it only concerned
 
with affixing the nuts to the bolts, or is it, on the other
 
hand, a profession? If it is a profession, are there any
 
ethical considerations which are relevant to the manner in
 
which engineers behave as they translate science into tech­
nology or are they, to put it bluntly, pxostitutes?
 
No direct answer was forthcoming.
 
An industry representative contended that the current use of the
 
word "engineer" in the sense of one who operates an engine was unfortunate.
 
He said that the European usage in which the term means one'who exercises
 
his ingenuity for private or public good or destruction gives a better
 
understanding of what an engineer really is.
 
The Public Interest
 
The most important aspect of technology assessment, according to
 
one agency official is the attempt to take an "ecological viewpoint" or
 
a "general systems viewpoint." "What human society is about is the
 
public interest and-not the interests of science or the interests of
 
technology." This immediately provoked the comment that "there is a 
difficulty in defining what the public-interest is." Several participants
 
volunteered to try to devise a definition. One, an agency official,
 
thought that Congress decides the public interest through its actions.
 
Another speaker defined the public interest as "opposition to any in­
crement toward destroying the human race." Still another felt that
 
questions about whether decisions are made in the public interest are
 
"silly... --a democracy the most that you have to do is make the facts
 
available to the public." If the public chooses not to take effective
 
action based on the facts, then the government can do nothing. That is,
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the government should not provide protection to the public if the public
 
does not want it. (This point is further elaborated in the paper pre­
sented at the third session of the series.)
 
Need for .Supplementary Institutions
 
To one participant, the primary question to be addressed is:, "How
 
do you organize social criticism effectively so as to affect public
 
-policy?U Organized social criticism can be quite potent in producing
 
.action; President Johnson, for example, was "brought down by the
 
operation of intense.., social criticism which affected institutions all
 
through the society." With respect to technology assessment, one must
 
determine how social criticism may be organized in the appraisal process.
 
What type of organization will bring out the development of beneficial
 
technologies without taking risks but also without destroying the con­
fidence of entrepreneurs? The speaker pointed out that:
 
The problem becomes one of looking at your
 
institutions. We can talk all night about im­
proving what we've got--like a new generation
 
of engineers--which I don't have any fight with,
 
except that I won't be around by the time it is
 
produced and in the meantime God knows what will
 
happen. It seems to me that the effective way
 
to proceed is by developing supplementary in­
stitutions with the idea in mind that they will
 
not just be made up,of engineers or scientists
 
but will be multi-disciplinary.
 
He proposed an independent institute of technology assessment. The
 
independence of such an institute would allow it to avoid one of the
 
problems this speaker sees in the operation of the Legislative Reference
 
Service.
 
What I suspect is part of the difficulty of
 
the LRS is that... much of its traffic consists
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- of'being responsive to questions on which answers
 
are wanted tomorrow. To remove the mechanism
 
from the consequences of erratic and random de­
mand would be a constructive thing.
 
An independent institute could provide a public, as well as a legisla­
tive, service. Financed by Congressional charter or by an endowment, the
 
institution would serve as an independent voice of "exposure, disclosure,
 
criticism, prediction, and early warning."
 
When asked by a Congressional aide, "Who would listen?",-the insti­
tute's proponent admitted that he could not answer that question and
 
that the question was one which "troubles me very mich, because I think it
 
says a great deal about the quality of intelligence in the society, and
 
maybe we deserve it." A congressional staff member asked why the National
 
Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering could not
 
serve the purpose of the proposed institute. The answer was that these
 
are membership organizations and, as such, have a corporate role which
 
is not necessarily consistent with the yals of a technology assessment
 
institute. An agency representative thought that the suggested institute
 
already exists in the universities, but it was pointed out by a Congressional
 
aide that university efforts are fragmented. It was further noted that,
 
at least at present, the university is not publicly recognized as the
 
institution which fits this particular problem. One professor commented
 
that the proposed assessment organization was "the institutionalization
 
of the Rachel Carsons and the Ralph Naders," but he was assured that the
 
intent of the technology assessment institute was not the "construction of
 
an asylum."
 
Most of those present agreed that the proposed institute would be a
 
positive step toward the improvement of the technology assessment process,
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but there were some questions concerning the mechanism whereby such an
 
institute could report its findings. One participant, for instance, was
 
concerned with "how this information generating capability, from wherever
 
it comes, gets introduced into the political decision-making process."
 
But, he continued:
 
It seems to me that one usefulness of an institution
 
[such as the one just described] would be that it might
 
well create a national constituency against the kind
 
of politics that we are accustomed to which could help
 
in the decision-making process.
 
The problem of the "bridge to Congress" still exists, in his view, and
 
he concluded that:
 
Our decisions are made through representative govern­
ment and it's likely to remain that we will be making
 
decisions through representative government. There­
fore, the linkage which Dick [Carpenter] proposes is
 
still an important one.
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3: 	 THE ADVERSARY PROCESS IN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
 
Harold P. Green
 
My purpose in this paper is to show the importance of introducing
 
an adversary process into the technology assessment mechanism in order to
 
assure that the assessment function will properly and effectively protect
 
the public interest.
 
At the outset, let me define my terms. When I speak of an adversary
 
process I am not suggesting a formal adjudicatory process in which oppos­
ing parties contend through legal mouthpieces with a decision made on the
 
record. Rather, I suggest only that a mechanism be developed which will
 
permit and facilitate the articulation in public of all relevant facts, pro
 
and con. And when I speak of technology assessment, I do not encompass the
 
assessment of the full potential range of the social consequences-of a
 
technology. Rather, in this paper I am concerned about technology assess­
ment solely from the standpoint of identifying and controlling those attri­
butes of a technology which adversely affect basic individual rights which
 
have traditionally been protected by the legal system, i.e., specifically
 
those incidents of a technology which may threaten the health, safety, and
 
security of the public. I believe, incidentally, that this aspect of tech­
nology on which I am focusing is its principal element and the very raison
 
d'etre for the present public discussion of technology assessment.
 
Most of the discussion of technology assessment which has taken place
 
to date has assumed the need for a new governmental assessment institution
 
which would identify and quantify the benefits, costs, and risks of
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technology, then strike a balance among these factors, and pass
 
on its conclusions and recommendations in predigested form to Congress as
 
a predicate for legislative action. This approach is reflected in Congress­
man Daddario's bill and was followed in Mr. Carpenter's paper last month.
 
Mr. Carpenter's view was that Congress as the political-assessment body
 
in our society must have the output of technology assessment bodies in order
 
to do its job properly. I have no serious objection to this approach.
 
Subject to my concern that Congress already is the recipient of more infor­
mation than it needs and can handle effectively, even with the aid of
 
computers, I have no doubt that Congress will inevitably benefit from re­
ceipt of the balanced, objective views of any responsible body. But I do
 
believe that this approach is not adequate, would not be effective, and is
 
in derogation of the appropriate role of Congress and the public in policy
 
formulation.
 
The assessment function is properly concerned with balancing the bene­
fits of a technology to the public against its costs (including risks) to
 
the public and emerging with a conclusion as to what government's role with
 
respect to that technology should be. Unfortunately the benefits and costs
 
(including risks) do not fall upon all segments and members of the public
 
correlatively. There is, I suppose, a high degree of correlation if we are
 
talking about lawn mower technology; but if we are talking about detergents,
 
pesticides, or the supersonic transport plane, it is clear that those who
 
enjoy the benefits of these technologies will not necessarily be the same
 
persons, or in appropriate degree, as those on whom-the costs (including
 
risks) will fall.
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Since the issue is one of benefits to the public ,versus costs (includ­
ing risks) to the public, the focus of technology assessment should be to
 
arrive at a conclusion as to what costs (including risks) the public is pre­
papared to assume in exchange for what benefits. In out democracy, such
 
decisions cannot appropriately be made by an elite body of specialists and
 
generalists-(who are specialists in technology assessment). They should be
 
made by the public itself expressing its views through its elected repre­
sentatives in the Congress who are accountable to-their constituents. This
 
requires that the entire assessment process take place in the open with
 
full articulation in language the public can understand of the benefits and
 
costs (including risks). In short, I do not agree with Mr. Carpenter that
 
there is any viable-distinction between political assessment and technology
 
assessment. Technology assessment is not an appropriate function for ex­
perts;. rather it is a process which should be performed entirely at the
 
politicallevel. Those who question whether the public and the Congress
 
have the competence to make the necessary sound assessments express a lack
 
of faith in the democratic process to cope with modern and future technology,
 
and if we act on the basis of such lack of faith we have a different ball
 
game. In my view, the basic problem is to compel scientists and technolo­
gists to present the issues to the public in the language of ordinary public
 
discourse rather than in the esoteric jargon of their disciplines, and if
 
this is done I have no doubt as to the efficacy of the democratic process.1
 
Most public discussion upon technology assessment to this date has
 
ignored a fundamental point. There is never any lack of articulation of
 
the benefits of a technology. Every technology has powerful vested interests-­
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private and frequently governmental and political--who can be relied upon
 
to press the benefits to the technology assessors. The problem is that the
 
negative factors and the risks are never fully or even adequately articulat­
ed. The inability of the negative factors to surface effectively is
 
attributable to a variety of circumstances. In some cases the risks are
 
totally unappreciated until a later date; in other cases, there may be an
 
appreciation of possible risks which have not yet been demonstrated to be
 
real. The proponents of the technology may always be counted upon to mini­
mize or suppress the risks. Although the proponents are usually well orga­
nized and well-financed in their articulation of the benefits, those who
 
seek to advance the negative factors tend to be rather disorganized and to
 
lack resources. Not infrequently--particularly in the case of government­
sponsored technologies--it is difficult for the opponents to obtain relevant
 
and adequate information about risks, and even more difficult, because the
 
experts who are privy to the relevant information are usually pro-technology,
 
to obtain experts to assist them in formulation of their contentions. The
 
natural consequence is that the opposition is forced to state its case using
 
information which is incomplete or not wholly accurate, and, therefore, is
 
easily discredited. Frequently the establishment seeks to discredit the
 
opposition ad hominem, and this exacerbates the situation forcing the oppo­
sition to take an extreme position which makes it even easier for the
 
proponents to discredit their contentions on their merits.
2
 
The basic problem of building an assessment institution is, therefore,
 
to provide a means whereby the negative factors, particularly the risks,
 
will be vigorously, effectively and responsibly pressed upon the decision
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makers in a manner which will permit the Congress to make its own judgements
 
and which will permit the public to make its own judgements so that its
 
views will become known to the Congress. In a nutshell, the problem is to
 
give equal time, opportunity, and attention to the negative factors.
 
It is in this respect that I think Congressman Daddario's initial pro­
posal for creation of a Technology Assessment Board is deficient. The
 
Board's findings, conclusions, and recommendations ex cathedra will not re­
flect what the public wants and what thep:ublic fears. The very expertness
 
and authority of the Board will detract from public discussion and debate.
 
I have the same concern about Mr. Carpenter's proposal. _In both gases,
 
incicentally, the suggested technology outputs will not be considered by
 
the Congress in isolation. Congress and the public will still be faced
 
with a barrage of propaganda from the technology's proponents, and we may
 
be certain that they will attack and seek to minimize the negative considera­
tions brought to light in the course of these assessment processes.
 
These considerations, lead me to the conclusion that what is needed for
 
the technology assessment function is an agency which would act as a respon­
sible devil's advocate or technological ombudsman and play the role of
 
adversary in the Congressional and public forums. This should be an agency
 
charged solely with the function and responsibility to probe for the negative
 
factors, to. identify these factors, and to press them vigorously upon the
 
Congress and the public. The agency should be either an agency totally
 
independent of the government or one which, like the General Accounting
 
Office, f~nctions as a part of the Congress. As between these alternatives,
 
my preference is for the latter, since the agency should have the right-to
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have full access to all relevant information within the control of the
 
3
 
government.
 
In discussing the manner in which such an agency would operate, it is
 
necessary to distinguish between two classes of technology. On the one
 
hand, there is echnoldgy whichis essentially private and which is develop­
ed and introduced primarily as a consequence of private, profit-seeking
 
investment. With respect to such technology, government's role is'typically
 
passive until problems arise which require the government to take action in
 
-the public interest. On the other hand, there is another class of tech­
nology-whichis developed primarily as a consequence of government invest­
ment. In this case, government has a strong affirmative interest in
 
development of the technology and also in its subsequent practical appli­
cation.
 
In the first of these cases, the market place opeiates as a continuous
 
technol6gy assessment mechanism. A technology will not be developed or
 
introduced unless its sponsor senses that there will be a profitdble return
 
on investment.' The price that buyers are willing to pay reflects their
 
assessment of the hazards which may be incident to the technology's Products.
 
Bdth the sponsors of the technology and its customer-users also assess the
 
potential costs to them which may result from liability to others arising
 
out of such hazards. Liability itself results from an assessment process
 
by the courts since the social utility of- the activity producing the injury
 
to the plaintiff is frequently weighed (sometimes explicitly) against the
 
5­deterrent effects of imposing liability. The estimated costs of potential
 
liability may be a deterrent to one who considers developing and introducing
 
65
 
a technology or using a technology or its products. Liability insurance,
 
which pools like risks and translates uncertain potential liability into
 
fixed periodic premiums serves to offset this deterrent, but if adequate
 
insurance is not available or is available only at-prohibitivelyoexpensive
 
6 
rates, the deterrent remains. 6 These private assessment mechanisms involve
 
a mix of incentives and deterrents which operate as people pursue their.own
 
self-interest. These mechanisms flash a green light or a red light which
 
serves to control the rate of development and introduction of technology.
 
It is only when the green light has been flashed as a signal -for introduction
 
of a technology that-the problem of technology assessment passes into the
 
hands of governmental.institutions. Even after the technology has been
 
introduced, government assessment does not occur until problems arise which
 
seem to warrant governmental action.
 
The initial step in governmental technology assessment occurs when the
 
legislature considers these problems to determine whether social control-is
 
required to protect the public against the technology's hazards and, if so,
 
the form such controls should take. The mere existence of obvious problems
 
does not mean that the legislature will act. The legislative process in­
volves considerable inertia and is at best an uncertain and lengthy affair
 
as the proponents of social controls battle the vested interests who stub­
bornly resist control.7 Typically, the legislative struggle involves two
 
-issues: (1) are there hazards which justify social control? and (2) will
 
the form of social control stifle the technology and deprive the public of
 
its benefits? Where legislation results, it represents the striking of what
 
the legislature believes is an appropriate balance between benefits and risks.
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In many cases the social controls are implemented under statutory
 
standards by an administrative agency. The agency's sole function in this
 
respect is to protect the public interest under the statutory standards.
 
These standards usually reflect the legislature's conclusion that the tech­
nology is useful and beneficial and should be controlled in such a manner
 
as to preserve its benefits. As the administrative agency functions, it
 
is required to assess the impact of its proposed regulatory actions in terms
 
of benefit and risk. Because its institutional bias is in the direction of
 
protecting the-public interest, the regulatory agency generally functions
 
as an adversary of the industry it regulates; i.e., its normal functioning
 
imposes social controls, at the expense of increasing costs and reducing
 
benefits, in order'to maximize protection of-the public against the industry's
 
hazards.
 
We have then in this case an-existing structure for governmental tech­
nology assessment. Obviously" it does not work perfectly. Legislative
 
judgements are often inappropriately biased or otherwise unsound. Admin­
istrative agencies make mistakes and, as students of the administrative
 
process have long recognized, they tend to develop unwholesome affinities
 
to the-industries they regulate and may become in effect their captives.
 
Such deficiencies are inherent in the political and administrative process
 
and are subject to corrective action if the public is aroused. On the
 
other hafid, a more difficult problem is raised by the fact that the assess­
ment institutions frequently lack sufficient information and knowledge to
 
function with optimum effectiveness. These institutions and the public
 
frequently do not become aware of hazardous conditions associated with a
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technology at a sufficiently early date, until after considerable harm has
 
occurred and strongly entrenched vested interests have come into being.
 
What is needed is an early warning system to trigger public and political
 
awareness of potential hazards at a much earlier time.
 
The type of devil's advocate agency I have suggested is ideally suited
 
to overcome these deficiencies. Its functions would include that of identi­
fying possible hazards and ascertaining the extent to which they are real
 
hazards. The agency would identify areas in which regulatory bodies should
 
prudently force the technology to slow down and areas in which further re­
search may be necessary. Hazards and potential hazards, when these are
 
identified, would be vigorously publicized and pressed upon the Congress
 
and the cognizant government agencies. Congressional inertia would be sub­
ject 'to the pressures of public opinion; foot-dragging by the administrative
 
agencies would become more visible and'subject to correction. A more sub­
stantial burden of proof would be thrust upon the sponsors of the technology.
 
I do not suggest that this approach will result in a perfect technology
 
assessment function. In a democracy, one cannot seek or expect a perfect
 
solution to- every problem; one can ask and expect only that the facts will
 
be made known so that political forces can operate to produce the solution
 
the public demands.
 
8
 
The second case, that of government-sponsored technology, is quite
 
different. These technologies develop with government investment which is
 
in no way related to the forces of the market place; indeed they develop in
 
defiance of the market since government investment is made for the very 
reason that the market does not provide incentives for development of the
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technology on the time scale government believes is necessary. Thus- the
 
"deep pocket' of the government supports technology development merely
 
because desirable benefits Lre foreseen even though there are no market
 
incentives, while none of the restraints and deterrent -which are present
 
with respect'to piivately-developed technologies are operative in this case.
 
It is apparent', moreover, that as the technology is assessed at various
 
points (usually in connection with authorization of the program and appropria­
9

tion of funds ) as it passes from the hands of the specialists-sponsors within
 
the agency through'the less specialized offices in the higher echelons of
 
the Executive Branch to the generalists in the Congress, there is a natural
 
tendency to minimize the existence and significance of any potential hazards
 
associated with the technology. I do not-mean to suggest that hazards are
 
callously ignored. On the contrary, they are usually carefully explored
 
and considered by the sponsors of the technological development. But the
 
existence of even substantial potential hazards rarely chills the enthusi­
asm of the mission-oriented agencies who are eager to demonstrate that what
 
is possible is feasible and will bring immense benefits to the public.
 
Hazards and risks are characteristically rationalized away. The ration­
alizations take one or more of the following forms: (1) The hazards are not
 
as serious as might appear; at least-there has been no demonstration that
 
they will indeed be harmffil. C2) Even if there may be some hazard or
 
inconvenience to the public, this may be "tolerable" or "acceptable" in
 
view of the enormous benefits the public will receive from use of the tech­
nology. (3) We are conducting research to learn more about the potential
 
hazards and research and development to provide a technological fix to
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eliminate or reduce the hazards. (4) In any event, there is no need to
 
worry about possible adverse consequences of the technology until its feasi­
biliby has been established. (5) Obviously, the government will permit use
 
of the technology only subject to appropriate controls to-assure that the
 
public will not be injured, and if such controls are 'not adequate to protect
 
the public, government will not permit use of the technology. QED. -
One need only consider the history of government development of such
 
technologies as atomic energy,10 weather modification, the supersonit
 
transport plane, and various military technologies such as-biological and
 
chemical agents to.appreciate that -existence of very substantial hazards has
 
not deterred development of such technologies because of precisely such
 
rationalizations. It is clear, moreover, that such rationalizations have
 
been accepted at the higher levels of technology assessment, i.e., the
 
Executive Offices, the cognizant congressional committees, and the Congress.
 
The impulse to convert science into technology which will be of benefit to
 
society seems to be irresistible at every level. In part, at least, this
 
may be attributable to the fact that information about the adverse conse­
quences reaches the higher and more generalized areas of -technology assess­
ment, if at all,, in a highly distilled form which does not facilitate
 
discussion and debate.
 
Although we do not have too much experience, outside of the military
 
and space areas, with the processes through which government developed
 
technology is introduced into practical application, some generalizations,
 
are possible. It seems inherent in the American governmental and political
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process that government will have an irresistible impulse to see technologies
 
developed by it put to practical use. For one thing, bureaucrats and­
politicians cannot lightly contemplate the prospect of having spent tens
 
or hundreds of millions of dollars on a project which turns out to be a
 
white elephant in the form of a feasible but unusable technology. Can it
 
be doubted that weather modification will be practiced when -the technology
 
is developed even though interests of a substantial number of people will
 
be substantially and adversely affected? Or that the supersonic transport
 
plane, when and if finally developed, will eventually be permitted to fly
 
in a manner which will result in effects which many members of the public
 
regard as intolerable? Again, I do not want to be read as suggesting that
 
government callously will foist hazardous technologies upon the public.
 
There is really no such thing as a clear-cut dichotomy between "safe" and
 
"hazardous". This is an area in which there is no black and white.
 
Whether or not something is appropriately safe or unduly hazardous is an
 
issue which lies in a gray area and the resolution of which is essentially
 
a matter of judgement on which reasonable men can differ depending upon
 
their outlook and biases. All that I suggest is that those who have a
 
vested interest in a technology will inevitably be more relaxed about haz­
ards than those who don't give a damn about the technology but who are
 
primarily concerned with the public safety.
 
We do have substantial experience in one area which is instructive.
 
The government has for many years sponsored and promoted the development
 
of nuclear power technology, and has supported, subsidized, and promoted
 
the introduction of the technology by private enterprise. This has taken
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place despite the fact that the public will be exposed to very small incre­
ments of man-miade radiation which, although never demonstrated to have
 
resulted in manifest injury, are clearly regarded as at least undesirable.1 1
 
The public is also called upon to assume the "exceedingly remote possibility"
 
of a nuclear power reactor accident which could cause damages to health,
 
life, and property of enormously catastrophic consequences, dwarfingby
 
many orders of magnitude any other conceivable catastrophe which might re­
sult from a man-made cause. Protection of the health and safety of the
 
public rests with a regulatory scheme which places reliances on "engineer­
ed safeguards", but, as we all know; man's engineering genius is far from
 
infallible.12 To further press this point, when the market'place flashed
 
a red light which would definitely deter private investment in the tech­
nology because of the enormous potential public liability (for which adequate
 
insurance coverage was not available) in the event of an accident, govern­
ment's response was to enact the Price-Anderson Act to remove this "roadblock."
 
That Act superimposes upon $82 million of private liability insurance pro­
tection (the maximum available) a government indemnity of $500 million
 
and cuts off any further public liability in excess of $582 million.13
 
This completely eliminates potential liability as a deterrent, since it is
 
not possible that any firm could sustain one penny's worth of liAbility
 
out of its own pocket. And, finally, it is candidly admitted that the
 
AEC regulatory program
 
...exerts all effort which could reasonably be ex­
pected to insure that there is no undue hazard to the
 
public health and safety while at the same time no
 
crippling obstacle is placedin the waydof development 
of [the] industry . . . (Emphasis added.) 14 
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There is, I believe, substantial reason to believe that the general
 
pattern will be to entrust regulation of new government-sponsored technol­
ogies to the agencies which developed them and have an interest in their
 
application.15 Let me add, however, that I do not think separation of
 
promotion and regulation into two separate agencies would be a panacea.
 
There is also reason to believe that expert bodies, rather than the public
 
itself, will make the decision as to what risks the public will be required
 
to assume in exchange for what benefits. Experts will decide on how much
 
sonic boom the public can stand; how much radiation it can tolerate in ex­
change for what benefits; when it should rain, shine, blow or snow in the
 
public interest; what kinds of children the genetic engineers should pro­
duce to further policy objectives; etc.
 
I believe the only effective mechanism for protecting the public
 
against the onslaught of new government-sponsored technologies is the type
 
of devil's advocate mechanism I have proposed. Indeed, such a mechanism
 
is much more necessary in this case of government-sponsored technology be­
cause it is the only effective means for building restraints and deterrents
 
into the system. Such an agency would give the public a full opportunity
 
to determine whether it wants the government to develop a new technology
 
which involves potential risks and, if so, the conditions under which de­
velopmentshould occur. It would force full consideration of potential
 
hazards upon the government at the developmental stage; and it would compel
 
regulatory agencies to give greater weight to the public health, safety, and
 
security than they do to the benefits of the technology. I cannot conceive
 
of any other technology assessment approach which would not involve the
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cost of significant loss of democratic -freedom in permitting an elite group
 
of experts to determine the extent to which individual rights will be su­
bordinated to the expert's conception of the public welfare in the name of
 
technological progress.
 
Let me try to recapitulate very briefly. I am distrustful of the ex­
perts. Scientists and engineers have a bias in favor of accomplishing what
 
they think can be accomplished. Their assumption that the problem of effec­
tive social control will take care of itself at an appropriate time is
 
politically invalid. In a government whose executive and legislative branch­
es are committed to achieving the benefits of science and technology,
 
excessive reliance is placed on the judgments of experts-because of the un­
fpunded myth that ordinary mortals are incapable of understanding the issues.
 
What is necessary is that there be injected into the assessment process
 
a clear and vigorous articulation of the negative factors in language com­
prehensible to the layman. This will compel the proponents of the technology
 
to present their case in similar language, and the decisions will be made
 
in the rough and tumble of the ordinary political process.
 
I am fully aware of the principal argument which will be made in
 
opposition to this proposal. It will run as follows. If the negative fac­
tors are presented to the public, to the Congress, and to administrative
 
agencies vigorously and in an unbalanced manner, undue apprehension will
 
develop because the recipients of this information will not be able adequate­
ly to evaluate the negative factors and place them in perspective. As a
 
consequence, scientific and technological advance will be unduly retarded.
 
My answer to this is two-fold. First, the proponents of the technology
 
74
 
have greater resources and at least equal access to the eyes and ears of
 
the public, the Congress, and the administrative agencies.- Secondly, I
 
can-conceive of no reason why the public in a democracy should be forced
 
to accept benefits it does not want, whatever the reason, rational or -ir­
rational.
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Footnotes
 
1 This point was effectively made by Harold L. Price, the'Director of
 
Regulation of -the Atomic Energy Commission, in 1961. Responding to
 
criticisms of the major role played by lawyers in the AEC's regula­
tory and licensing program, Price, a lawyer, said:
 
These questions are not deep scientific ques­
tions that can only be resolved back in somebody's
 
laboratory. Sure, we need and could not move with­
out the help of competent technical people, andiwe
 
get that-help. We who are not technically trained
 
cannot determine the calculations, and we-cannot de­
termine what the technical safety question is, and,
 
therefore, what the risk is. But once that has been
 
identified to us, you and we and anybody with reason­
able-training can make a commonsense judgement as to
 
whether the risk is acceptable or not.
 
2 	This phenomenon is manifest in the flouridation controversy. For an
 
example of the manner in which the establishment treated one dissenter
 
who was permitted to testify before the Joint Committee on Atomic
 
Energy in 1965, see Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic
 
Energy on Proposed Extension of AEC Indemnity Legislation, 89th Cong.
 
1st Sess. 155-76.
 
3 Special procedures-would, of course, be necessary where classified
 
information is involved.
 
4 The demand side of the market will indicate the extent to which buyers
 
will pay a particular price for a product with hazards; the extent to
 
which they will pay a higher price for the product with more safety
 
built in; and the extent to which they may accept the hazards at a
 
lower price.
 
5 For example, in 1931 the Wisconsin Supreme.Court decided that a care­
ful driver who splashes muddy water on a pedestrian on a rainy day should
 
not be held liable to the pedestrian. The court balanced the-benefits
 
against the risks: "The benefit of allowing people to travel under such
 
circumstances so far outweighs the probable injuries to bystanders that
 
such conduct is not disapproved." Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 233,
 
234 NW 372 (1931). This type of balancing operation is performed with­
out pretense of nice mathematical precision. Rather, it is a gross
 
process based on the informed and experienced judgement of judges who
 
reflect community values.
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6 There is,little direct evidence to .support this proposition because,
 
since a new technology when introduced is usually closely based upon
 
and related to previous experience, insurance is generally available
 
at reasonable rates. In the case of nuclear power, however, when the
 
new technology represented a quantum jump over previous experience and
 
previous levels of potential public liability, adequate liability in
 
surance was not available at any price, and it is clear that there
 
would have been no private investment in nuclear power in the absence
 
of alternative arrangements to eliminate the threat of substantial
 
uninsured liability. See infra.
 
7 Admiral Rickover has described the pattern as follows: "Warnings of
 
scientists are rejected as 'unproven' or 'exaggerated.' Later . . .
 
the argument shifts to an attack on the legitimacy of any kind of pro­
tective legislation. Such legislation would violate basic liberties,
 
it is claimed; it would establish government tyranny and subvert free
 
democratic institutions. If all this is futile and legislation is
 
imminent, there will be urgent demands that it be postponed until
 
'more research' can be undertaken to establish the appositiveness
 
of the proposed law." A Humanistic Technology, address before the
 
British Association for the Advancement of Science, London, Oct. 27,
 
1965.
 
8 There is also an intermediate case--private development of a tech­
nology where related government-sponsored work makes a substantial
 
contribution. The government contribution operates as a subsidy,
 
tending to cause the market to flash a green light for development
 
and introduction of the technology at an earlier date. The prin­
cipal effect will be that adverse affects will be felt by more
 
people to a greater extent at an earlier date, thereby heightening
 
the need for effective governmental technology assessment.
 
9 It is characteristic of most government-sponsored technology that
 
assessments take place in the context of consideration-or a relative­
ly small line item in a large budget or money bill. Only rarely
 
is the assessment made in terms of consideration of an isolated
 
public policy issue on which full attention can be focused.
 
10 I use atomic energy as my principal example in this portion of the
 
paper. I do so because it is the most advanced of the government­
sponsored technologies with an immediate impact on the public, and
 
because there is more relevant information available as to the
 
benefits and risks than for any other government-sponsored tech­
nology. I believe, however, that the atomic energy experience is
 
typical of the manner in which other government-sponsored technologies
 
have been and will be assessed.
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There is no evidence that exposure to low levels of radiation-have
 
produced manifest somatic injury; nor is there any evidence that there
 
is a threshhold of exposure below which no somatic injury will occur.
 
It is, however, generally accepted that any radiation exposure pro- ­
duces undesirable genetic mutations. These considerations lead to the
 
general rule enunciated by the Federal Radiation Council that "there
 
should not be any man-made radiation exposure without the expectation
of benefit.resulting from such exposure." In actual practice, the 
amounts of industrial radiation to which workers and the public may 
be exposed are established by the National Committee on Radiation 
Projection on what is candidly stated to be a "philosophy of risk" 
or "calculated risk" basis as they assess benefits and risks. De­
spite the fact that the Chairman of the NCRP has stated that the 
setting of radiation protection standards is not "basically a scien­
tific problem . . . . It is more a matter of philosophy, of morality, 
and of sheer wisdom," the people involved in the NCRP's standards­
setting function are all specialists in the relevant scientific 
disciplines. 
12 	Because the technology is new and leapfrogs experience, the engineer­
ed safeguards have little basis in experience and reflect primarily
 
the predictions of experts that they will be effective.
 
13 	A 1956 Brookhaven National Laboratories report estimated, on pes­
simistic assumptions, that a serious power reactor accident might
 
cause as much as $7 billion property damage in addition to sub­
stantial personal injury and loss of life. A more recent study,
 
the details of which have been suppressed, led to the conclusion,
 
as stated by the AEC Chairman, that because of additional experience
 
the chances of such an accident are even more exceedingly remote,
 
but because more recent power reactors are larger and are located
 
closer to population centers, the damages that might result could
 
be even more substantial.
 
14 	Report to the AEC by the Regulatory Review Panel, July 14, 1965.
 
15 	The difference in approach between the typical administrative
 
agency-concerned only with the protection of the public interest
 
and the new-fangled agencies which try to mix protection of the
 
public interest with promotion of technology is vividly illustrat­
ed by the example of radiation preservation of food. For many
 
years the atomic energy establishment has been developing a
 
technology for using radiation to preserve and sterilize food.
 
It believes the technology is now ripe for practical use by food
 
processors, and it is clear that if AEC had regulatory jurisdiction
 
the technology would now be used. Through a fluke in the law,
 
however, radiation is a "chemical food additive" subject to
 
regulation by the Food and Drug Administration. The FDA has re­
duced the atomic energy establishment to a state of petulant
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frustration by rejecting its claim that irradiation of food should be
 
,permitted-because it has been tested with no indications that irradi­
ated foods are harmful; the proper test, FDA insists, is that there
 
be a,demonstration that it is safe.­
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Discussion of THE ADVERSARY PROCESS IN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
 
Professor Green began the discussion with .a review of the basic
 
premises from which his argument proceeds. In his view, discussions of
 
technology assessment tend to be imprecise because of a failure to separate
 
distinct aspects of the problem before seeking solutions. One of the
 
primary distinctions which must be made is that which exists between private
 
technologies and the methods necessary for adequate assessment of such
 
technologies on the one hand and government-sponsored technology and its
 
assessment system on the other.
 
Of the two, Dr. Green is less worried about assessment of private
 
technologies. For such technologies "at the most basic level we find that
 
the marketplace provides a set of restraints which in themselves operate as
 
a form of technology assessment. I think it is clear that the system
 
works because there are competing interests involved; buyers and sellers
 
have their own self-interests." One element of the assessment system for
 
private interests is the high degree of individual responsibility for
 
hazards which is imposed by the legal system through liability provisions.
 
This compels a great deal of thought and analysis on the part of the de­
veloper of a technology before he is willing to embark on a new project.
 
On top of the marketplace, a system of governmental assessment affects the
 
private developer; "legislative and regulatory processes are, in a very real
 
sense, a technology assessment." Government regulation involves a high
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degree of the adversary process. Dr Green noted that
 
. . . the Administrative agency which is entrusted with
 
regulatory responsibility really doesn't function properly
 
unless it is, in a very real sense, an adversary. It is
 
an adversary in most cases because it is charged with the
 
single responsibility .of pursuing the public interest .
 
as opposed to the private interest in exploiting and
 
using a particular technology.
 
Thus; in the case of privately-pursued technologies, mechanisms exist for
 
effective assessment. Of course, these private and governmental institutions
 
of assessment do not always function adequately. For the market system to
 
operate with full effectiveness as an assessment mechanism there must be
 
adequate knowledge on the part of the parties involved. That knowledge must
 
be available before the effects of the technology are strongly felt. These
 
conditions are not always met because of the difficulty of establishing a
 
clear causal relationship between hazards and results. As for the govern­
mental assessment, it is often ineffective due to "inertia and stagnation
 
on the part of both legislative and regulatory bodies."
 
The problems of government-sponsored technologies are, in the speak­
er's view, more acute than those of the private sector. For one thing,
 
government technology develops much more rapidly and this means that
 
1t
to the extent that the technology is hazardous more people suffer
 
more injury before it is possible to take effective action" to restrain
 
the technology. No real restraints exist other than what Dr. Green char­
acterizes as "self-restraint." Decisions to proceed are made on a calculated
 
risk basis with determinations as to acceptable risk made "largely on the
 
basis of judgements by scientists."
 
It is taken as axiomatic that benefits of technologies are always
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adequately articulated. It is the purpose of the technology assessment
 
mechanism proposed in the paper to correct this imbalance by "ferreting
 
out the risks." The mechanism would also question the "uncritical accept­
ance" of expert opinion and the assumption that "our legislativebodies
 
and the public are incapable of comprehending the information which is
 
relevant to decisions (with technological components)" and would seek to
 
make the important issues understandable to all of the interested public.
 
This would compel proponents of technological application to respond in
 
kind.
 
Dr. Green concluded: "I visualize that this will stir people up-­
that it will get people apprehensive and I think that this is useful."
 
He did not have to wait long to see his prophesy fulfilled. A seminar
 
participant responded to the paper with surprising vehemence:
 
I'm sure you've all heard the homily that it takes a
 
carpenter to build a barn but any jackass can kick it down.
 
This arrogant, gratuitous, and insulting paper by Professor
 
Green is representative of all the jackasses in the world.
 
His certitude in the correctness of his position is unmatched
 
since the dogmatists of the Middle Ages. His nihilism would
 
undo a million years of evolution for, make no mistake about it,
 
what Professor Green is proposing here is nothing less than the
 
complete destruction of civilization.
 
Later, this participant admitted that his wording was perhaps too strong
 
but that a response of this sort was necessary in order to balance the
 
extreme position taken in the paper.
 
This "intemperate attack" was criticized by another seminar participant.
 
He rejected the notion that any efforts toward the regulation of technology
 
lead to the destruction of the civilization that now exists and stated that
 
"I don't believe that the jackasses are all wrong. Occasionally a jackass
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stands up-and kicks in the right direction."
 
There seemdd, at this point in the discussion, to be some feeling among
 
those present that the prepared paper might be a spoof or "a jesting'probe
 
to goad -us into thinking," but most of the comments which follow were based
 
on the assumption that it was meant s&riously. ­
An'agency'official thought that the paper proposed, in essence, the
 
"institutionalization of converatism." 'He expressed some concern with the
 
manner in ihich society seems to establish different'sets of evaluative
 
criteria for new social technologies, of which the proposal in the paper
 
is one example, than for new biblogical -and physical te&hnologies and asked
 
the participants, "Are you willing to b& as skeptical about new social
 
technologies as (you are) about new physical technologies?"
 
The same speaker further characterised the proposed assessment mech­
anism as the "institutionalization of reasons for fear." This worried him 
because 
7e all know that demagoguery is fueled by fear'and it
 
seems to me that you've proposed here the ferreting out and
 
publication of -fear.
 
Another agency official took 'issue with this point of view. "Is it not
 
the ignorant who are stampeded by fear?" he asked. The proposal, in his
 
opinion, seeks to reduce ignorance and to increase rationality. Dr. Green
 
echoed this point, noting that the institution he proposes is to be a
 
"responsible" body and would not go out of its way to frighten people.
 
The discussion turned to a consideration of some of the specific
 
assumptions and points of the paper. A university researcher questioned
 
the assumption that benefits of technology are always articulated. Citing
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the example of the automobile manufacturers reaction to electronic car
 
development he claimed that "large and powerful economic interests very
 
often serve as a brake, rather than as an accelerator, for technological
 
change." A Congressional aide agreed that very often technological advances
 
require more effective articulation. Dr. Green conceded that there are
 
cases in which industrial concerns choose, for some reason, to suppress
 
innovations. His point was not to deny this but rather to emphasize that in
 
those cases in which economic motivation exists, the benefits are always
 
articulated. The problems raised by industries sometimes hindering inno­
vation were, he felt, beyond the scope of the paper.
 
A professor could not clearly visualize the role of scientific experts
 
in the proposed mechanism. Even this "negative agency" would be required
 
to get its information from "the scientists and technologists in whom
 
you've stated little reliance should be placed." How is the information
 
to be used? "If you can't use their scientific judgements pro, why should
 
you accept their scientific judgement con." Dr. Green responded that
 
scientists would play a very important role in the kind of technology
 
assessment mechanism he proposes but he insisted that scientists should
 
not make decisions on problems of "philosophy, morality, and sheer wisdom."
 
An industry representative said that he could not agree that private
 
commercial applications create less of a problem in technology assessment
 
than do government sponsored technologies. And an agency official challeng­
ed the assumption that the market mechanism is an effective assessment
 
device citing as examples the use of polyvinyl chloride containers and de­
tergents as just two failures of the market mechanism. Dr. Green pointed
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out that he had not claimed that the market was completely effective but
 
felt that it was "useful." It fails to work effectively when it neglects
 
the "externalities" such as long range environmental effects.
 
A university researcher believed that the value of an institution of
 
the type proposed in the paper was that it provides a place for the citizen
 
to go when he feels threatened by some technological advance. Now one can
 
go to Congress, but effective action doesn't always result unless a willing
 
champion for a particular cause is found.
 
A Legislative Reference Service staff member noted that it would
 
probably be quite difficult to find people who would be willing to work for
 
a one-sided organization such as the proposed assessment institution. Dr.
 
Green agreed with this point when he stated that "the kind of organization
 
that I propose is not viable for the reason that you could never get anybody
 
to work for it." He even noted that while he had not intended his paper as
 
a spoof or a "put-on" he felt that it might, in reality, be a spoof because
 
of the difficulty of staffing the assessment body. Still, he felt that it
 
was useful to discuss the concept of such an organization.
 
A significant polarization in the attitudes expressed during the dis­
cussion was noted and criticized by two participants. One, a university
 
researcher pointed out that acceleration of technology without restraint
 
and "reverting back to the aboriginites" are not the only two alternatives
 
open to society. He hoped that we "could encourage and stimulate technology"
 
while keeping it responsive to public demands. The other, a professor, felt
 
that the proposal of an agency of the sort being considered without a careful
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definition of "bad" effects on technology runs a risk of missing the "big
 
middle." The "big middle" is composed of
 
those things produced by technology which government
 
agencies legally can't do a thing about because they don't
 
harm, don't do you any good -- all they do is bleed your
 
pocket.
 
Unless the agency broadens its definition of negative effects to include
 
this middle ground it fails to protect the consumer.
 
An industry representative agreed with Dr'. Green's faith in the man­
on-the-street as a decision-maker. The essence of democracy is the ability
 
of the people to decide upon actions to be taken in the public interest.
 
A Congressional aide said, however, that the best you can expect from the
 
public is that "they rise to the occasion once in a great while." The
 
public would quickly tire of becoming involved in ail technology assess­
ments. But an agency official replied,
 
I think you neglect the tremendous propensity of the American
 
public for being engaged in a soap opera. There 'isno shortage
 
of people who want to go out and belly-ache about any conceivable
 
kind of bad thing that's going on.
 
Another participant, however, still felt that "the public has a limited
 
capacity for indignation." He claimed that we can't expect all problems to
 
be handled by public controversy and that in the long run new laws and
 
institutions with clearly defined responsibility are necessary. Still
 
another speaker noted that in many cases the public seems to take no action
 
at all in the face of potential hazards (such as polyvinyl chloride bottles).
 
"Are you saying that public inaction is a choice in these things?" he asked.
 
An agency official sought to examine just how far one can or should
 
rely on the public to make decisions in its own interest. The question
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which must be considered is similar to the one which asks whether a patient
 
should direct a doctor on the form of medication he is to receive. Tech­
nology assessment is, in a sense, a professional endeavor and
 
a very important function of a professional ethic is . .
 
(that it requires action) in the interest'of the client
 
. . . whether or not the client agrees that the action is
 
in his interest.
 
Thus, for instance, we impose the requirement that all people be immunized
 
against certain diseases without in each case consulting the person to be
 
immunized. He askedDr. Green whether he truly thought that the public
 
should always be permitted to make decisions in its interests. For example,
 
should the public be permitted to take action which could be destructive to
 
itself? Dr. Green held that the example of a doctor's treatment of a pa­
tient was not really relevant to the question at hand and repeated his
 
point that
 
the question is entirely one of knowledge, of legislative
 
responsibility, and of the public's ability to respond
 
meaningfully. It seems to me to be 'axiomatic that if
 
one is talking about a question of balancing risks to the
 
public against benefits to the public, it is the public
 
itself which ought to be the one to decide whether it wants
 
those benefits in exchange for the risks.
 
Some of those present were concerned about the location of an insti­
tution such as the one proposed here. A professor and a Congressional
 
staff member thought that a-true adversary process would be best located
 
in the Congress. But another Congressional aide disagreed. Congress, he
 
held, is apt to be slow in getting mobilized on most issues and technology
 
assessment, to be effective, often requires a rapid response. Further,
 
Congressmen serve theit constituents and often vote for programs which are
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locally beneficial even if there are detremental aspects on a national
 
scale. An6ther participant held that an effective technology assessment
 
mechanism should be located near the President in order to best influence
 
national policy. An agency official objected to any location within the
 
governmental structure. An arm of Congress is subject to manipulation; an
 
arm of the executive is ultimately subject to pressures such as those which
 
confronted the National Bureau of Standards during the battery additive
 
controversy. He concluded that the proper location is "in the public domain."
 
Others believed that effective technology assessment requires more than one
 
location and the discussion of this point concluded without any real con­
sensus.
 
Dr. Green asked those present-whether there could be any conceivable
 
objection to allowing the public to possess full information on all matters.
 
A university researcher agreed that information availability was to be de­
sired but questioned whether a mechanism whose sole function is the deter­
mination and dissemination of information concerning the detrimental aspects
 
of technological applications really provided a means for giving the public
 
all of the relevant information. To this Dr. Green responded that the
 
public is certainly not fully informed now (although a congressional staff
 
member insisted that in this country we are better informed than those in
 
"any other society on the face of the earth") and that his proposed insti­
tution would help to fill some of the gap.
 
A university researcher said that the objections which had been ex­
pressed concerning the "negative" assessment mechanism had perhaps been
 
overstated.
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We probably need quite a multiplicity of new institutions
 
and mechanisms and ways of dealing with this (technology assess­
ment). I don't see anything incompatible between an agency
 
doing so'called objective detailed analyses looking at all
 
sides of a question and another group which is trying to bring
 
out certain of the negative aspects ... and to present them in
 
an effective way that everyone can understand.
 
le proposed experimenting with numerous types of social institutions in
 
order t6 develop effective mechanisms for technology assessment.
 
It was a consensus of the participants that a comptehensive assessment
 
system is necessary and that some sort of adversary process can play a role
 
in such a system. A participant summed up the feelings of the group by
 
noting that almost everyone present thought that an objective agency is
 
needed somewhere in the system and that a smaller number felt that an
 
"adversary institution" of the kind proposed by Dr. Green could also play
 
an important role in a truly effective assessment system.
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4: 	 THE MANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
 
Louis H. Mayo
 
I. Introduction 
 N 9 0 0
 
This is not the first time in 	history that various societies have
 
been concerned about technological innovation and the dire impact, actual
 
or prospective, of new applications on existing interests, institutions
 
and value schemes of such societies. Some think, however, that we are
 
now faced with a technological intrusion of such magnitude that it
 
threatens devastation not only to the environment but to our fundamental
 
social values and institutions. We can no longer easily assume that
 
technology is routinely absorbed into the social matrix, in turn modifying
 
social attitudes and practices. In the view of some serious observers, the
 
new technology may very well obliterate the social matrix. In a most
 
provocative article in the Saturday Review of March 2, 1968, Wilbur H. Ferry
 
of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions posed the question:
 
"Must We Rewrite the Constitution to Control Technology?" He came out with
 
an affirmative answer. Mr. Ferry concluded his piece with a quote from
 
Robert L. Heilbroner:
 
(T)he coming generation will be the last generation
 
to seize control over technology before technology
 
has irreversibly seized control over it. A generation
 
is not much time, but it is some time . .I
 
One may or may not agree with Professor Heilbroner's blunt assessment, but
 
few would disagree that the misuse of technology can produce swift and tragic
 
harm. Such an assertion, however, does not move us far toward the design of
 
technology control mechanisms which will be most compatible with-our preferred
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social values. We must work from, or out of, the existing context of
 
conditions, trends and resource constraints, whether we like it or not.
 
Surely, we would not wish to discard every element out of existing
 
technology assessment structure, even though some drastic revision may
 
urgently be in order. At least it would seem advisable to assure our­
selves as to why and in what respects our present assessment arrangements
 
are inadequate. In any event, we have little choice but to recognize
 
and work from the base of existing social institutions, eliminating,
 
modifying or adding assessment mechanisms and processes as necessary for
 
the development of a "controlled technological system, capable of producing
 
benefits by design rather than by accident."
2
 
The basic thrust of this paper is to analyze the frequently advanced
 
notion of a Total Problem Approach to technology assessment. A tentative
 
suggestion is offered of one type of institutional arrangement which might
 
produce a close approximation to the Total Problem Assessment approach.
 
Such an arrangement would supplement and coordinate the Existing Technology
 
Assessment Function; it would not supplant it.
 
Several terms and expressions are used throughout this paper which
 
require tentative definition. Technology Assessment Function is employed
 
to refer to technology assessment activities in a general sense. Technology
 
Assessment refers to the-identification of the effects (direct-and derivative­
immediate, intermediate and long-term) and the evaluation of the social
 
desirability or undesirability of such effects as related to particular
 
technological applications. Mechanism(such as a Congressional Committee or
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the OST or a Special Study group) refers to the organizational Ientity
 
conducting the assessment process. Process refers to the decisional/
 
operational procedures (adversary process, panel discussion, research study)
 
utilized by the assessment mechanism. A particular mechanism and its
 
customary decisional process constitutes an Assessment Sub-system. The
 
term Assessmen System refers to all assessment sub-systems which have
 
relevance to a given technological application (flouridation, aircraft
 
noise abatement) or a pattern of similar applications (food and drug
 
assessmeht system). Social Sub-system is used to refer to the social
 
interactions and social effects taken into account in the assessment of
 
a given technological application. Normally, Assessment Sub-systems for
 
a given application will consider only limited interactions and impacts of
 
the Total Social Sub-system affected by such application.
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II. 	 The Technology Assessment Function: A Brief Overview
 
If we accept as a tentative definition of technology assessment,
 
the identification of the effects (direct and derivative--immediate,
 
intermediate and long-term) and the evaluation of the social desirability
 
or undesirability of such effects as related to particular technological
 
applications, one is probably safe in asserting that the decision process
 
in every substantial technological project involves to some degree technology
 
assessment.
 
While "technology assessment" seems to be an expression of recent
 
origin, examination of the literature will disclose innumerable examples
 
of technology assessment as defined above even though most instances are
 
obscured within other frames of discussion. The volumes of Singer (Ed.)
 
on A History of Technology; Derry and Williams, A Short History of
 
Technology (1961); Kranzberg, Melvin and Carroll Pursell, Technology in
 
Western Civilization (1967); Bronowski and Mazlish, The Western Intellectual
 
Tradition (1960); Elting E. Morison, Men, Machines and Modern Times (1966)
 
and Dupree, Science in the Federal Government (1957) are rich sources of
 
information.
 
From earliest times we can gain some perception of the interaction
 
between developing technology and society and the various means employed
 
to evaluate the social impact of applications. We are advised by R. J.
 
Forbes in Technology in Western Civilization that in ancient Mesopotamia
 
on occasion technical projects were submitted to the scrutiny and
 
advice of learned bodies of priests who formed advisory boards."3 The
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military has often been the social organization taking the initiative
 
in the assessment and application of new technologies. Surely the
 
major technological projects through history have involved tremendous
 
efforts-in planning, resource allocation and implementation which have
 
inevitably required some evaluation of benefits and costs, whatever
 
the value system might have veen against which such impacts were measured.
 
Societies have been concerned with the interrelationship of technological
 
applications on such social values as health and well-being, the physical
 
environment; national prestige, the economy and= certainly with the impact
 
of scientific and technological advance on systems of belief and thought
 
processes.
 
Assessments are usually intertwined with an on-going.decision process
 
which renders it difficult to make "clean" extractions of assessment from
 
other phases of such processes. For descriptive purposes it may be useful
 
to apply the,following rough distinctions among assessments:. reactive
 
(evaluations of impact after the application has been made); projective
 
(evaluations pf probable impact prior to the application of the technology)
 
and reactive-projective (evaluations made.through time from early to
 
advanced applications of developing technology).
 
There is an almost endless list of technology assessments,on a "grand
 
scale" where massive commitments of resources have been required,. One can
 
easily imagine the magnitude of the effort in terms of debate, analysis,
 
planning and implementation which was involved in such engineering projects
 
as the separate and elaborate aqueduct and sewer systems of the city of Rome,
 
the extensive land-reclamation projects in the Netherlands during the late
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Middle Ages, and the construction of the Suez Canal in the 1860's. Several
 
"lassessments" were made of the technical feasibility as well as the probable
 
political and economic implications of the Suez Canal.4 It is of interest
 
to note that the assessment and planning of a complete national transporta­
tion network was carried out in our early history. The scheme, though never
 
enacted, was put forward in 1824 by the Corps of Topographical Engineers
 
under the War Department. Professor A. Hunter Dupree states in Science in
 
the Federal Government:
 
Despite constitutional scruples, the Congress increasingly:
 
appropriated money for roads and harbor improvements. One
 
offshoot of Monroe's straddling position on the constitution­
ality of internal improvements was the Survey Act of 1824,
 
under which the Corps of Topographical Engineers made a
 
comprehensive plan for canals between the Chesapeake and
 
the Ohio, along the Atlantic seaboard, and for a road from
 
Washington to New Orleans. This plan, the only one the
 
government ever attempted to make for the country as a
 
whole, required considerable technical competence, and had
 
it been executed, would have required-even more.5
 
Technological applications have almost always had their detriments as
 
well as their benefits and this is particularly evident with respect to
 
environmental encroachments. For example, in the 1500's "dwellers in the
 
iron-working districts of England and Northern France were complaining
 
bitterly of the shortage of fuel and demanding checks upon the activities
 
.of the ironmasters"6 who werecutting down acres of surrounding forests to
 
supply their fuel:-needs for smelting iron, thereby depriving the local people
 
of both easily accessible firewood-and recreational areas. In the mid-1800's,
 
English citizens protested loudly over the noisy, smoky locomotives. 'Many
 
land owners arranged for intermittent firing of guns across their ground to
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keep out railroad surveyors. "Parliament, exercising the right of eminent
 
domain,-eventually overcame these difficulties for the railroad companies,
 
but only at a price: as a concession to objectors., a change was included
 
in railway charters requiring that locomotives must not emit smoke." 7 And
 
the public reaction to large steam carriages "brought forth in 1865 the
 
famous RED FLAG ACT which required a flagman on foot to precede each steam
 
vehicle."8 The manufacture of-explosives such as nitroglycerine posed
 
serious hazards. "In Britain the most satisfactory conditions for explo­
sive manufacture were codified in the Explosives Act of 1875, and similar
 
legislation was introduced in other countries to safeguard the workers in
 
the industry."9
 
The experience of this country with reference to efforts to protect
 
the health, safety and general welfare of its citizens as,well as the natural
 
environment, is given detailed treatment in Dupree's Science in the Federal
 
Government. Congress has been intimately concerned with an extremely broad
 
range of matters which have in some substantial manner involved technology
 
assessment, as for example:
 
1) In the early 1800's, Dr. James Smith of Baltimore proposed the
 
free distribution of cowpox vaccine as a protection against small­
pox. Congress.in 1813 "passed a law naming him Vaccine agent and
 
giving him the privilege of using the mails without paying postage."
 
In 1820 it was proposed that a "national vaccine institution" be
 
- chartered by Congress. But an unfortunate mistaken shipment of 
smallpox scabs instead of cowpox vaccine to North Carolina resulted
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in the inevitable spread of the disease. Subsequent objections
 
by a North-Carolina Congressman defeated efforts to-provide
 
federal aid to the institution and led to the abandoment of the
 
idea of free national distribution of the vaccine.1 0
 
2) 	 Certainly one of the most interesting technology assessment
 
iiicidents in our history involved steam boiler explosions.
 
Between 1816 and 1848 "a total of 233 steamboat explosions had
 
occurred in which 2,563 persons had been killed and 2,097 injured,
 
with property losses in excess df $3 million'I I While it was not
 
until 1852 that stringent and effective laws were enacted regulating
 
boiler construction, operation and inspection, the Franklin Institute
 
had researched the problem in 1836 and made recommendations at that
 
time which embodied most of the recommendations finally adopted in
 
1852.12
 
3) 	 The rapid railroad expansion after the Civil War brought with it
 
some public health problems. "Cattle brought from the southern
 
states, though remaining healthy themselves, infected northern
 
animals in large numbers with a disease that often proved fatal
 
(Texas cattle fever)." Congress appropriated $15,000 for the
 
Commissioner of Agriculture-to investigate the problem of livestock
 
disease, but the results seem to have been unsatisfactory. A
 
similar problem arose later with the introduction of refrigerated
 
ships for the exportation of Americaimeat to Europe. Hog cholera
 
and trichinosis was the result. In response to this "crisis"
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Congress created a new Bureau of Animal Industries to investigate,
 
regulate and prevent the transmission of livestock-carried
 
diseases.13
 
4) 	 In the early 1860"s, Spencer F.-Baird of the Smithsonian noticed
 
the "great diminution in the numbers of the fish which furnish the
 
summer food supply to the Coast" resulting from fishing in the
 
breeding grounds. He insisted that federal regulation was necessary
 
and that-it should be based on a research program to ascertain
 
"not only the biology of each species of fish, but . . . the
 
ecology of life in the ocean." The independent Fish Commission
 
was created in 1871 which-was changed to the Bireau of Fisheries
 
of the Department of Commerce and Labor in 1903.14
 
5) 	 In the 1850's the introduction of the English sparrow upset the
 
ecological balance in an unexpected way. Private scientific
 
societies such as the American Ornithologists Union began to survey
 
the nation's wildlife and assess ecological factors in wildlife
 
distribution. The national scope of such problems brought in the
 
federal government which in 1886 established the Division of
 
Economic Ornithology and Mammology in the Department of Agriculture.15
 
6) 	 The conservation plans of John Wesley Powell of the Geological
 
Survey in the 1880's with respect to irrigation and Western land
 
settlement met great hostility inside and outside the government.
 
As Dupree states: "The irrigation work was dead, and with it
 
Powell's great plan of orderly settlement based on facts of
 
environment as determined by science."1 6
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Perhaps the crux of the historical import of technology assessment,
 
relevant to present purposes, is that in the Western countries there has
 
been a strong presumption that the impact of .scientific inquiry and
 
technological advance is socially beneficial. From Francis Bacon on we
 
seem to have accepted the "science is good in itself" notion. Certainly
 
-.the scientific approach, however superficial, pervaded the outlook of the
 
philosophers of the Enlightenment, that high.point-of, belief in human
 
rationality and the potential of man to perfect himself and society on earth.
 
The Royal Society (chartered 1662) and similar organizations promoted the
 
idea that 'investment in science was an investment in prosperity.'1 7 Such
 
organizations as the Lunar Society (1775-1791) were more "practical minded"
 
and socially sensitive to impact of science and;technology than the more
 
prestigious Royal Society. 1 8 Even the human wastage and misery inflicted by
 
the early 19th century Industrial.Revolution did not greatly diminish our
 
infatuation with science and technology.,
 
But many voices were raised over the abuses of expanding industrialism
 
supported by technological development. Not only were -alarms sounded of the
 
degrading human situation resulting from industrialism, but in some instances
 
rather far-sighted action was taken to curb such abuses.19 Yet the over­
riding attitude continued to encourage technological development. This was
 
particularly true in America during the 19th century where resources were
 
abundant, the population was dispersed, transportation needs were critical
 
and individual initiative was given the widest scope. According to the
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authors of a Short History of Technology the technological progress achieved
 
by the end of the 19th century was prodigious. They state: "For technology
 
exists to produce goods and services, and the western world had marvelously
 
increased its productivity, measured in terms-of-human labor." They con­
tinue' "by 1900 . . . the unskilled laborer in all-the western countries was 
earning more and had a shorter w6rking'iay than the privileged'class of
 
skilled workers before the Industrial Revolution."20 But there were some
 
who expressed misgivings as the following quote from Men, Machines and Modern
 
Times indicates in reference to Thomas Huxley:
 
He came to Baltimore toward the end of the last century
 
to say that he remained unimpressed by all the power,
 
natural resources, knowledge and machinery that had so
 
greatly extended man's competence over his physical
 
environment. "The great issue," he went on, "about which
 
hangs a true sublimity and the terror of overhanging fate
 
is, what are you going to do with all these things?"
21
 
Nevertheless, the industrialism supported by doal, s.team and a burst of
 
inventiveness and motivated by the excitment of "progress" and personal
 
gain reflected a social attitude raised to a Constitutional right through
 
the doctrine of 'freedom of contract." 2 2 Furthermore, many of the truly 
dedicated efforts to protect a broader and longer term concept of the 
"public interest" wdre-blunted or defeated by the reluctance of the federal 
government to encroach upon the traditional bounds of the State "police
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power" over health, safety and general well-being.

As some of the preceding comments have indicated, this nation has applied
 
various assessment mechanisms since the early 1800's although we have relied
 
primarily on the "market" system for guiding and shaping the nature of new
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technological applications... There have-been notable exceptions, however,
 
as with the long agitation for, improved public protection from adulterated
 
foods and drugs. 24 Further, the telegraph represents an early instance of
 
initial government support for the "demonstration" phase .of a new technological
 
application.2 5 Governmental regulation has, in general, been gradual and
 
piecemeal and--as.in the case of transportation--usually evolved as a
 
reaction to public demand for correction of specific and severe adverse
 
effects of particular applications. The Judical, Legislative and. Executive
 
branches have all been participants in this assessment function, as have
 
numerous business, civic and professional associations.
 
Although the Interstate Commerce Commission was established in 1887
 
and the first Pure Food and Drug Act was enacted in 1906, many of our more
 
prominent technology-based regulatory agencies and statutory measures to
 
control technological applications were not established until well in the
 
20th century.26 For the-most part, these agencies represent reactive mea­
sures rather than prospective efforts to assure development of a new tech­
nology in the public interest. Even broadcasting was not brought under
 
regulatory control until 1927 after frequency interference became intolerable.2 7
 
The development of nuclear energy represents perhaps the most outstanding
 
example of new technology whose development began under government supervision
 
and for which a reasonable well-ordered assessment structure has been main­
tained.2 8 The Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 196629 was
 
a noteworthy example of the establishment of special assessment sub-systems
 
for a pattern of interrelated technological applications. This represented
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an effort to develop coordination among all relevant governmental agencies
 
and to design an overall national organizational structure for the advance­
ment of the marine sciences and the rational exploitation of ocean resources
 
for both national and international social goals. Pursuant to this Act,
 
the Council on Marine Resources and the Commission on the Marine Sciences,
 
Sciences, Engineering and Resources were organized to undertake these tasks.
 
Increasingly, since World War II, technological developments have been
 
initiated and supported by the government or through combined government
 
and industry efforts or government-university arrangements. Such government­
initiated and supported programs are normally subject to a formalized
 
assessment system which includes the following sub-systems (mechanisms and
 
review/decisional processes):
 
. One or more Agencies or Departments
 
Federal Council for Science and Technology
 
Office of Science and Technology
 
President's Science Advisory Committee
 
Bureau of the Budget
 
Congressional authorizing committees
 
Congressional appropriations committees
 
Congressional oversight committees
 
Originating Agency or Department once the program
 
in in operation
 
General Accounting Office
 
Official ad hoe commissions or study groups
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.Government contractors,or grantees
 
•Continuing,cycle of annual or.perliodic reviews
 
of on-going programs by the Bureau of the
 
Budget and other of the aforementioned
 
mechanisms.
 
The interaction among these sub-systems even with respect to one area
 
of technology can be extremely intricate. But the assessment is not likely
 
to be limited to governmental entities. Assessments may also be made by:
 
Users and operators of the technology involved
 
Community groups affected by a technological application
 
*lass media commentators
 
Specialized journals in science and technology
 
Scholars in various journals
 
Professional association committees and study groups
 
The National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of
 
Engineering
 
Independent policy and program analysis groups
 
Private standards-setting organizations
 
Etc.
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III. Fragmented Assessments and the Total Problem Approach
 
In part I of this paper it was-stated that the basic analytical concept
 
to be-examined would be that of a Total Problem Approach to Technology
 
Assessment. The Daddario Statement on Technology Assessment speaks of
 
'3 0
 
examining technological applications in terms of the "total social framework."
 
Senator Muskie in commenting on Senate Resolution 78,to establish a Senate
 
Select Committee on Technology and the Human Environment uses the expression
 
"total impact of scientific and technological change."3 1 The Staff Report
 
supporting the Muskie Resolution states in part:
 
The Subcommittee expressed its conviction that the "big
 
issue" of the future will be the ability of government
 
and particularly the Congress, to see and to cope with each
 
technological problem in its entirety, and to join the
 
social sciences with the physical sciences and engineering
 
to solve such problems. 3 2 (Italics added).
 
Attention should be given to what this concept means--br might mean--in the
 
context of the existing Technology Assessment Function. Technology assess­
ment must usually be considered-within a time frarespanning years. Most
 
technologies develop gradually. Hence, the social implications may not be
 
immediately perceived. The social impacts become more evident through time.
 
The means of evaluating the consequences may change through time. As
 
applications increase and the technology affects a larger segment of partici­
pants, the larger the number of interest groups that become involved as
 
operators or otherwise as receivers of benefits or absorbers of costs. As
 
participants increase, the number of assessment sub-systems (assessment
 
mechanisms and assessment processes) increases. Such assessment sub-systems
 
will normally be concerned with one special aspect of the problem. Only a
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few will give attention to the larger ,social sub-system affected by the appli­
cation or pattern of similar applications.
 
There are various reasons why assessments by particular sub-systems
 
are truncated. The authority to deal with given aspects of a problem may
 
not be with the-mechanism; or the sub-system-may have a capability for
 
dealing with only a special aspect of the problem; or the data may not be
 
available for it to make a useful assessment at a given point in time even
 
within its special area of competence. Even if the data is available to
 
establish the "present state of the art," an apparent lack of feasible
 
alternatives for advancing the analysis toward a proactical solution of the
 
problem may inhibit any genuine assessment effort. One of the obvious and
 
difficult barriers to reliable "public interest" assessments is the bias, 
overt or hidden, of most assessment sub-systems. 33 All of the essential
 
elements for a fully adequate assessment (one analyzing all of the variable
 
interactions within the total social sub-system) can be brought into focus
 
only at certain points in time. Hence, assessments are almost necessarily
 
incremental and cumulative with only periodic complete assessments being
 
made or even feasible.
 
A most useful study could be made on the strengths and weaknesses of
 
various assessment sub-systems. For example, a court case usually deals
 
with an after-the-fact situation and declares rights and duties flowing
 
from a technological application with respect to some highly restricted
 
issue. It is basically reactive as contrasted with a prospective assess­
ment. Initiation is not within the control of the court. The problem
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definition or scope of the assessment is largely determined by the issue in
 
contention. Information is selected and limited by relevance to the specific
 
issue.. In other words, the range of alternatives that can be considered is
 
extremely narrow.
 
Executive Departments and Agencies usually have their scope of authority
 
and responsibilities spelled out by a statute. Such authority may be a
 
narrow mandate for a special type of R & D with respect to a given technology.
 
It may be reasonably broad as where the mandate calls for the administration
 
of a given technology, such as broadcast communications, in-the "public
 
interest." Further the rule making and policy declaring authority of regulatory
 
agencies provide a projective dimension to the assessment function. Congress,
 
it would seem, of .all the permanent governmental entities, has the broadest
 
authority and flexibility to make inquiries and assessments. The charter of
 
special ad hoc study groups can vary from an inquiry into a specific issue to
 
a Total Problem Assessment.
 
An illustrative sampling of assessments of the so-called Aircraft
 
Noise Problem may give some specificity to the foregoing remarks. Some
 
aspect of this problem has been treated by the Judiciary, Congressional
 
Committees, the Executive Office of the President, Executive Departments
 
and Agencies, local government units, private engine and airframe manufac­
turers, special ad hoc study groups, individual scholars and many other
 
assessment sub-systems.
 
In the United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), military aircraft
 
flying as low as 83 feet over a chicken farm of the plaintiff, "caused the
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chickens to fly into the walls in fright, and destroy(ed) the use of the
 
property as a chicken farm."34 It was held that such diminution of
 
property value was a "partial taking" which'required compensation under
 
the Fifth Amendment, and thereby clarified certain specific rights and
 
liabilities.3 5 Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), involved
 
a similar "taking" through noise-from civil aircraft to or from a municipally­
owned civil airport and controlled by a government control tower. The court
 
was faced with the narrow question of determining the party liable--here the
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airport controller.

An extract from the Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Aircraft
 
Noise Abatement, No. 1353, of July 1, 1968, sets out in rather explicit and
 
succinct form the fragmentation of the assessment and decision function,
 
stating that its immediate concern was with noise abatement at the source.
 
The concern with aircraft noise has not, of course, been
 
confined to agencies of government. The several segments of
 
of the aviation industry have participated over the years
 
in numerous efforts looking toward solutions for noise and
 
sonic boom problems. Engine and airframe manufacturers
 
have maintained programs in noise research.
 
This investment by the industry is representative of one of
 
the avenues of approach to aircraft noise reduction, that
 
is, the development of aircraft which generate less noise.
 
Another approach to noise reduction is through the establish­
ment of special flight operating techniques and prodedures.
 
The third principal control technique which merits serious
 
consideration is the planning for land use in areas near
 
airports so as to make such use compatible with aircraft
 
operations. This is a matter largely within the province
 
of state and local governments. While all these tech­
niques must be thoroughly studied and employed, the first
 
order of business is to stop the escalation of aircraft
 
noise by imposing standards which require the full applica­
tion of noise reduction technology.3'
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In its Notice of Proposed Rule Making on "Noise Standards: Aircraft
 
Type Certification," issued by DOT/FAA on January 3, 1969, the FAA under­
took as its first order of business to concentrate "on the aircraft that
 
are most likely to raise aircraft noise levels in airport neighborhoods.
 
These aircraft include subsonic transport category airplanes regardless of
 
means of propulsion and sub-tonic turbojet powered airplanes regardless of
 
'
 
"38
category.
 
The Committee on Environmental Quality of the Federal Council on 
Science and Technology (September 1968), "Noise--Sound Without Value,"
 
stated in its report:
 
The objective of the Task Force was not an exhaustive treatise
 
on the technical aspects of the noise problem; but rather an
 
exposition of its dimensions and a proposal for a more
 
adequate federal program directed toward elucidating the
 
effects of noise on man and his environment and developing
 
means for abating the problem.39
 
The comprehensive staff report on "Policy Planning for Aeronautical
 
Research and Development," prepared for the Committee on Aeronautical and
 
Space Sciences of the Senate by the Legislative Reference Service of the
 
Library of Congress (May 1966) gave the noise problem very brief attention,
 
referring primarily to NASA responsibilities, but noted the then recently
 
published OST Report on "Alleviation of Jet Aircraft Noise Near Airports,"
 
including the broad scope and detailed treatment given the aircraft noise
 
problem in the Report.
 
Two studies have undertaken to place the aircraft noise problem in a
 
relatively broad social sub-system. The Summary Report of the Aeronautics
 
and Space Engineering Board of the National Academy of Engineering (August 1968)
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entitled."Civil Aviation Research and Development: An Assessment of Federal
 
Government Involvement," did not make noise the focal point of the study
 
but did consider noise in its relationship to other major variables in the
 
context of the general civil aviation program of the nation. And the Report
 
of the Jet Aircraft Noise Panel, Office of Science and Technology (March 1966),
 
entitled "Alleviation of Jet Aircraft Noise Near Airports," provided a multi­
dimensional perspective to the problem. This Report probably more closely
 
approximates a Total Problem Assessment than any of the others referred to
 
above.
 
A reasonably complete representation of the Aircraft Noise Assessment
 
System, including the various types of operations in the Policy Analysis,
 
Project Planning and Program Implementation Continuum that might be assessed,
 
and the range of sub-systems making up the assessment system is provided by
 
the Aircraft Noise Contextual Matrix (Appendix B to this paper). One
 
might start here with transportation or environmental pollution as the
 
broad Social Sub-System involved. If we dommenfhe with environmental
 
pollution, it is readily apparent that this area can be broken down into
 
air pollution, water pollution, radiation exposure, aesthetic debasement,
 
noise and so forth. Taking noise as the primary problem, sources can be
 
identified as surface transportation, construction, aircraft engine noise, etc.
 
The-source of aircraft engine noise can be reduced further to types of
 
aircraft or by a division between civil and military aircraft. The alleVi­
ation of the problem may be viewed as one of reducing engine noise, devising
 
noise abating take-off and landing techniques, or of laid use management.
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These three primary noise abatement target areas can be reduced further
 
into numerous sub-problems. If we select civil aircraft, it can be noted
 
that there are at least 35-40 entities or assessment sub-systems (mechanism 
plus the decisional processes of such mechanisms) which are relevant in 
the aircraft noise problem context. Each will have its own perspective
 
(interests or objectives), special capability, and on-going and planned
 
projects. Now: Who has the responsibility for the assessment of the
 
Total Aircraft Noise Problem? The Senate Report referred to above states
 
that "the Secretary (of DOT) is now the focal point for Government-wide
 
' 4 0 
activity in the field of aircraft noise abatement. But the Secretary
 
clearly does not have authority over all aspects of aircraft noise abatement.
 
The import of the foregoing is that only infrequently, if ever, during
 
the evolutionary period of a given application will there be a comprehensive
 
social impact approach taken by one of the assessment sub-systems. Even when
 
a supposedly total social sub-system approach is taken (an effort is made to
 
appraise all of the significant factor-variable interactions within the
 
relevant social sub-system), it will'necessarily be based upon thd information
 
available at that time. While this may be extremely useful for continuing
 
program planning'in connectio'with future applications of the given tech­
nology, as by identifying probable hazards which might be avoided, such
 
assessment is still only a stage of a continuing process of assessment--at
 
least until the technology has reached full utilization or the social problems
 
created by the technology have been eliminated or minimized by an innovative 
"technological fix.41 Hence, a Time Dimension must be incorporated in a
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workable approach to the Technology Assessment Function. More will be said
 
on this point later, but it might be noted that Congress first gave serious
 
attention to the aircraft noise problem in 1959 (many years later than the
 
courts), but it was not until 1968, after several interim hearings and
 
special studies, that Congress apparently felt sufficiently confident to
 
specifically authorize the FAA to establish maximum noise standards under
 
new Section 611, Control and Abatement of Aircraft Noise and Sonic Boom, as
 
an amendment to the Federal Aviation Act of 1968. Further, the assessment
 
went primarily to the abatement of aircraft noise at the source rather than
 
to the total aircraft noise social context. But the point here is that the
 
assessment of a relatively low priority social problem such as aircraft noise
 
can involve a variety of Assessment Sub-Systems, each having a different set
 
of objectives, capabilities, practices, feasible alternatives, and forums
 
(formal or informal) for making its contribution. Such assessment sub­
systems make up, by definition, the Assessment System for the particular
 
technological application. But the critical question is: Do they all
 
intersect at sufficiently frequent intervals to effectively combine
 
assessment outputs, and, even if they do, does this add up to a complete
 
assessment of the impact of the given application on the social sub-system
 
affected? Who has this responsibility for assuring a Total Problem Assess­
ment other than Congress? The OST? Do we need a new entity or a structure
 
of new assessment arrangements for this purpose?
 
The point of our Total Problem Assessment deficiency is well made
 
by Karl D. Kryter in his recent article, "Sonic Booms from Supersonic
 
Transport," 4 2 wherein he states:
 
In view of the costs and commitments of aviation
 
facilities involved in producing and operating the
 
SST, it would seem prudent for various governmental
 
and scientific bodies, if not the general public
 
itself, to examine closely the pertinent data from
 
psychological and sociological research and their
 
relation to arguments for and against the overland
 
operation of the SST. The general unavailability
 
of an integrated interpretation of the implications
 
of the psychological, sociological, and acoustical
 
research related to the acceptability of sonic booms
 
to people has prompted the publication of this paper.
 
In the last analysis the-sonic boom is a psychological­
sociological problem, and it would perhaps be regrettable
 
if all relevant information, such as it is, from these
 
scientific disciplines were not available and discussed
 
in the practical context of the problem. 43 '(Italics
 
added.)
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IV. 	Concept of Adequacy in Technology'Assessment
 
Reference to the Provisional Schematic: Tehnology Assessment Function
 
(Appendix A herein) will show the basic operational phases of a particular 
assessment. The assessment is initiated by some requirement (formal or 
customary) or some non-regularized stimulus such as a "crisis" situation. 
The task of problem definition may be "given" or it may have to be 
formulated by assessment sub-system. The Assessment Fuhction, of course, 
involves a continuous interaction among the iratious operational phases noted 
rather than a mechanical first phase, second phase, etc., procedure. Most 
assessments of a particular technological application involve periodic
 
assessments through time, the same assessment sub-system often making several
 
specific assessment inputs into the continuing assessment function.
 
In most assessment situations involving a problem of any complexity,
 
the establishment of the "definition of the problem" or the "objective of the
 
assessment" or the "context in which the problem is to be analyzed," or, in
 
short, the social sub-system encompassing the social variable interactions
 
and effects to be assessed, there.will be interplay among all of the opera­
tional phases shown on the TAF Schematic. Starting with a given assessment
 
sub-system and the institutional mechanism (Congressional Committee, for
 
example) which is undertaking the assessment, then the formulation of the
 
problem definition will or may depend upon the initiating stimuli, the
 
character (authority, capability, practices, etc.) of the assessing mechanism,
 
the availability of data relevant to an analysis of the social sub-system to
 
be assessed, the decisional procedures which the assessing mechanism is
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competent to employ, the possible followup actions which may result, and the 
-vajious impacts of alternative 'actions (social effects-:immediate or remote,
 
direct or indirect--on various participants ,--bocietal-values, and-community
 
institutions and practices).
 
There are various concepts of"Ad-uacy that might be applied. Approaches
 
will differ with the perspectives of particular "adequacy evaluators." Two 
different approaches will be given brief attention here. First, one might
 
accept the social sub-system or prbblem definition posited by the-assessing
 
mechanism and then measure Adequacr by the extent to which a full analysis
 
has ben-made of the social relatiofiships, interactions, and-effects within
 
thd social sub-system posited. In this approach, one is primarily concerned
 
with the Information Selection and Decisional Procedure phases of the assess­
ment. The second approach would begin with 'an analysis of the Adequacy of
 
the social sub-system posited. It would be necessary to take into account
 
such factors as the general nature of the problem (social impact of a given
 
technological application or applications), the'urgercy with which attention
 
should be directed to certain adverse effects, the formal obligations and
 
capability of the assessing-mechanism, the availability of data relevant to
 
various dimensions of the overall problem, and the probability of useful
 
application of the assessment results to maximize social benefits and minimize
 
social costs. The question would then be asked: Might a more comprehensive
 
model (social sub-system) have optimized the utility of the assessment? Or
 
conversely, might a less comprehensive model-have been a more sensible
 
"problem definition" in view of the factors mentioned above (such as capability 
114
 
of the assessing mechanism) or in view of the fact, in a given instance,
 
that other assessment sub-systems with high level capabilities had previously
 
assessed or were currently assessing all of the relevant dimensions of a
 
social sub-system co-extensive with the "total problem" and the remaining
 
need was only for a specialized assessment (within a constricted social
 
sub-system in which the particular assessing mechanism has a recognized
 
capability) in order to complete the full assessment of the "total problem?"
 
In the Second approach it is evident that the "adequacy evaluator" would
 
have to make an analysis and evaluation of the Information Selection and
 
Decisional Procedure phases in order to be assured-that the information
 
sources and the decision capabilities of the assessing mechanism can support
 
a thorough analysis in the-optimum social sub-system proposed.
 
It will be noted that both approaches to adequacy evaluation suggested
 
that the Adequacy of the overall assessment is largely dependent upon the
 
quality of performance of the operations within the Information Selection
 
and Decisional Procedure phases. The following criteria are relevant to
 
measuring the performance of the operations within these two phases:
 
Information Selection Phase 44 
1) Availability and timeliness of data 
2) Economy (cost of obtaining related to value) 
3) Dependability (accuracy, reliability) 
4) Comprehensiveness (contextuality, systematic) 
5) Openness (opportunity for participation) 
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Decisional Procedure Phase 45
 
1) Problem Definition
 
2) Specification of goal-objectives
 
3) Controlling contextual factors--recognition of
 
Demands of participants
 
Resources available
 
Relevant institutional framework/legal process
 
Customary practices
 
Major movements and trends
 
4) Invention of alternative courses of action
 
5) Projection of more probable outcomes for each
 
6) Description/prediction of specific consequences of
 
each alternative
 
7) Evaluation in terms of goal-objectives
 
The foregoing indices are to some extent objectively measurable. There
 
are, of course, other criteria which would be applied in the evaluation of
 
Adequacy of assessment. Judgments will certainly be made on the "quality"
 
of the analysis, as well as on the "operations" of the analysis. The skills
 
of those performing the assessment and'the methodologies used will also be
 
matters for evaluation. Further, as given assessment sub-systems are observed
 
through time, reputations will emerge as to the quality level of performance.
 
One might say with considerable confidence that the problem of Adequacy 
of Assessment presents both a tremendous challenge and opportunity for con­
ceptual and analytical study.
 
Previously, the fragmentation of the Technology Assessment Function was
 
mentioned in connection with the frequently stated need for Total Problem
 
Assessments. This is a fine notion, but the concept should be pursued a bit
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further-. Assuming that "one-shot," Total Problem Assessments are needed
 
(which they are), it is not at all evident that -such efforts are feasible
 
with reference to certain applications at particular times. The assessment
 
system simply may not have all of the necessary sub-systems to produce the
 
essential data, or the data may be available but there exists no mechanism
 
within the assessment system for assembling-and analyzing the full data
 
input. Therefore, the alternative concept of a Total-Problem Assessment
 
Through Time should be considered with outputs of the.various .sub-systems
 
being cranked into the-continuing assessment as feasible. Such continuing
 
approximations to a Total Problem Assessment would be responsive to changing
 
social demands and to new data developed on previously recognized and
 
significant interactions in the Social Sub-System affected by the application.
 
Further, the concept of Total Problem Assessment Through Time provides the
 
means for applying the sharpest possible focus to the selection of the Social
 
Sub-System to be assessed. In other words, it provides an excellent means
 
of testing the Adequacy of an assessment in accord with Adequacy Approach #2
 
described above.
 
The evolution of the assessment function with respect to the Highway/Motor
 
Carrier Social Sub-System may serve as a useful device for illustrating
 
Adequacy Approach #2. We are here concerned with the assessment function-­
not with the merits of the issue. During the last Congress, Senate Bill
 
S.2658 brought to the focus of attention the prospect of Federal establishment
 
of increased maximum sizes and weights of motor carriers operating in the
 
Interstate Highway System. It is clear from the Report of the Senate
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Committee on Public Works that the assessment supporting the favorable'recommen­
dation of the bill was narrowly limited with primary focus on the'physical
 
capacity of highways to accomodate the larger vehicle. Under "Purpose of the
 
Legislation" it is stated:
 
S. 2658 as reported with amendments will facilitate a
 
more efficient and economic use of the Interstate System
 
and insure that the vehicles using that system will not
 
unreasonably and unnecessarily impair its serviceability
 
or durability.
 
In making this recommendation the Committee was supported by the Bureau of
 
the Budget and the Secretary of Transportation. In the letter of the
 
Secretary of DOT to the Chairman of the Senate Committee it was noted that
 
pursuant to the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 the Secretary of Commerce
 
had undertaken to "determine future maximum desirable dimensions and weights
 
for vehicles operating on the Federal-aid highway systems 4 7 and that a report
 
had been made to Congress on August 18, 1964.
 
The Committee Report also stated that "highway safety will not be
 
jeopardized as a result of the proposed maximum allowable sizes and weights." 9
 
In support of this conclusion the Report stated that the "evidence presented . . .
 
with regard to highway safety did not demonstrate a meaningful relationship
 
between the sizes and weights under consideration and the incidence of traffic
 
''5 0
 
accidents.
 
Nevertheless, even though some attention was given to highway safety
 
and even to increased "user charges" in addition to increased maintenance
 
and construction costs, one might view this assessment as inadequate in
 
terms of a Total Problem Approach to assessment. The overall Social Sub-System
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affected in some manner by this proposed legislation was hardly touched
 
in this assessment. Why wasn't the motor carrier size and weight factor
 
considered in a Social Sub-System, as for example:
 
1) A component of a national transportation "systed'(all 
types of carriers for people and products) including 
an assessment of the impact (on participants, values, 
and institutions) of the interaction of the.transporta­
tion sub-system with other major social sub-systems. 
2) A component of'a national freight transportation 
"system" including all modes of carriers with an 
assessment focused primarily on the implications 
for speedy and economical service to all relevant 
distributors and consumers. 
3) A component of the national highway program of primary 
and secondary roads, such sub-system including a 
consideration of the implications of the national high­
way program for all highway transporation activities 
and an analysis of the social, economic, and political 
impacts of such activities on other social sub-systems 
(excluding, for instance, other modes of transportation). 
4) A component of the special 41,000 mile Interstate 
Highway only--otherwise as in 3) above. 
However, in a letter-from the Secretary of Commerce of August 18, 1964,
 
to the Speaker of the House the point was made that such a proposal should
 
be considered as only a phase in a continuing process of progressive imple­
mentation5 1 in adapting vehicular standards. Therefore, it would seem
 
prudent to appraise the assessment function with respect to Highway/Motor
 
Carrier applications in the time dimension of our developing highway program.
 
We might start in 1956 when Congress enacted major Federal highway aid
 
legislation which reflected the request of President Eisenhower for:
 
(A) grand plan for a properly articulated (highway)
 
system that solves the problems of speedy, safe,
 
transcontinental travel--inter-city transportation-­
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access highways--and farm-to-market- movement-­
metropolitan area congrestion--bottlenecks--and parking.52
 
A special Presidential Advisory Committee of which General Lucius Clay was
 
Chairman, had submitted a Report which the President attached to his
 
message to Congress on "A 10-Year National Highway Program." While the
 
President's Message directed attention to the "Nation's highway system"
 
rather than to a social sub-system including all modes of transportation,
 
the Social Sub-System posited by both the Advisory Committee study ahd
 
the Congress clearly showed the intention to include all significant social
 
interactions and effects of this proposed "National highway system."'5 3
 
Analysis of the Congressional Committee Report shows that an extremely
 
wide range of engineering, financial, and social factors was considered.54
 
From our present perspective, however, we would note that some factors were
 
given relatively little consideration and that others were given no attention
 
whatsoever. The Advisory Committee and the Congress seemed to be much more
 
concerned with matters bearing upon the efficient implementation of the
 
highway program rather than with cumulative and qualitative social impacts,
 
particularly those which might be detrimental. One might feel, of course,
 
that the exclusion of other modes of transportation was sufficient to dis­
qualify the assessment supporting this legislation as a Total Problem Assess­
ment. The Clay Report did explicitly state, however, that:
 
This Committee was created to consider the highway
 
network, and other media of transportation do not
 
fall within its province. This relationship between
 
the several modes of transportation is under study
 
by other Government agencies and special committees
 
fully informed of these views.55
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Accepting this-limitation, 'however,it is still to be noted that no considera­
tion was given to increasing environmental pollution which would result from
 
the growing traffic volume: air pollution from exhausts, engine noise,
 
resulting aesthetic debasement, or the derivative health hazards from the
 
foregoing sources. Nor was a great deal of attention given to the relation­
ship between the increased number and size of motor freight carriers and
 
the possible increased hazards to private auto drivers and passengers. Further
 
there were several factors which the Congress could not treat adequately for
 
lack of relevant information.56 In view of these gaps, must one conclude that
 
the assessment was inadequate? A negative conclusion without further analysis
 
is not necessarily warranted. In the 1956 social context of urgent highway
 
transport needs, coupled with the relatively low priority then given to
 
certain social values which now have been drastically upgraded, one might
 
reasonably conclude that Congress posited an extraordinarily broad social
 
sub-system for assessment. But whatever view one might take of the 1956
 
assessment, our primary concern here is with the scope of the assessment that
 
should have been made of the proposed increase in motor carrier size and weight
 
as set forth by Senate Bill S.2658 in the last Congress. One might find it
 
difficult to justify the extremely narrow scope of interaction (Social Sub-

System) considered in connection with S.2658, limited, as noted, primarily to
 
an inquiry of the ability of the highway network to withstand the wear and tear
 
of the larger motor carriers. But if we view this assessment in the sequence
 
of assessments made by Congress between 1956 and 1968$iwe may get a different
 
perspective. Taking the assessment supporting the 1956 National highway
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network legislation as the basic assessment,-the fQllowing legislation is
 
illustrative of Congressional action ( and assessments) during the interim
 
period:
 
Federal Highways, Billboard Regulations (19587
 
Further legislation in 1959; 1961, and 196357
 
Air Pollution from Motor Vehicle Exhaust Fumes (1960)5 
8
 
Clean Air Act (1963)
5 9
 
Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act (1965)60
 
Air Quality Act (1967)61
 
Interstate Compacts on Traffic Safety (1958)62
 
(1962)63
Specifications for Hydraulic Brake Fluids 

(1963)64
Minimum Standards for Seat Belts 

Provision for State Highway Safety Programs (1965)65
 
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (1966)66
 
Highway Safety Act (1966)67
 
Standards for Bridge Inspection (1968)68
 
Highway Beautification Act (1965)
 
Additional legislation in (1968)69
 
Establishment of the Department of Transportation, including
 
the National Transportation Safety Board (1966)70
 
Further action relevant to the National Highway Program includes provision for
 
broader community participation in highway planning.7 1
 
In view of the manner in which Congress has approached the Highway/Motor
 
Carrier issue (and perhaps, must approach the problem, that is, in terms of
 
specific bills), can it be plausibly maintained that Congress has been in
 
effect making an organized Total Assessment on a cumulative, sequential basis?
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Has consideration by Congress of the various aspects of the Highway Program
 
been "programmed" in such manner as to assure the closest possible approxi­
mation to a Total Problem Assessment through a reasonable period of time?
 
To put the matter more explicitlyr Was thereany-need for a broader Social
 
Sub-System to be considered by Congress than the Senate posited in connection
 
with S. 2658? Was it not a wholly adequate supplementary assessment in the
 
context of previous related assessments? After this bill breezed through the
 
Senate, it ran into heavy opposition in the House. The AAA launched a
 
72 
national advertising campaign against House passage. The treatise of
 
Professor John W. Fuller of Washington State University on "Current Issues in
 
the Regulation of Motor Vehicle Sizes and Weights" was inserted in the Con­
gressional Record for the apparent purpose of inviting attention to a much
 
broader scope of social effects, primarily "social costs," than had been given
 
attention by the Senate.73 In short, some people clearly felt that the scope
 
of the Social Sub-System posited by the Senate Report was not sufficiently
 
comprehensive to assess properly the significant social impacts of this pro­
posed legislation. But what should the scope have been in light of the many
 
previous Congressional assessments relating to Highway/Motor Carrier activity?
 
Several questions emerge from this recital of the legislative history of
 
S. 2658 which seem highly relevant to the improvement of the Technology Assess­
ment Function. In continuously developing programs involving substantial
 
scientific and technological applications, how does one determine the Optimum
 
Social Sub-System to posit for examination at a given point in time? To
 
what extent does the Optimum Social Sub-System depend upon the nature of the
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initiating or carrier issue (or proposal such as S. 2658) which invites or
 
compels the positing of the Social Sub-System to be examined? Surely,
 
every time some aspect of Highway/Motor Carrier activity needs attention,
 
it is not feasible nor necessary to conduct a Total Assessment involving
 
the consideration of every conceivable decisional factor and social impact
 
(direct, indirect, immediate, and remote) that might flow from such action.
 
There is hardly a limit to the scope of social impacts that can be investigated.
 
What kind of assistance might be useful to the relevant Congressional Committees
 
in determining the "scope of the social sub-system" to be evaluated prior to
 
action on such a proposal? If the specific bill itself sets the limits of
 
the inquiry, then we in effect beg the question we are supposed to be exploring
 
and thus fail to advance beyond our current level 'of fragmented. unrelated and
 
inadequate assessments. Should Congressional Committees request from the
 
responsible agency or agencies explicit and systematically organized suggestions
 
as to the scope of the social ihteractions that should be explored in connection
 
with specific legislation taking into account previously developed data from
 
assessments from all relevant sources? Is there a continuing and critical
 
question of positing the Optimum Social Sub-System to be examined in a given
 
Congressional Hearing assessment? Or do organized community interest groups
 
in conjunction with comments of relevant Government agencies assure that an
 
adequate scope of social interactions and impacts is considered?
 
Since we have a time dimension to consider and an assessment system
 
composed of a diversity of assessment sub-systems, it would seem that we
 
might accept as one provisional model of the assessment function the notion
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of an.Aggregative Approach to Total Problem Assessments (Total Problem
 
Assessments Through Time). This is roughly what the Congressional model
 
of Assessment amounts to. It will at intevals bring together the various
 
assessment sub-systems to a greater or lesser degree. Whether such periodic
 
efforts do in fact bring together all of the relevant sub-system outputs is,
 
of course, another question. Even if so, there is still the further question
 
of whether the combined outputs are utilized in such a manner as to extract a
 
complete social sub-system assessment as of that time. The final question is
 
whether in many assessment patterns the full matrix of relevant assessment
 
sub-systems, even if properly utilized, add up in their complete contribution
 
to what amounts to a Total Problem Assessment of the applicable technology.
 
Periodic study groups or standing intergovernmental committees or even
 
Congressional subcommittees very seldom assume the responsibility for making
 
a Total Problem Assessment with any degree of thoroughness. Even if this is
 
the objective, limitations on authority, time, information, or other essential
 
resources preclude a wholly satisfactory total problem assessment, including
 
such elements as the scope of the social sub-system that should be treated,
 
what has been done which contributes to the analysis of such a social sub­
system, and what still needs to be done in terms of policy..analysis, project
 
planning (including research and development), and program implementation.
 
Surely we need a more systematic and reliable mode of managing this kind of
 
inquiry.
 
What would seem indispensable to our getting into a position of "confi­
dent control" over such social sub-systems, as for example, that encompassing
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the aircraft noise problem, is an activity which will construct a Compre­
hensive Matrix of the Total Social Sub-System in which the aircraft noise
 
problem is located, and maintain a continuing appraisal of the assessment
 
status of the problem. Such a Matrix Function would necessarily include:
 
1) Identification of the participants (operational and
 
affected) within the Total Social Sub-System.
 
2) Characteristics of the various participants (which are
 
to be considered as Assessment Sub-Systems).
 
3) a) Perspectives (demands, associations, etc.) 
b) Formal authority (if any) 
c) Resources--general 
d) Capabilities having specific application to 
aircraft noise problems 
e) Practices relevant to this problem 
f) Proposed future activities relevant to this problem 
g) Etc. 
3) 	 The relationship of the activities of particular participants
 
to the various components of the Policy Analysis, Project
 
Planning, Program Implementation Continuum, noted in the Air­
craft Noise Contextual Matrix.
 
4) 	 Particularization of:
 
a) Significant controlling conditions and trends in the
 
social'sub-system posited.
 
b) Present and prospective social impact of existing or
 
prospective practices related to the problem context.
 
c) 	 Research and Development done, in progress, or proposed.
 
d) 	 Governmental regulatory measures taken or proposed.
 
e) 	 Alternative means available or in prospect for aircraft
 
noise abatement (whether with reference to source or
 
affected participants and activities).
 
5) 	 Ways in which the total social sub-system posited can be reduced
 
to more limited social sub-systems for purposes of treatment by
 
particular assessment sub-systems.
 
6) 	 Modes of coordinating specific assessment outcomes so that at
 
appropriate intervals the full effort can be combined into the
 
equivalent of an assessment of the Total Sub-System posited.
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.The mechanics of constructing, maintaining, and monitoring the Matrix
 
Function-is open, but clearly all of the new analytical, communications"
 
and managerial concepts, as well as automatic data processing and simulation
 
techniques can and should be utilized. The resultant would be the establish­
ment of means for effectively relating capabilities to needs. The Aircraft
 
Noise Contextual Matrix is a rudimentary representation of what would be
 
involved in this task.
 
It would seem that the OST'Panel Report on "Alleviation of Jet Aircraft
 
Noise Near Airports" 74 reflects one of the closer approximations to the
 
Comprehensive Matrix approach. But even the enlightened effort of the OST
 
Panel should be appraised for its limitations in terms of the Comprehensive
 
Matrix Function. First, the Report represents an ad hoc rather than a
 
continuing effort. Further, while the range of content is remarkable, one
 
is left, nevertheless, with some uneasiness as to whether all of the major
 
significant social interactions and relevant assessment sub-systems were
 
identified and their perspectives, capabilities, practices, and prospective
 
future contributions fully appraised. Perhaps the critical question, for
 
purposes of analyzing the Technology Assessment Function, is why this special
 
ad hoc group had to be set up in the first place. Does the persistent
 
practice of either establishing or recommending the appointment of Special
 
Assessment Sub-Systems (groups, task forces, committees, commissions and
 
so forth) provide most persuasive evidence that a much greater degree of
 
"regularity" needs to be brought into the Technology Assessment Function?
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V. 	 Tentative Suggestions to Strengthen the Technology
 
Assessment Function
 
While recognizing that attempts to give systematic and comprehensive'
 
treatment to the Technology Assessment Function are of" fairly recent origin
 
and that cutrent study projects are yet to report, a few tentative notions
 
are suggested below khich might usefully be given some critical attention.
 
Initially, we can probably agree that several identifiable conditions
 
have 	and continue to contribute to the inadequacy of present assessments:
 
1) 	 Only recent emergence of interest in developing effective
 
appraisal systems for Social System Analysis as contrasted,
 
for example, with economic-market analysis.
 
2) 	 A strong disposition to react to crises rather than to
 
anticipate outcomes and evaluate consequences in terms
 
of alternative schemes of social indicators.
 
3) 	 The fragmentation of Technology Assessment Sub-Systems; the
 
truncation of assessments made and the concomitant lack of
 
management and informational systems for assuring Total
 
Problem Assessments.
 
4) 	 The lack of conceptual thinking on the Technology Assessment
 
Function,.including alternative notions of Adequacy of
 
Assessment, which reflects current deficiencies in the
 
Professionalization of the Function.
 
5) 	 The failure to utilize the resources (methodology,
 
techniques and professional skills) for technology
 
assessment we now possess, including the lack of support
 
for the level of effort required to assure the effectiveness
 
of such utilization.
 
6) An inability to translate intellectual discussions or analytical
 
findings of future detrimental consequences of given technologi­
cal applications into a Public Perception that Problem exists.
 
7) 	 Alarm on the part of some segments of society that undue
 
emphasis on technology assessment will inhibit technological
 
innovation and hence, limit the range of individual opportunities
 
and social progress.
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,-The previous discussion has stressed that the Technology Assessment
 
Function is both pervasive and fragmented. One would hardly expect the
 
situation to be otherwise in our pluralistic society. Furthermore, the
 
magnitude of this function is enormous. This fragmentation reflects many
 
conditions that work against the Total Problem Assessment approach: con­
tinuing specialization of knowledge and skills, highly compartmentalized
 
jurisdictions and authorities, narrow assessment foci, and so forth. Since
 
many of our traditional values are supportive of divisiveness in assessment
 
activities, progress toward the effective management of Total Problem
 
Assessment will require strong and substantial efforts. Emphasis must be
 
given to new professional skills, institutional arrangements, and value
 
re-orientation to some extent.
 
For the general support of a more adequate Technology Assessment
 
Function there is need for strong encouragement of greater professionalism
 
in this activity. Efforts in the universities toward the development of
 
problem-oriented, policy analysis professionals are rather limited. While
 
some progress is being made, the traditional disciplinary boundaries and
 
the surge toward greater and greater specialization makes it exceedingly
 
difficult to introduce a Total Problem Perspective. Concepts of "Systems
 
thinking" and techniques of information and simulation management do,
 
however, provide new and effective means by which those disposed toward
 
problem-oriented approaches can utilize specialized knowledge, for policy
 
analysis. Further, there is clear evidence that an increasing number of
 
young professionals are interested in breaking out of the constrictions of
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a traditional discipline or profession -in order to deal with social problems
 
in a broader context.
 
One of the more critical deficiencies is the lack of a satisfactory
 
information system for dealing with the appraisal of public programs, in­
cluding major projects having significant technological components. There
 
is much in the existing literature bearing on Technology Assessment: court
 
decisions, regulatory agency hearings on rule making and policy positions,
 
special task group reports, studies of the National Academy of Sciences and
 
Engineering, scholarly studies, industry R&D reports, and so forth. But
 
this is not well organized for effective use in terms of the problem approach.
 
It is an extremely time-consuming and inefficient process to bring together
 
relevant and important work that has been produced in the past. Many signifi­
cant reports of special commissions and committees established to assess a
 
techno-social problem context are almost impossible to obtain.
 
The materials could be set out in various ways: digests of case studies,
 
reports of relevant entities, Congressional hearings, Agency appraisals, etc.
 
But the emphasis must be placed on a problem approach rather than a rule
 
approach as in the legal references. In other words, the organization should
 
emphasize Alternative thinking rather than Rule-Deductive thinking. We must
 
have materials which will enable us to compare and contrast problem definitions,
 
social goals, descriptions of existing conditions, influential trends,
 
available resources, alternative means of achieving objectives, and the
 
predicted impact of alternative means on various schemes of social values.
 
The establishment of such an information management system would be a major
 
130
 
step forward in a systematic approach to technology assessment. It should
 
be designed both to support systematic inquiry into techno-social problems
 
and to utilize fully the concepts and analytical tools of the new technology
 
such as systems analysis, automatic data processing, and advanced techniques
 
of simulation.
 
Other conditions will require some modification. Economic Market
 
Assessments are no longer suitable for many technological projects. It is
 
therefore essential that forums and decisional arenas be provided wherein
 
the full range of social values can be expressed and alternative courses of
 
action judged on the basis of the fullest information and analyses it is
 
possible to obtain. So long as the predicted consequences of technological
 
applications differ among the "experts," as will surely be the case, and so
 
long as value priorities differ among various segments of the community,
 
there will obviously be differences of opinion as to the feasibility and
 
:desirability of technological applications. Whether early warning should
 
be made of possible beneficial or adverse effects will be debatable with
 
reference to many applications. Provision should be made for a vigorous
 
"adversary process" in the broadest and most legitimate sense. Confrontation
 
should be expected in providing alternative views of social objectives,
 
problem definition, existing conditions, influential trends, courses of
 
action, and the probable consequences flowing from each such course. The
 
"open forum" approach is the means of soliciting the broadest community
 
participation and assuring that the full assessment resources of the nation
 
are drawn upon.
 
131
 
There is need to assure a continuous upgrading of the performance of
 
technology assessment systems, to see that new systems or sub-systems are
 
initiated when necessary to cope with new or projected technological
 
applications, to see that useless duplication is eliminated where feasible,
 
and to see that distorted and irrelevant outputs of sub-systems are noted
 
and dismissed. In this task, criticism of poor performance and persuasion
 
to improve performance will probably be a better technique than any type of
 
formal control.
 
A highly fragmented Assessment Function, however, has the inherent
 
characteristic of rendering it extremely difficult to assure that the
 
essential data and analyses are available at appropriate times, periodically
 
or through socially permissable time spans, for a Total Problem Assessment
 
or an Optimum Assessment (which may not be a Total) of a given technological
 
application. Hence, a coordinating or programming function is needed which
 
is lacking in many techno-social problem contexts today. Reference to the
 
Aircraft Noise Contextual Matrix should demonstrate the difficulties in
 
making a Total Problem Assessment even with respect to this relatively low
 
priority social problem (as compared to other National Problem areas). No
 
entity now has the authority (in view of Federal-State-Local-Private divisions
 
of power and responsibility in this problem context) to assure a Total
 
Problem Assessment. .Congress has been reluctant to intrude into traditional
 
areas of State powers as is vividly illustrated by the treatment of aircraft
 
noise and the various problems associated with the continuing development
 
of Highway/Motor Carrier technology. Hence, a Total Problem Assessment
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requires persuasion and appeals to mutual interest in order to obtain the
 
essential cooperation and support from state and local government ent-ities
 
as well as private sector organizations in the task of assembling all
 
relevant information.
 
Pursuant to this point there may be a need for Interim Organizing
 
Mechanisms where it is not clear which existing agency has the ultimate
 
responsibility for the initial assessments of a developing technological
 
application. In this way Congress would have better means than it now has
 
for securing the best assessment feasible at any given time.
 
One matter which must be given attention is the relationship between
 
technology assessment and the follow-on decision process. The two are inextric­
ably related. Most technology assessment sub-systems are decisions. Technol­
ogy assessment (looking at alternative ways of applying technologies to
 
determine what the impacts will be in terms of social goals) is a part of
 
every consideration of a new technological program unless the decision process
 
is totally lacking in rationality. Our basic interest is in assuring adequate
 
assessments upon which the socio-political decision can be made. It is
 
therefore important that all public and private entities (assessment sub­
systems) and all segments of society affected by the probable action partici­
pate in the decision process. With certain exceptions, as with some Presidential
 
Commissions having a broad charter to inquire into a given problem, Congressional
 
Committee hearings now provide the most satisfactory forum for approximating
 
a Total Problem Assessment. Usually, though not always, most of the govern­
mental, industry, and community entities having relevance to the problem either
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as direct data input assessment sub-systems or as a segment of the affected
 
public have an opportunity to participate. The contribution of such
 
participants is normally, by virtue of the nature of the Technology Assess­
ment Function, truncated and directed to a special aspect of the problem
 
context. Special interests of one kind or another are advanced as should
 
be expected. Even the particular Committee may be a promoter of certain
 
types of technological projects. Assuming, however, that the outcome in
 
deciding what action to take is based upon the resultant of the conflicting
 
views advanced, one must ask whether this procedure provides for a fully
 
adequate assessment. We have noted that the assessment system for any
 
particular technological application is made up of sub-systems, each with
 
differing objectives, resources, capabilities, and projects, and can supply
 
only a partial assessment of the total problem.- Since so many of the techno­
social problems with which we must deal today are extremely broad in their
 
social reaches, is it not absolutely essential that we recognize an addi­
tional dimension in the concept of an adequate assessment?
 
Congress, as has been noted, is at the apex of the Technology Assessment
 
Function. Congress is, in general, less constricted in its capability to
 
approximate a Total Problem Assessment than is the Judiciary, the Executive,
 
the Regulatory Agencies, private assessment entities, the economic market,
 
or even ad hoc commissions established for the explicit purpose of making a
 
total assessment. Congress has the ability to extract or compel almost a
 
full spectrum of informational inputs, despite such occasional obstacles as
 
Executive Privilege. In this connection, it has persuasive powers beyond
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strict Constitutional authority. It is the ultimate authorizing, funding,
 
and oversight branch, a fact hardly necessary to mention. Congress translates
 
assessments into action-projects and programs. But the question remains as
 
to whether information and analysis of the comprehensiveness and reliability
 
needed for a Total Problem Assessment of many techno-social problems is now
 
available. It seems doubtful.
 
Perhaps through greater effort to systematize the continuing oversight
 
of the adequacy of assessment systems Congress could improve the quality of
 
the data it receives and acts upon. Congress could probably obtain additional
 
assistance from the Executive and Regulatory Agencies if it demanded more
 
comprehensive submissions of data, including the range of interactions and
 
social impacts that should be examined in connection with any new proposal.
 
At the least, response to this demand would be interesting. But in fairness,
 
it would be necessary to provide many agencies with resources for policy
 
analysis they do not now possess. Even so, while improved in-house assess­
ments might be helpful, there would seem to be an imperative need for a
 
separate structure of assessment mechanisms and processes (assessment sub­
systems) which would directly support the Total Problem Assessment approach.
 
This notion has been referred to above as adding a new dimension to the
 
"public interest," one independent of any special, partisan interest. 
The
 
assumption made is that there may be a "public interest" that, in some
 
instances, will be something more or different than the resultant of the
 
usual partisan interest conflict. At least this is an assumption which
 
might be explored. Some assessment sub-systems now make a significant
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contribution of this nature, as for example the Science Policy Research
 
Division, Legislative Reference Service, of the Library of Congress.
 
But again, the technology assessment function in this country is
 
vast and complex. It seems unlikely that one monolithic evaluator, however
 
well supported, can do the job. Such an arrangement would obviously have
 
many other disadvantages. One might think of a structure of several entities,
 
or Assessment Centers, possibly but not necessarily being associated with
 
other community institutions. Wherever located or however financed, they
 
would have several common and indispensable characteristics: They would­
be independent, devoted to the Enlightenment Processr-not Power. Thei
 
fltimate responsibility would be to the Public, even though their assessments
 
might be utilized primarily by legislative bodies, particularly the Congress.
 
With respect to those patterns of techno-social problems each might undertake
 
to assess, the approach would be in terms of Total Problem Assessments. They
 
would also monitor and appraise the adequacy of relevant assessment systems.
 
They would develop the data banks essential to this task. They would be
 
neutral forums for soliciting the fullest range of relevant views in the
 
selected problem areas. They would report fully on the basis of assessments
 
made in terms of information sources, assumptions made, and identifiable
 
decisional components so that such assessments could be critically and systemat­
ically compared with other-assessments. They would not be merely an "on
 
call" activity, subject to any and every agency's demand for an instant
 
response to-a request. A basic purpose of such an institutional arrangement
 
would be, however, to anticipate emerging problem areas so that useful assess­
ment information could be supplied in a timely and orderly fashion.
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Clearly, there would be some difficult problems relative to the opera­
tional procedures. What would be the ground rules for obtaining essential
 
material if classified by a government agency? What procedures might be
 
developed to obtain relevant information from resisting private sources?
 
What information might be relevant but (for reason of other strong social
 
purposes iuch as encouragement of economic competition) not available to
 
such entities? Who would support such Centers? Would it not be in the
 
public interest for Congress to do so even at the risk of occasional
 
embarrassment to particular Committees or to other agencies of government?
 
But support should probably be diversified if possible. In any event, it
 
will be necessary that substantial support be supplied to perform the job
 
properly. This must be a Continuing function. Further, a long learning
 
curve is to be expected ahd it will take time to organize the resources and
 
engage the quality of professionals who can cope with this type of task and
 
who are dedicated to the importance of the function.
 
But Congress cannot perform the entire technology assessment function
 
alone. What Congress does need is.the competent, comprehensive, and
 
continuously current assessment data upon which it can confidently take
 
action with reference to programs involving particular technological applica­
tions. The suggested structure, or a similar one, might very well provide
 
the means by which the Congress can be confident that it is continuously
 
aware of the status of the many dimensions of the Technology Assessment Function
 
A group of Assessment Centeis stressing the Total Problem Approach to
 
assessment would provide the type of support essential both to the needs of
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Congress and to the general public- The Assessment-Centers would assume the
 
major burden for data collection and organizational analysis relieving Congress
 
of the necessity of having to resort to limited staff resources for this
 
purpose. Instead of having to rely upon the relatively haphazard procedure
 
of picking up bits and pieces of hopefully relevant assessment information
 
on particular applications, or at best, having to rely upon the partial
 
assessments of a fragmented assessment system, the Congress would have an
 
orderly way of keeping informed on all significant techno-social problem
 
contexts, existing and emerging. The loci for Total Problem Assessment would
 
be fixed. While the various Centers would cover somewhat different areas of
 
the Technology Assessment Function, Congress would know which one was giving
 
attention to what Assessment System (meaning to which technological applications-­
existing and prospective).
 
Such.Centers could not only provide timely and reliable inputs into the
 
final Congressional assessments but would be continuously sensitive to signals
 
of impending or prospective severe detrimental impacts of technological
 
applications. The Assessment Centers would contribute to continuity of the
 
assessment function with reference to particular techno-social problem con­
texts. With such continuity should come a higher degree of reliability, less
 
waste in terms of duplication of effort, and a higher level of confidence in
 
the assessments made. The adequacy of performance of the assessment systems
 
for the more significant technological applications would be appraised,
 
including pointing out deficiencies in the assessment sub-systems--whether a
 
lack of assessment mechanisms or weaknesses in the evaluative processes of
 
138
 
such assessment mechanisms. The Centers could identify the necessary outputs
 
needed from various assessment sub-systems before a Total Problem Assessment
 
would be feasible. They could bring to the attention of Congress the need
 
for timely consideration of given applications instead of leaving such
 
assessment efforts to chance, or to the challenge of one or more influential
 
participants, or to the necessity of confronting "crises" where technology
 
has "run wild," or to mere routine statutory or customary responsibility for
 
oversight. The Centers could further indicate the scope of the social-sub­
system that could optimally be considered--range of relevant social interactionE
 
and effects. Or, in instances of prospective technological applications where
 
a regularized assessment system does not exist, the Centers could recommend
 
either the establishment of a new entity or an ad hoc commission as an initial
 
approach to a Total Problem Assessment.
 
In any event, there is no escaping the need for the foregoing assess­
ment tasks if the Congress is indeed concerned about the adequacy of the
 
National Technology Assessment Function. It appears highly unlikely that
 
we shall ever gain confident control over technological development and
 
technological applications until vie have provided the means by which the
 
closest possible approximations to Total Problem Assessments can be made.
 
But this will remain an elusive goal unless certain entities are given the
 
responsibility for Total Problem Assessments (including formal authority
 
insofar as essential to the assessment function) and the resources necessary
 
to adequately perform this enormous task of assessment information management.
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VI. Concluding Remarks
 
The diversity of approaches that may be taken to the analysis of the
 
Technology Assessment Function and the multiplicity of alternative arrange­
ments which may be devised for the management of this Function suggest the
 
need for some further clarification of the assumptions upon whih the
 
suggestions of Part V rest. The Total Problem concept of technology assess­
ment is the approach herein adopted. This concept involves a Comprehensive
 
Information Management activity having an "objective" orientation to the
 
assessment function. It would not assume a prosecutorial, partisan stance,
 
one primarily concerned with seeking out adverse impacts of technological
 
applications. On the contrary, the Total Problem approach to technology
 
assessment would be concerned with monitoring the performance of technology
 
assessment'systems relevant to each of the major Techno-Social problem areas,
 
recommending Optimum Social Sub-systems for interim assessments, identifying
 
opportunities for the application of technology to the solution of social
 
problems and seeking out and publicizing existing or prospective detrimental
 
impacts, especially in those problem contexts where such information is
 
unlikely to come to the attention of relevant users or other affected members
 
of the public through normal information channels. The stance of such an
 
activity would be neutral. Its information management functions would be
 
comprehensive. An assumption is made here, which is certainly open to debate
 
and testing, namely, that even "shocking misapplications" of technology can
 
more readily and reliably be identified and avoided through continuing moni­
toring of all significant techno-social problem areas than by a "hunch-sampling"
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technique. In time, however, systematic selective sampling may be an adequate
 
substitute for the Total Problem Approach both with respect to identifying
 
opportunities for the effective application of new technologies to social
 
problems as well as identifying probable detrimental impacts of new
 
applications.
 
One basic purpose of this paper has been to examine certain notions
 
such as Fragmentation of Assessment 'Systems, the Total Problem Assessment
 
Approach, Optimum Social Sub-System for examination in particular assessments,
 
and Adequacy of assessments. A second basic purpose has been to pose two
 
critical and interrelated questions: 1) What is the magnitude of the Technology
 
Assessment Function? and 2).What is the level of support required for the
 
effective performance of this function? It has not been the purpose of this
 
paper to propose a final organizational structure for the execution of the
 
function. Hopefully, feasible alternative structures will follow from an
 
inquiry into the two questions posed above. In this connection, the Assess­
ment Centers described are primarily intended to suggest the level of effort
 
and the quality of performance that would be required to maintain Total Problem
 
Assessments of all major Techno-Social Problem areas rather than to reflect a
 
hard and fast proposal for an organizational structure that could accomplish
 
the overall assessment task.
 
It follows from the comments in the preceding paragraph that it was not
 
the purpose of this paper to give attention to the complex of questions that
 
arise in designing a mechanism or combination of mechanisms that might be
 
employed in establishing the linkage between the assessment function (informa­
141 
tion management) and the official decision function--the C6ngressional
 
political arena. This problem involves many intricate dimensions which are
 
now being considered by other study groups.
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28See Mayo, "The New Technology and National Goals: Some Implications
 
for Legal-Policy Decision-Making," 37 Notre Dame Lawyer, 33, 42 (1961)
 
29The Marine Resources and Engineering Development Act of 1966, Public
 
Law 89-454.
 
30U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee
 
on Science, Research and Development, "Technology Assessment," Statement of
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ist Session, at 14.
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331lustrative of this point is the following extract from the Report by
 
the Jet Aircraft Noise Panel of OST:
 
In recent years an industry-wide organization, the National
 
Aircraft Noise Abatement Council, has been engaged in develop­
ing a broad program of studies and research aimed at reduction
 
of jet aircraft noise. However, a major difficulty in develop­
ing practical approaches has been inhibition of initiative by
 
any one of the several groups involved because of conflicting
 
economic and other interests. For example, it is difficult
 
for engine manufacturers to initiate costly engine modifications
 
because airline operators claim they cannot afford to pay for
 
them; for economic reasons, some airline operators insist on
 
maximizing the payload to be carried with a specific engine/air­
frame combination in spite of resulting take-off noise levels
 
objectionable to communities near the airports; some local
 
governments in communities bordering on airports are not willing
 
to accept the economic consequences of zoning constraints or the
 
exercise of eminent domain and argue that aircraft noise rather
 
be reduced by improving engines, off-loading aircraft and
 
steeper take-offs and landings; and many affected residents
 
object to being uprooted, and having to give up long-time
 
personal and community associations.
 
(Report of the Jet Aircraft Noise Panel, Office of
 
Science and Technology (March 1966) entitled "Allevi­
ation of Jet Aircraft Noise Near Airports" at 4.
 
34See James D. Hill, "Liability for Aircraft Noise--The Aftermath of
 
Cuasby and Griggs," 19 Miami Law Review, 1, 15 (1964).
 
351d. at 15-20.
 
361d. at 20-22.
 
37Report No. 1353 to accompany H.R. 3400 at 2. 90th Congress, 2nd Session.
 
38DOT/FAA Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Docket No. 9337, Notice No.'
 
69-1, "Noise Standards: Aircraft Type Certification," of January 3, 1969, at 2.
 
39Section of the FCST Report entitled: "Objective of the Task Force."
 
40Report No. 1353, supra note 36, at 2.
 
41 See discussion of the concept of "technological fix" in Weinberg,
 
"Social Problems and National Socio-Technical Institutes," in Applied Science
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and Technological Progress 415 (1967) (Report to the Committee on Science
 
and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, by the National Academy of
 
Sciences).
 
4 2Science, January 24, 1969, at 359.
 
431bid.
 
44jones, "Systems Approaches to Multi-Variable Socioeconomic Problems:
 
An Appraisal" at 23-24 (Staff Discussion Paper, Program of Policy Studies
 
in Science and Technology, The George Washington University, 1968).
 
45Mayo and Jones, "Legal-Policy Decision Process: Alternative Thinking
 
and the Predictive Function," 33 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 320, 349-351 (1964).
 
46Report of the Committee on Public Works, U.S. Senate, of March 27,
 
1968, entitled, "Vehicular Weights and Dimensions," to accompany S. 2658,
 
at 1. (Hereinafter referred to as Report No. 1026).
 
4 7Report No. 1026, supra note 44, 
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Dimensions and Weights of Vehicles Operated on the Federal Aid Systems," of
 
August 19, 1964.
 
To solve the serious problems developed by the analysis of
 
the available but incomplete data in the report, a policy
 
of utilizing progressive steps to implement any findings'
 
with regard to vehicle standards has been adopted. It is
 
contingent on the continued support by the Federal and
 
State governments of existing levels of funding. This
 
policy of progressive implementation provides an adequate
 
interim solution for States; an upgrading of standards
 
after a reasonable period on the basis of present knowledge;
 
and a program for developing a further improved approach to
 
this increasingly complex problem. (Italics added.) Id. at 17.
 
52Presidential Advisory Committee Report, "A Ten Year National Highway
 
Program," at 1, attached to the Message of the President, "National Highway
 
Program," of February 22, 1955. Referred to the Committee on Public Works,
 
84th Congress, ist Session, House Document No. 93.
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of 1956, House Report No. 2022, April 21, 1956. Committed to the Committee
 
of the Whole House on the State of the Union.
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72The American Automobile Association launched a full page ad attack
 
on the bill which exibited a cartoon of a trucking "road hog" with the
 
caption: "Mr. Congressman: Will you let the trucking lobby run over 104
 
million motorists?" See Washington Evening Star, July 15, 1968, back page.
 
7 3Vol. 114, No. 124, July 18, 1968, at E. 6622.
 
74See note 32, supra.
 
75Nor should any one agency necessarily have the formal authority as
 
contrasted with having the essential resources and the responsibility for
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Discussion of THE MANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
 
Dr. Mayo opened the discussion with a review of some of the more
 
important points in his paper. The technology assessment function, he
 
held, can be thought of as lying between two extremes. In the first, the
 
assessment process is viewed as "highly selective, restrictive, investi­
gatory approach" which focuses on trying to uncover the serious adverse
 
effects or potential benefits of particular technological applications.
 
In the other, the assessment function involves
 
.. taking a comprehensive information management approach
 
to technology assessment which would attempt to do some
 
initial appraising and.. .continuing monitoring of all of
 
the major techno-social problem areas in society.
 
Although there "...clearly are any number of alternative ways in which
 
one might go about treating technology assessment," Dr. Mayo chose to
 
start from the broad base indicated in the second extreme mentioned
 
above.
 
Dr. Mayo made a brief reference to the isolation of various study
 
efforts directed toward the understanding of the assessment process when
 
he noted the need he had found to include some definitions of the terminology
 
used in the paper. "It seemed to me," he commented, "that a bit of
 
standardization of certain components of the technology assessment function
 
is helpful in trying to analyze these problems." 
He then introduced the notion of the total problem approach to 
technology assessment. This involves looking at a technological applica­
tion with the intent of examining all of the significant impacts of that
 
application on society. Such an approach was contrasted to the system of
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truncated or partial assessments which characterize current attempts at
 
the appraisal of technology. Truncated assessments occur because of
 
various factors including the limited authority of most bodies engaged
 
in the assessment process, limited capability, and scarcity of resources.
 
Dr. Mayo noted that
 
...it is very infrequently.. .that we have a situation of
 
a total problem assessment being made. We do not have
 
entities in our technology assessment structure which have
 
the responsibility, formal or voluntarily assumed, for
 
total problem assessment.
 
The paper discussed one example of this lack of overall responsibility:
 
The aircraft noise problem. The example of congressional consideration
 
of truck size and weight regulationdemonstrated another failing of the
 
assessment process, the lack of any central information centers which
 
are capable of providing Congress with the kind of information necessary
 
to discern a broad range of social impacts of a given technology. This
 
in Dr. Mayo's view is a glaring deficiency but one which can hopefully be
 
remedied:
 
There is a possibility that even if it is not feasible to
 
do any substantial reorganization of the government (and)
 
even with the fragmentation of authority for programs...,
 
the information base upon which these programs operate and
 
upon which decisions are made.. .can be coordinated in
 
some way.
 
He suggested the need for new kinds of mechanisms in support of Congress
 
to provide an effective information base. To this end he proposed a
 
number of assessment centers with the capability to take a total problem
 
approach to technology assessment.
 
The Need for A New Organization
 
An agency representative was concerned that the paper might be
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attacking the wrong problem in attempting to find a way to introduce a
 
broad,total problem approach:
 
I'm not sure that the question is most fruitfully
 
formulated in terms of whether there is any place
 
that Congress can go to get information. I suspect
 
that.. .if one combines the Legislative Reference
 
Service and the resources available through NAS,
 
NAE, and the National Research Council that there
 
is structurally no dearth of places that Congress can
 
go to get specific answers to well formulated
 
questions ....
 
Congress' problem, in his view, is the lack of any "coherent focus for
 
all of the diverse pressures that exist" so that the correct questions
 
can be asked in a timely way. The need, then, is for an improvement in
 
the ways that Congress formulates the questions that must be answered
 
for effective assessment.
 
It was noted by a professor that it is often difficult to separate
 
the group asking a question from the kind of answer which is received.
 
He claimed that under the current system the "...group that asks the question
 
knows pretty well in advance what the answer will be." He felt that
 
somehow "...the group that answers the questions must be divorced from the
 
group that asks the questions" and decides who will answer them. (A
 
dissenter, a Congressional staff member, interjected, "Then nobody will
 
pay any attention to the answer.")
 
A Legislative Reference Service researcher agreed that the problem
 
of framing questions is a crucial one but he noted that one needs some
 
basis to ask a good question and to screen frivolous and inconsequential
 
concerns. Some information, perhaps even some research in advance of the
 
emergence of an assessment problem, is thus necessary to allow the Congress
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to understand the issues involved and investigate all of the important
 
aspects of a problem.
 
An industry representative, however, was not happy with the proposal
 
to establish technology assessment centers:
 
When I read about a suggestion of creating a new body
 
of any sort to add to the multiplicity of bodies we
 
already have, I tend to throw up my hands. We have
 
more than enough already.
 
A Congressional aide agreed that the concept of a new body or bodies
 
was not workable. He saw any such body as merely another power base
 
and claimed that Congress would never be willing to support another
 
political power base. Another participant took issue with this view.
 
He contended that Congressional interest and support would depend only
 
upon "...how high on the list of society's worries" technology assessment
 
comes. In his view it is quite likely that Congress will soon recognize
 
the magnitude of the task it must perform in this very rapidly changing
 
world and will "someday begin to array itself with supporting institutions
 
with quite diverse characteristics."
 
A Congressional aide pointed out that the problem of securing
 
scientific advice for Congress is not a new one. Various proposals for
 
obtaining such advice have been brought before Congress, particularly in
 
the late 1950's and early 1960's. The issue was resolved at that time
 
through the creation of the Science Policy Research Division (SPRD) of
 
the Legislative Reference Service. The speaker was careful to point out
 
that such a location was chosen for the new body because of the control
 
which Congress could have over the work done by the Division. "Congress
 
pays the salaries," he noted, "but they (the IRS) have absolutely immutable
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ground rules.. .as to how they operate." Another participant didn't
 
feel that the SPRD represented an adequate solution of the problem.
 
He believed that the staff of twenty-five was not sufficient to handle
 
the job of providing scientific information to Congress. The National
 
Academy of Sciences was suggested as a possible source of information;
 
it has the advantage of being able to draw on a "broad and deep body of
 
expertise." But a professor questioned the effectiveness of the NAS ad
 
an assessment mechanism because "...the Academy has no continuity, or very
 
little, in given areas." An industry representative, however, found the
 
lack of continuity "...a plus because I would hate to have the same guys
 
passing judgement on everything."
 
While expressing agreement with the broad thesis of the paper,
 
another participant commented that he '..•would not quite be prepared
 
to come down strongly on the point that ... total problem assessments
 
don't occur under the present system." He cited flouridation and nuclear
 
testing in the atmosphere as two examples of problems which were assessed
 
on the issues involved. An agency representative noted,however, "...that
 
one might take the two examples mentioned and make something of a classic
 
case study of the inadequacy of the existing assessment method." The two
 
cases demonstrate the typical problem of assessments carried out by
 
agencies which are committed to the advancement of given technologies, in
 
these cases the Public Health Service and the Atomic Energy Commission.
 
He conceded that
 
..in neither case can one say that the system was wholly
 
a disaster but I think that in both cases it is fairly
 
clear that a more objective kind of assessment might have
 
been obtained if there were a more neutral source of
 
funds and of evaluation.
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To this, the first speaker replied that he had not meant to convey the
 
impression that technology assessment is in good shape in government but
 
only to indicate that he thought that, on occasion, something approaching
 
a total impact assessment is attained. He added that he is "...in favor of
 
creating more effective and organized and focused machinery to serve
 
society" in the appraisal of the consequences of technology.
 
The Role of Ad-Hoc Studies
 
Dr. Mayo asked the group to consider the current method of commissioning
 
ad-hoc studies when assessment needs arise. He mentioned the recent
 
establishment of commissions to study the effects of DDT and SST and
 
asked what the purpose of such action is:
 
Why hasn't somebody been in a position to have gathered
 
(the information)...so that we would have the data right
 
now on what we know and what we do not know.... Is there
 
no place that you can go to find the accumulated information
 
that gives you all the data on the prospective impacts...?
 
Several participants did not seem as concerned with the commission
 
method of assessment and pointed out advantages that can accrue from ad-hoc
 
assessments. An agency representative pointed out that new assessments
 
are necessary after a change in administration because previous "...alleged
 
fact-finding studies were affected---by judgements of people who no longer
 
hold responsibility." In disagreement with at least one other seminar
 
attendant, he held that these reviews of the facts and conclusions of
 
prior studies are not diversionary or stalling tactics but are the results
 
of a new administration taking its responsibility seriously. A professor
 
believed that repetitive assessments were necessitated by the nature of
 
the information available. He found no fault in a system which examines
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"exactly the same problem over and over again in terms of new criteria,
 
and new data that are available." The "continuing process of re-evaluating
 
the same problems.. .probably is desirable." He thus took issue with the
 
implication that if we only had a way to gather all of the information our
 
assessment problems would be solved. Varying criteria and new,ways of
 
looking at old information necessarily make assessment a continuing process.
 
One speaker, an industry representative, went so far as to suggest
 
that the commission mechanism be the principal method of assessment:
 
I would propose that each question, as it comes up,
 
should be approached by an ad-hoc collection of
 
specialists with knowledge relevant to what the
 
problem is.
 
In this way the problem of aircraft noise, for example, would be examined
 
by different people from those who study the DDT problem.
 
Public Participation
 
The discussion turned to the recurrent topic of the role of the public
 
in the assessment process. An agency official noted that the paper did
 
not clearly indicate to whom the assessment centers were to report, Congress
 
or the public. It was suggested that any assessment mechanism could report
 
to the public while at the same time its findings could be useful to the
 
Congress. The agency representative stressed the important role which the
 
public must play. Congressional interest in assessment problems, he
 
noted, is not without public impetus. He was thus concerned with the
 
emphasis on Congress as the focal point of technology assessment; the
 
public impetus for Congressional action, unles it is fostered, could
 
conceivable die away. A brief discussion of the role of magazines such
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as Environment followed; the importance of such a public information
 
service was agreed to by most of those present.
 
The Problem of Bias
 
A Congressional aide raised another thorny point which recurred
 
throughout this series of seminars. He was concerned with the neutral
 
or objective role which was proposed for the assessment centers mentioned
 
in the prepared paper:
 
How would your (Dr. Mayo's) system bring out the negative
 
effects unless the centers were, in fact, to adopt other
 
than a weighing or neutral stance as you imply?
 
The resources of the proponents of most technologies enable them to
 
marshal large numbers of -facts whereas "those who are opposed generally
 
are in a weaker position." The speaker thought that only through the
 
establishment of some kind of advocate for the public interest could the
 
assessment system make certain that all aspects of a technological applica­
tion would be surfaced. Dr. Mayo commented that this proposal did not
 
preclude the establishment of such an ombudsman or advocate; that role
 
may in fact be necessary but it is only one step toward the implementa­
tion of a total problem approach to assessment. Another participant
 
emphasized the need for more than one approach to the problem:
 
I think the problems of technology assessment, social
 
-responsibility, and social accountability have to be
 
exercised in a multiple context with all the limita­
tions that go with it. You cannot lean on any one
 
crutch.... (What is needed is) a variety of efforts
 
and energies directed toward a multiplicity of critical
 
points of power, and hopefully when the need is there
 
they -ill converge to produce an outcome that affects
 
the quality of society.
 
A Legislative Reference Service representative noted that it is
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crucial to recognize that technology assessment has two levels, one of
 
which is connected with a technical problem and another which is in­
volved in political matters. These must be separated in order to obtain
 
effective assessments. In particular, the technical problem must be
 
solved before the issue is thrown into the "political hopper." He claimed
 
that this separation is really an easy one to perform if only the princi­
pals involved would put their minds to it. This point brought disagreement
 
from several participants. Everyone present agreed with the desire to
 
separate facts from value judgements but a university researcher noted
 
"...in order to ascertain the technical situation you have to make many
 
assumptions which are colored by political points of view" so that the
 
suggested separation may, in fact, be impossible. An agency official
 
agreed; one cannot always determine the technical facts before the political
 
process begins to operate because the answers to technical problems often
 
come late. The separation of technical and political is impossible since
 
often "to generate support for needed research you need political muscle."
 
Conclusion
 
During the discussion period an agency official sounded a warning
 
that can serve as a conclusion to this discussion and to the series of
 
seminars in general. He noted that
 
...the range of possibilities in conducting a scientific
 
investigation is almost infinite and that a scientific
 
investigation is never conducted in a vacuum but is
 
always guided by some kind of conjecture.
 
In technology assessments, the conjecture concerns the possible conse­
quences of a new or existing technology. One must be wary of such
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conjecture, the speaker warned,-because almost always 
... the problems people worry about at any given time 
turn out in retrospect, ...not to have been the problems 
they should have been worrying about. 
It should be the intent of those who study technology assessment to 
attempt to find ways of anticipating the correct and important problems 
which accompany the use of technology. Only then can decision-makers 
begin to devise policies which will maximize the beneficial impacts of
 
technology while minimizing the detrimental consequences.
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EDITOR'S COMMENT
 
One conclusion that can be drawn from this seminar series is that there
 
is no one solution to the problem of finding adequate means of evaluating
 
the effects of technological advance upon our society. No single proposal
 
can close all of the gaps in the existing system. Information management
 
centers, "negative" assessment boards, the Legislative Reference Service,
 
and ad hoc commissions all solve parts of an existing problem but none, alone,
 
can yield a truly adequate overall assessment. As several of the partici­
pants noted, what is needed is experimentation with a multiplicity of
 
mechanisms that together can approach something like the total problem
 
assessment discussed by Dr. Mayo in the final paper of the series.
 
Much of the study of technology assessment has been directed toward
 
the development of a Congressional capacity to adequately appraise the con­
sequences of technological applications. Although there was clearly a consensus
 
among the seminar participants that Congress needs some help in this area,
 
it became quite clear in the discussions that many people are unwilling to
 
accept Congress as the focal point of technology assessment to the exclusion
 
of other sectors of society. There was, for example, great interest through­
out the series of discussions in the role of the public in the assessment
 
process. The views expressed ranged widely, from those of some who believed
 
that, in a democracy, all that is necessary to protect the public interest
 
is a fully-informed general public to those of others who thought that the
 
understanding of technological progress is beyond the ability of the lay
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*public and that meaningful decisions can be made only by scientific experts.
 
The place of public participation has perhaps been neglected in most analyses
 
of technology assessment. If this series of discussions provided no clear
 
indication of the public's role, it at least raised some questions which
 
should be answered. Can technological progress be explained to the public?
 
What measures can be taken by interested laymen to make their point of view
 
known in the face of the great amount of data and resources accumulated by
 
vested interests? Can the public interest be stimulated by the impacts of
 
any but the most pervasive and hazardous technological applications? How
 
can ,atrue public interest affect the decision-making centers of government?
 
Who can fund and who wilt listen to advocates for the public interest? Mere
 
statements that the public should play a part in the assessment process do
 
not suffice; it is necessary to examine how the public can have an impact
 
upon policy decisions which affect the public welfare. The questions raised
 
are difficult without doubt but they have been neglected for too long.
 
Not all technologies pose the same sorts of assessment problems. As
 
was noted several times in the discussions private and government-sponsored
 
technologies must be approached differently. The seminar participants were
 
by no means in agreement as to which was the more critical problem. Some
 
contended that government-sponsored developments, particularly large-scale,
 
highly accelerated programs, pose problems of scale and timing while operat­
ing independently of the market system which provides a check on private
 
technological applications. But others noted that the market mechanism has
 
failed in such cases as the manufacture of non-degradable detergents or
 
pollution-producing automobiles (with the accompanying failure to produce an
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alternative to the internal combustion engine) and expressed concern with the
 
difficulty of finding ways to assure that private enterprise does not lead to
 
widespread social and environmental problems. In an age when technological
 
developments from any source can potentially cause irreversible changes in
 
our way of life, it would seem that no single aspect can be neglected in the
 
complacent belief that solutions to potential problems already exist or can
 
readily be found.
 
There is an additional point which was implicit throughout much of the
 
seminar series but which was never fully developed. "Technology assessment"
 
has been gaining a reputation as an essentially negative endeavor. In the
 
view of the editor and of many of the participants, this is unfortunate. It
 
would seem that technology, if wisely applied, has the potential to solve
 
more problems than it will create and to provide mankind with a fuller and
 
richer life, free from the struggle for subsistence which has characterized
 
earlier generations. But it cannot be denied that many new technologies
 
carry with them dangers, often unforseen, which may threaten the very exist­
ence of civilization. If men are swinging from a view that technology is
 
infallibly good to one which looks warily upon potential detrimental effects,
 
this is perhaps because the missed opportunities resulting from a failure to
 
apply a particular technology are not as clearly visible as the environmental
 
degradation which results from the unchecked progress of other technologies.
 
It must be recognized that consideration of only the potential benefits of
 
technology can lead to irreparable harm. But at the same time, it must also
 
be noted that emphasis on only the potential risks of technology can lead to
 
technological stagnation with a concomitant loss of opportunity for the
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improvement of man's way of life. To be worthwhile, technology assessment
 
must have a dual goal. It should seek to identify the ways in which tech­
nology may be utilized to fulfill the needs and desires of man while it seeks
 
to minimize or eliminate the dangers and harmful impacts of technological
 
application.
 
